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3 Abstract 
This research report is an exploratory statistical analysis of the Norwegian Maritime 
Authority’s (NMA) incident database, with the objective of exploring possible Risk Influencing 
Factors (RIFs) in Norwegian maritime traffic for the National Ship Risk Model project. I use data 
on vessel accident reported from 1981 through 2014 on groundings, collisions, allisions and 
fires/explosions. Capsizings are also included in part 1 of the analysis. The analysis divides 
vessels into 12 categories.  
The analysis consists of two main parts. The first part is a descriptive analysis where I 
describe common traits of accidents. 
Fires and explosions are most common on small fishing vessels in outer coastal waters in 
the Northern regions.  They usually happen in good weather. A notable proportion of fires and 
explosions happen while the vessel is in dock. 
Groundings are most common among cargo vessels, however small fishing vessels in 
coastal fishing are also notable. Narrow coastal waters are typical, as is the northernmost region of 
the coastline. Groundings are most common in the dark and at night, while the ship is underway. 
Capsizings typically involve smaller fishing and cargo vessels in outer coastal waters. The 
northernmost region of the coastline is once again notable for capsizings. Capsizings are 
characterized by strong winds, and more frequent in moderate and high seas than other types of 
accidents.  
Collisions are most common among fishing vessels and break bulk vessels. They are most 
frequent in outer coastal waters, but narrow coastal waters and harbour areas also feature notably 
in collisions. Once again, the northernmost coastal region reports most collisions. Collisions tend 
to happen in good weather conditions. 
Allisions are most common among medium sized passenger vessels, in particular ferries. 
They tend to feature vessels certified for trafficking protected waters. Half of all allisions are 
reported in narrow coastal waters, which in practice usually means striking the quay. Most 
allisions happen in the two regions between Lindesnes and Trondheim. They tend to happen in 
good weather, but a larger proportion happens in in strong winds compared to other accidents. 
The second part of the analysis is an advanced statistical analysis. I perform a multinomic 
regression on accidents, and compare the relative influence on vessel types and qualities, 
geographical qualities and weather qualities in an integrated model. In addition, I perform 
multinomic analyses of certification, operational states and time variation. I perform logistic 
regressions on damage severity, injuries and fatalities using variables from the integrated model. 
In addition, I predict conditional probabilities for results from these analyses. 
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The main results are as follows. For vessel types, I find significant but modest differences 
in accident qualities for ferries, passenger/cruise vessels, high speed craft, work & service vessels 
and break bulk vessels. Foreign vessels are more likely to experience groundings than other 
accidents. Higher gross tonnages are associated with decreased probabilities of groundings. 
Accidents vary substantially between waters. Groundings are most likely in narrow coastal 
waters, collisions most likely in outer coastal waters, and allisions most likely in port areas. 
Fires/explosions are more probable along quay than in other waters. 
Weather has a limited effect on accident probabilities. Collisions are ten times more likely 
under conditions of no visibility. 
Variations in time were modest. Groundings are more likely by night than by day, and 
collisions less likely. Vessels certified for coastal fishing had the highest probability of 
fires/explosions. Allisions appear more likely on arrival of port than on departure. 
Vessel damage severity was primarily associated with vessel length. The shorter the vessel, 
the higher the odds of severe damage, particularly in allisions. I were not able to explain much of 
the variation on injuries and fatalities. High seas increase the risk of injury substantially in 
fires/explosions, whereas high speed craft have around five times higher probability of injuries 
than large fishing vessels. Groundings in short vessels increase the probability of fatalities by over 
30 times. 
I propose the following main risk influencing factors. 
For fires/explosions, fishing vessels appear at high risk. Large gross tonnages increase risk 
of fires, as well as longer vessels. The risk of fires is high at the quayside, while weather appears 
to be little influential. 
For groundings, cargo vessels (work and service vessels in particular) appear at higher risk. 
Vessels of low gross tonnage and longer length appear at higher risk. Narrow coastal waters 
increase the relative risk of groundings substantially. 
For collisions, small break bulk vessels appear at higher risk. Travelling in no visibility 
increases the relative risk of a collision considerably. Outer coastal waters increases the risk of a 
collision considerably. 
For allisions, high speed craft of medium gross tonnage and longer lengths appear at higher 
risk of allisions. Allisions are closely tied to the harbour area. 
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4 Introduction 
This research report is an exploratory statistical analysis of the Norwegian Maritime 
Authority’s (NMA) incident database, with the objective of identifying Risk Influencing 
Factors (RIFs) in Norwegian maritime traffic. The following chapter gives a brief description 
of the National Ship Risk Model project, the objectives of the second work package in the 
project, and an overview of the contents of this report. 
4.1 The «National ship risk model» project 
The National Ship Risk Model (NSRM) is a joint research project with the ultimate 
objective of developing a risk model for traffic in Norwegian waters. The research group 
consists of Studio Apertura at NTNU Social Research, Safetec Nordic AS and NTNU. The 
project is funded by the Norwegian Maritime Authority, the Norwegian Coastal 
Administration and the Norwegian Research Council (NTNU Social Research 2014). 
The NSRM will be used to better monitor and communicate the risk picture of maritime 
activities in Norwegian waters. It will be used by the NMA to monitor changes in the risk 
picture, prioritize inspection activities (risk based inspections), and support decisions 
regarding development of regulations and safety improving measures. Furthermore, the risk 
model will be used as a tool by the NCA to improve the quality of their risk analysis 
preceding major interventions and modifications of fairways and ports, as well as in the daily 
risk assessments performed by the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) Centres.  It will also be used 
in the decision processes related to the pre-deployment of the governmental tugboat 
contingency service as well as oil spill response measures. 
4.2 Goals of Work Package 3. 
The objective of this work package is to generate knowledge regarding causes and 
conditional factors associated with different types of marine accidents. This knowledge will 
be generated by conducting statistical exploratory analysis of accident data. The data will be 
analysed by using explorative methods of logistic and multinomic regression analysis. The 
dependent variables will be accident types and accident qualities such as damage severity, 
injuries and fatalities. Parameters for the independent variables in the explorative analysis will 
be qualities of vessels, geography and weather. The results of these analyses will improve the 
knowledge regarding causes of marine accidents. The conceptualization of RIFs is based on 
the assumption that the risk (in terms of a quantitative measure) can be controlled by 
changing/managing/controlling the Risk influencing factors. The identification of RIFs will 
9 
 
be used as input in work package 5 (the development of risk models).The deliverables of this 
work package are: 
a) Research report presenting findings  
b) One publication in scientific journal 
4.3 Layout of the report. 
The report is laid out as follows: Chapter 5 deals with some theoretical perspectives on 
risk influencing factors in maritime accidents. Chapter 6 describes the data in the NMA 
database and the operationalization of these data for the present analysis.  
Chapter 7 and 8 together form part 1 of the analysis, and focuses on common traits in 
accidents. Chapter 7 presents descriptive statistics focusing on traits within accidents. Chapter 
8 summarizes the descriptive statistics in the form of common traits of each accident type.  
Chapters 9 and 10 form part 2 of the analysis, where accident traits are compared 
between accidents in advanced statistical models. (Take note that this is not directly 
compatible with the descriptive statistics presented in chapter 7, so a separate set of 
descriptive statistics is found in the appendix, chapter 13.) Chapter 9 presents the logistic and 
multinomic regression techniques applied in the analysis, with examples from the current 
dataset. Chapter 10 presents the statistical models. The analysis is laid out in the following 
way: First, I test the vessel, geographical and weather qualities in individual models in 
chapters 10.1-10.2. The significant variables from each model are then put together in an 
integrated model, which is the main item of interest in this report. Results from this model are 
presented in chapters 10.3-10.7. 
Additionally, a few separate analyses are presented on additional qualities of accidents. 
These include separate analyses of time variables, operational states vessel damage severity. 
This is covered in chapters 10.8-10.10. Variables from the integrated model are also applied 
on two analyses of factors influencing injuries and fatalities in vessel accidents. This is found 
in chapters 10.11-10.13.  
Chapter 11 brings an integrated discussion on risk influencing factors in vessel 
accidents. 
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5 Theoretical perspectives 
The term “risk influencing factor” (RIF) is derived from Bayesian network analysis, and 
means any factor that affects an undesired event (Rausand & Utne 2011:187). The undesired 
events here are the accidents. A particular challenge in analysing data from an accident 
database is that we do not have access to non-accidents. For example, it may well be that most 
groundings take place in broad daylight under good weather conditions. What we cannot tell 
without access to regular traffic data is whether these conditions are substantially different 
between accidents and non-accidents. The NSRM research project plans to analyse regular 
traffic data retrieved from the AIS system. The findings from this report will be used as input 
into that analysis. 
The present analysis uses accident data from 1981 forward, and I have not been able to 
retrieve regular traffic data for this period. The main reason for using data from back to 1981 
is that it yields more statistical power. I work under the assumption that risk influencing 
factors have a partly static nature. For example, I assume that the effects of strong winds and 
high seas have not changed substantially since 1981. Any findings from the analysis therefore 
present an average of effects since the inception of the database. 
Another challenge in the present analysis is that the accident database mainly quantifies 
technical data, such as vessel quality, geography and weather conditions. The database does 
contain some qualitative data on events surrounding the accident, but this analysis limits itself 
to the quantitative data that is readily available in the dataset. I can assume that these data 
only cover a limited range of causes of accidents. 
At the current stage, I have not been able to retrieve normalized maritime traffic data. 
This analysis therefore limits itself to analysing only the accident data. It follows that there 
are serious limitations to the potential generalization of the findings. This has two major 
implications. First, a large part of the report will therefore be descriptive in nature, and aim to 
summarize the most common traits of maritime accidents. Second, as a consequence of not 
having access to information on non-accidents, the analysis will instead be forced to compare 
different traits of accidents. 
As for the first part, it is our view that knowing the most common traits of accidents is 
useful in for example prioritizing inspections based on risk. Following a section of descriptive 
statistics, I will therefore devote a section to summarizing the most common traits for each 
type of accident. This is not a statistical analysis per se, but rather a qualitative description of 
singular traits of accidents. 
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As for the second part, it poses somewhat of a challenge, as accidents are not directly 
comparable. For example, it is impossible to know whether a decrease in accidents is due to a 
decrease in traffic, or a true decrease due to improved security measures. What we can do, 
however, is compare the relative influence of parameters against accident types. To achieve 
this, I will apply the technique of multinomic regression, which allows us to compare all 
different types of accidents against each other in a single model. We can, for example, 
investigate whether there are significant differences in vessel qualities between for example 
groundings and collisions. Or we can see whether strong winds or high seas are significantly 
different between types of accidents, while simultaneously comparing vessel types and 
different types of waters. This is presented in the section on regression analysis. First, there 
will be a multinomic regression comparing different accident types according to vessel, 
geographical and weather qualities. Then, there will be separate analyses for a smaller number 
of items. Accident severity, injuries and fatalities will be analysed using a combination of 
logistic and multinomic regression. Logistic regression will for example be used to compare 
fatal accidents against non-fatal ones. 
Following each statistical analysis, there will be a presentation of the most important 
results. In Chapter 11, there will be a discussion on the most important findings. 
The NSRM research group proposed the use of correspondence analysis in internal 
research project documents. I demonstrate this technique in the appendix, chapter 14.6, but it 
was judged not to be suitable for further use in this statistical analysis. 
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5.1 Risk models 
As this is an exploratory statistical analysis, the purpose of the analysis is on 
contributing to building a risk model. I have taken inspiration from Balmat et al. (2011) in 
selecting items for analysis, see figure 5.1.1 below. 
 
Figure 5.1.1: Maritime risk assessment architecture (from Balmat et al. 2011). 
 
Adapting this architecture posed a challenge. I had to select items on the basis of 
availability. The technical nature of the database tells quite a lot about what Balmat refers to 
as static risk factors. I did not have data on ship history. Data on hull material was available, 
but only for a small number of cases. In terms of meteorological risk factors, I did not have 
access to data on weather forecasts. For the third risk factor, speed evolution and shipping 
lanes, I had some data on waters that was analogous. 
I opted for a slightly different architecture, based on the available data. 
First, there was a lot of data available on vessel qualities. This includes information on 
vessel type, nationality, technical information such as length and gross tonnage, and 
regulatory information such as vessel register. 
Second, there was data available on geographical qualities such as the location and the 
type of waters of the accident. 
Third, there was data available on weather qualities such as sea state, wind force, 
visibility and lighting. 
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Additionally, I looked at time qualities of the accidents such as year, seasons and hours. 
Finally I identified two complex variables for separate analysis: certification and operational 
state. Details on these items are found in chapter 6. 
The database also contains information on some additional accident qualities regarding 
the consequences of accidents. I selected damage severity of the vessels, as well as injuries 
and fatalities as items for further study. I consider this useful information in building a risk 
model. 
An overview of the issues covered in this report are summarized in figure 5.1.2 below. 
 
Figure 5.1.2: Potential risk influencing factors in maritime accidents, with consequences. 
5.2 Research questions 
On the basis of the preceding discussion, the research questions can be summarized as:  
1. How do vessel qualities, geographical and weather data affect the relative risk 
of maritime accidents? 
2. How does time, certification and operational state influence the relative risk of 
maritime accidents? 
3. What factors contribute to severity of vessel damage, injuries and fatalities in 
maritime accidents? 
Question 1 is covered in chapters 10.1-10.7, question 2 is covered in 10.8-10.10, and 
question 3 is covered in 10.11-10.13. I now proceed to describing the data and its 
operationalization.  
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6 The NMA incident database. 
In the following chapter, I will briefly describe the history of the database, accident 
types and other qualities of accidents, as well as a qualitative description of the variables used 
in the analysis. Every variable is operationalized for use in this study at the end of each 
description.  
6.1 History of the database. 
The following is a brief outline of the history of the database, largely based on internal 
documentation supplied by the NMA. The database was created in 1981, under the acronym 
DAMA (Norwegian: “Databank til sikring av maritime operasjoner”, English “Databank for 
securing maritime operations”) (our translation). The criterion for inclusion was that the 
incident was under investigation by the NMA inspectors. The original database contained 
vessel incidents and serious personnel accidents, such as fatalities. By 1986, the NMA 
required any accident-related injury to be reported. In 1986, the NIS ship register was 
initiated, after massive relocation of nationally registered ships. In 1989, a separate database 
for personnel accidents was created. In 2006, the NMA itself was reorganized and relocated 
from Oslo to Haugesund. In 2008, the term work accident was redefined as any incident that 
results in injury during shipping operation. Additionally, all incident reporting was gathered 
on a single form, instead of using multiple forms for different types of events. In 2012, the 
Norwegian Maritime Code was updated to correspond with EU directive 2009/18. In 2013, all 
registering of accidents was reorganized to be done by a single unit. 
Consequences for the analysis. 
In terms of the current analysis, the main focus herein lies on the vessel accidents. None 
of the changes in regulation and reporting through the years appear to have fundamentally 
changed the reporting of accidents such as groundings, collisions and fires/explosions. As 
such, the entire database appears to be valid for analysis. In terms of personnel accidents, we 
limit ourselves to personnel accidents co-occurring with vessel accidents. The main difference 
here appears to be the change in 1986 from reporting only serious accidents to any accident. 
The fact that reporting, and personnel accident reporting in particular, has been organized in 
different ways through the years might also have an effect.  
Another fundamental change is the introduction of the NIS register in 1986. However, 
in the context of the current analysis, this change might not affect the analysis much, as the 
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NIS ships are not licensed to carry cargo or passengers between Norwegian harbours, or be in 
regular traffic between Norwegian and international ports (Lovdata 1987). 
The statistical analysis will therefore be an analysis of average effects of risk 
influencing factors from 1981 until 2014. 
6.2 Validity of the data 
6.2.1 Reporting of maritime accidents. 
The present analysis rests on the assumption that the database is trustworthy. Still, there 
are several possible sources of error in reporting. The first and perhaps most crucial issue is 
whether all relevant accidents are in fact reported to the NMA. This is covered in the section 
on reliability. Second, there is also the issue of whether all relevant information is actually 
reported. At present, the NMA uses a publicly available form for reporting incidents and 
registering them. There have been several changes in regulation regimes through the years. 
For example, the NIS regime was not instituted until 1987. Some historical comparisons are 
thus limited.  
Another type of related reporting issue is very relevant here, as it goes towards the 
severity of accidents. Presently, for example, the NMA requires all collisions to be reported, 
regardless of damage. There is plausible reason to believe that this might not always be 
adhered to, as there may little to be gained for captain, crew or shipping companies in 
reporting accidents. In fact, reporting may have undesirable effects, as it costs time, money 
and possibly reputation. 
Thirdly, some of the reporting relies on a qualitative assessment on the part of the 
reportee, as well as the NMA caseworker. For example, the criteria for assessing an accident 
as “severe” or “less severe” might be open to interpretation, and might also change over time. 
6.2.2 Reliability of vessel accident data 
Research on the accountability of accident databases in general, and road and aviation 
databases in particular, suggests that accidents in general are substantially underreported 
(Psarros et al. 2010). With regards to maritime accident databases, Psarros et al. focused on 
the tanker vessel segment in the years 1997-2007, comparing data from the same NMA 
database as the present study with data from Lloyd’s Register FairPlay (LRFP). Their study 
suggests that only around 30% of all fires and explosions in this segment were actually 
reported. 
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The present study limits itself to accidents in Norwegian waters. A relevant question in 
this case is whether there are substantial differences in the reporting between Norwegian 
vessels and international vessels. Nævestad et al. (2014) suggest that even for serious 
accidents, there is a possibility that international ships might report the accident to their 
national maritime authorities and not to the NMA. At present, there is no open international 
database of accidents, which makes true reporting of maritime accidents even harder to 
calculate. 
Concluding, then, it is safe to assume that the NMA database does not report all 
accidents in Norwegian waters, and that the degree of underreporting might be larger for non-
Norwegian ships. It is generally assumed that less severe accidents are more under-reported 
than severe ones, although there is not strong empirical proof for such a claim. 
6.3 Accident types.  
Incidents vs accidents: The database is formally called an incident database. In this 
context, the term refers to any event that is reported to the NMA, fulfilling the criteria at the 
time of the event. The events are either accidents, described below, or near accidents/misses, 
described in Chapter 6.4.2. 
The database contains information on various types of accidents. At an overall level, the 
database distinguishes between personnel accidents and vessel accidents. The majority of 
accidents are personnel only, numbering in excess of 20.000 events where one or more 
persons were injured or killed. The second overall category is vessel accidents, which are the 
accidents analysed herein. The database contains around 9500 such events in total. However, 
personnel injuries and fatalities are reported for vessel accidents as well. 
Within the category of vessel accidents, the database distinguishes between 12 different 
accident types. They are, in order of frequencies: groundings, collisions, fires and explosions, 
allisions, other accidents, environmental damage and pollution, leakage, capsizing, weather 
damage, stability failure without capsizing, vessel missing and machine breakdown. 
I have selected the four most common types of accidents for inclusion in the analysis. In 
addition, capsizings have been included in the section on common traits in accidents, due to 
the severe nature of this accident type. Capsizings were too small for inclusion in the 
advanced statistical analysis, however.  
The database itself does not contain a qualitative description of accident types. 
However, the NMA has published guidelines for incident reporting (Sjøfartsdirektoratet 
2013), which can be summarised as follows: 
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Grounding: Any incident where the vessel touches ground. This is in line with Jin et 
al’s (2001) definition: “vessel is in contact with the sea bottom or a bottom obstacle, struck 
object on the sea floor, or struck or touched the bottom”. Note that the NMA does not require 
the occurrence of damage to report groundings (Sjøfartsdirektoratet 2013). 
Collision: A collision, as strictly defined by the NMA, is any incident of two (or more) 
vessels striking each other on the water surface, independent of the amount of damage. It is 
noteworthy that any such incident is reported as two separate cases in the database, as the 
database uses the ship as the primary unit of analysis (Sjøfartsdirektoratet 2014a). Note that 
unlike Jin et al. (2001), the NMA categorizes incidents involving only one vessel as a separate 
category, see allisions below. 
Fires and explosions: The incident itself is self-explanatory. I consider the event as it is 
recorded in the database, without regard to whether the fire itself is a consequence of some 
other event, in contrast with Jin et al. (2001), who define fire and/or explosion as the initiating 
event reported. 
Allisions: Strictly defined, an allision (Norwegian: kontaktskade) is the striking of a 
stationary object, other than another vessel. The database only reports allisions for incidents 
causing damage to the vessel or stationary object (Sjøfartsdirektoratet 2013). Thus, the 
separation between collisions and allisions are not only quantitative, but also qualitative. 
Capsizing is when a boat or ship is turned on its side or it is upside down. 
There have been numerous changes in the reporting scheme since the database’s 
inception in 1981. However, it appears that the classification of vessel accident types has been 
consistent throughout. 
6.4 Other qualities of accidents 
6.4.1 Accident severity 
The main part of this analysis deals with accident types as dependent variables. In 
addition, as pointed out in the introduction, accident severity is applied here as a measure of 
risk.  Around three fourths of the database contains information on accident severity, 
measured by the degree of damage to the ship. The categories are, in assumed order of 
severity: Total shipwrecking/sinking, total shipwreck/no sinking, severe damage, less severe 
damage and no damage. The notion that shipwrecking with sinking is more severe than 
shipwrecking without sinking is debatable. I therefore split severity in two groups. Less 
severe accidents include the original categories less severe damage and no damage. All the 
other types are included in the more severe accidents. 
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As pointed out in the next chapter, there are other qualities of accidents that can be seen 
as measures of severity. These include near accidents, as well as the number of deaths and 
injuries associated with the accident. I cover these in the next sections. 
6.4.2 Near accidents, injuries and fatalities 
Near accidents (Near misses) are unplanned events that did not result in injury, illness, 
or damage. The NMA uses the criteria of danger of life, major material damage or serious 
pollution (Sjøfartsdirektoratet, n.d.). In the context of this study, a near accident could be used 
as a measure of severity, and be used to identify risk influencing factors. However, data on 
near accidents were not found to be sufficient for statistical analysis. 
Injuries. The database contains an item on vessel accidents involving personnel 
injuries. As for fatalities, the database lists the number of injuries per incident. Thus, the 
larger amount of incidents is limited to single person injuries, whereas the most severe 
accident reported 75 injuries. As with severity and fatalities, I have chosen to divide injuries 
into two categories for the analysis: Accidents with no injuries, and accidents with one or 
more injury. 
Fatalities or missing personnel. The database contains a shared variable for vessel 
accidents involving fatalities or missing persons. It is important to note that the database does 
not list these events individually. Rather, it reports the number of fatalities for each incident. 
Thus, the larger amount of cases involves a single fatality, whereas the largest number of 
fatalities for a single incident is 20. In the context of this study, this could be seen as a 
measure of the severity of an accident. To simplify, in this analysis I have opted to split the 
analysis in two groups: accidents with no dead or missing personnel, and accidents with one 
or more fatalities or missing persons. 
6.5 Vessel groups in the database 
The database categorizes vessels in five general groups, they will henceforth be referred 
to as “vessel groups”. It is important to differentiate this from the term “vessel types”, which 
refers to more specific subcategories of vessels within each group, and is covered in the next 
section. In order of frequencies, the groups are cargo, fishing, passenger and recreational 
vessels and finally, what is referred to as “mobile offshore units”.  The current analysis limits 
itself to cargo, fishing and passenger vessels, as the number of incidents for the last two types 
is extremely small in comparison, and thus does not meet statistical requirements for 
inclusion. 
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Vessel groups in the database are based on the SOLAS agreement, “International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea”, as maintained by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) (IMO 2015b). 
Definitions: 
A cargo vessel is a ship whose primary function is to carry cargo. The IMO (2015b) 
does not define this term precisely, but refers to specific types of cargo ships instead, such as 
bulk carriers and oil tankers. Thus, this category can be seen to be the broadest type of 
category in the dataset. The database contains many sub-categories of cargo vessels, which 
will be reviewed in the next section. 
A fishing vessel is a vessel that is used in commercial fishing. Regulations divide these 
vessels into three subtypes according to length: 6 – 10.67 m, 10.67-15 m and more than 15 m 
(Sjøfartsdirektoratet 2014b).  
A passenger vessel is usually defined as a merchant ship whose primary function is to 
carry passengers. The database does not define the category specifically. The NMA defines 
this as a ship that can carry more than 12 passenger or which needs a public permit to carry 
passengers (NMA 2012). 
6.6 Vessel types in the database. 
Vessel type is a complex categorization. In the database, vessel type is identified using a 
two or three character code, for example 1B, which is the code for an oil tanker. The first code 
is a number from 0 to 9 identifying a main type of vessel, where the second character is a 
number referring to a sub group of vessel types, sometimes adding a third character in the 
form of a number, referring to a subgroup of the subgroup. The database contains around 130 
vessel types in total. There is a big challenge in reducing this number to a manageable and 
meaningful number of vessel types. The complete list of vessel codes is listed in the appendix 
in Norwegian. I provide a provisional translation of the cargo vessel types. 
The most important distinction is the first number. An overview of the 10 main types is 
given in table 6.6 below. 
  
20 
 
 
Code Vessel type 
Type 0 A broad category of tankers, including chlorine and gas tankers. 
Type 1 Tankers, ranging from oil to water and chemicals. 
Type 2 2A: Break Bulk/Bulk/Container 
 2B: Tank/Ore 
Type 3 Bulk ships 
Type 4 Break bulk 
Type 5 Passenger ships and ferries 
Type 6 Fishing and other sea catching vessels. 
Type 7 Specialty ships 
Type 8 Expedition vessels 
Type 9 Various ships 
Table 6.6: Vessel types in the database 
 
6.7 Vessel categories in the present analysis. 
 
Based on work by the NSRM research group (Safetec 2014), I propose a risk structure for vessel types 
as follows: 
6.7.1 Fishing vessels 
Fishing vessels were split into two categories above and below 15 meters of length, as 
current regulations mainly differentiate between these two sizes (NMA 2013). 
6.7.2 Passenger vessels 
Five categories as described below, based on codes in the accident database, given in 
parentheses. 
Passenger vessel type 1: Inland ferries. This category includes two types of car ferries 
(5C and 5C1) and ro-ro passenger ferries (5C2), with the assumption that inland ferries are 
below 8000 GT. 
Passenger vessel type 2: International car ferries. This category includes the same 
ferries as type 1, with the assumption that ferries in international traffic are above 8000 GT. 
Note: The two preceding categories had to be collapsed into one group for statistical reasons. 
This is noted under the analysis section. 
Passenger vessel type 3: Passenger/cruiseships. This includes the general category of 
passenger ships and ferries (code 5), various subtypes of passenger ships (5B, 5B1, 5B2), 
combined passenger/break bulk (general) cargo ships (5F) and indeterminate passenger 
vessels and ferries (5G). 
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Passenger vessel type 4: High-speed craft. This includes hovercraft (5H), 
catamarans/trimarans/hydrofoils (5I), general catamarans (5I1), passenger catamarans (5I4) 
and catamarans with combined passenger and break bulk cargo (5I5). 
Passenger vessel type 5: Other passenger vessels. This category includes other small 
passenger/ferry/medical/shuttle vessels (5K), vessels with limited passenger carriage, 
medical/shuttle vessels (5K2), railway vessels (5D), 
hotel/lodging/hospital/missionary/exposition vessels (5E) and governmental passenger and 
patrol vessels. 
6.7.3 Cargo vessels 
Cargo vessels are the most diverse category. The NSRM research group has divided the 
vessels into 6 subtypes (Safetec 2014). I briefly summarize the qualities of the vessel types 
here. A full listing of all the separate vessel types is given in the appendix. 
Bulk vessels carry cargo in bulk, meaning commodity cargo that is transported 
unpackaged in large quantities. The most common type of bulk vessel in the database is 
“common bulk” (3B), but cement (3F) and sand (3G) are also fairly common types of bulk. 
All the bulk ships included here belong to code 2 and 3 in the accident database vessel type 
categorization. 
Break Bulk Cargo Vessels (general cargo, Norwegian: godsfartøy) carry goods that 
must be loaded individually. All the vessels in this category correspond to the NMA code 4. 
The most common types registered are “general cargo” and “pallet cargo”.  
Offshore service vessels are ships specially designed to supply and serve offshore oil 
platforms. They correspond to codes 7D, 7D1 and 7D2 in the database. Work processes differ 
substantially from other bulk vessels, and regulations involve additional authorities, such as 
the Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway. 
Tanker vessels are merchant vessels designed to transport liquids or gases in bulk. This 
includes most of the vessels coded 0 or 1 in the database, with oil (1B) and chemicals (1D) 
being the most common types. 
Well boats are live fish carriers, derived exclusively from code 3H in the database. 
Work processes differ substantially from other bulk vessels, and regulations involve 
additional authorities, such as the Norwegian Food Safety Authority.  
Work and service vessels are a diverse group of vessels that operationally have little in 
common with the other cargo categories. The most common types recorded in the database 
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are tugboats and rescue ships (7A), research and supervision ships (7C) and pilot boats and 
fire rescue ships (7F). 
Vessels which did not satisfy these criteria were excluded from the analysis. This meant 
that a few very small vessel types such as training ships were excluded from the analysis. 
6.8 Vessel properties 
In addition to the vessel types listed in chapter 6.7, I investigated some further vessel 
properties, detailed below. 
Nationalities. The analysis divides nationalities into three groups based on the Paris 
MOU (2014a) port state control, which classifies ships on how they meet international safety, 
security and environmental standards, and whether crew members have adequate living and 
working conditions. The “White List” represents quality flags with a consistently low 
detention record, flags with an average performance are shown on the “Grey List”, and the 
“Black List” shows flags with a poor performance that are considered high or very high risk 
(Paris MOU 2014b).  Individual countries are listed in the descriptive statistics. 
Ship registers: The database contains a record of the two Norwegian ship registers, 
NOR and NIS. As a main rule, inclusion in either the regular Norwegian register (NOR) or 
the Norwegian International Register (NIS) is mandatory for ships longer than 15 meters, 
independent of use (Sjøfartsdirektoratet 2014c). Some ships may be voluntarily registered in 
NOR, if they are at least 7 meters, or are used for commercial purposes. NIS was founded in 
1987, with the main purpose of ensuring that Norwegian ships were registered under 
Norwegian flags, to improve the competitivity of Norwegian ships in international shipping, 
and to maintain the employment of Norwegian seamen. Ships in NIS are under Norwegian 
jurisdiction. 
NIS was not introduced until 1987, which means that there is some skew to the analysis. 
The parameters for NIS vessels are average parameters for the period 1987-2014, as opposed 
to NOR vessels, where the parameters are average parameters for the entire period. 
Class: A classification society is a non-governmental organization that establishes and 
maintains technical standards for the construction and operation of ships and offshore 
structures. The largest known classification society for vessels in the database is DNV, which 
as of 2013 merged with another major society, Germanischer Lloyd. I have retained DNV as a 
separate category in the database. Other known classification societies made up a separate 
category, which includes American Bureau of Shipping, Bureau Veritas, Germanischer Lloyd 
and Lloyd's Register. Other, unknown and unclassified vessels made up the last category. 
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Cargo. Around three fourths of the records contain information on cargo. Cargo in this 
context does not exclusively mean commercial cargo on merchant ships. Fish catches on 
fishing vessels and ballast is also recorded, as are passengers on all types of ships. These 
categories are also some of the most common types of cargo registered in the database.  
The present analysis divides cargo into nine categories: Ballast, fish, passengers, 
dry/bulk/container, bulk/ore/grain/coal, oil/chemicals/gas, other known, empty and finally 
unknown cargo. (Take note that although the database lists “other known”, it does not actually 
say actually what this known cargo is.) 
Gross tonnage (GT) (Norwegian: bruttotonn) is a measure related to a ship's overall 
internal volume. Gross tonnage is calculated based on "the moulded volume of all enclosed 
spaces of the ship" and is used to determine things such as a ship's manning regulations, 
safety rules, registration fees, and port dues. The measure was introduced in the International 
Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, which came into force in 1982 (IMO n.d. a). 
The general rule for Norwegian ships is that ships of at least 15 meters should be measured 
according to GT (Lovdata 2009). The database records a continuous measure of GT, which 
includes around 90% of all incidents. Additionally, the database breaks GT down into three 
categories, below 500, between 500 and 3000, and above 3000. The reasoning behind these 
groupings appears to be the application of different safety regulations. For example, one 
regulation requires AIS to be fitted aboard all cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards 
not engaged on international voyages, and all passenger ships irrespective of size (IMO n.d. 
b). Another example is that there are different requirements in training according to these size 
limitations. 
Thus, gross tonnage contributes to differences in risk based both on differences in 
physical properties in ships, and differences in regulation. For example, a smaller ship would 
respond differently to weather conditions such as high seas than a larger ship, all other things 
kept equal. In terms of regulation, the question is whether the increased degree of training 
required to steer a larger ship accurately reflects the increased degree of risk associated with 
increased size. 
The present analysis divides gross tonnage into three categories: below 500, between 
500 and 3000, above 3000 and finally unknown GT. 
Length. The database records the length of the ship according to the same criteria as 
gross tonnage (Lovdata 2009). Thus, there is both a continuous measure in meters, as well as 
a grouping of ships shorter than 10.67 m, between 10.67 and 15m, 15 to 24 m, and longer 
than 24 m. Length is also associated with how GT is measured, as the formulas for GT differ 
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with the length of the ship. The 10.67 limit applies to fishing vessels as described above, 
while 15 m is the lower limit required for measurement of GT. Almost all records contain 
information on length. 
The present analysis divides length into five groups: vessels shorter than 10.67 m, 
between 10.67-15, between 15-24, above 24m and finally of unknown length. 
Vessel age. The database records the year of build for around nine tenths of all ships. 
This information is used to calculate age of ship at the time of accident by subtracting the year 
of build from the year of the accident. 
The statistical analysis divides year of build into five categories: 0-5, 6-15, 16-25, 25 
and older and finally unknown age. 
Operational state. The database contains information on operational state, meaning the 
stage at which the accident happened. There are no less than 17 categories originally. The five 
largest categories are underway, on arrival at port, along the quay, during fishing and on 
departure port. These categories by themselves imply that docking is an inherently risky 
activity. Due to the complexity of the category, a separate analysis was performed on this 
variable. 
The statistical analysis breaks operational stage into 7 categories: the five given above, 
in addition to other known and unknown operational stage. The “other known” category 
consists of numerically very small categories such as in drilling position, in storage, anchored, 
on dynamic positioning, in security state, in towage, on installation and at buoy.  
6.9 Geographical properties 
The database records all known maritime accidents in Norwegian waters. This includes 
actual or potential spills in the territorial waters of Svalbard, Jan Mayen, and in the 
Norwegian economic zone. Thus, incidents involving both Norwegian and international ships 
are found in the database. Additionally, the database contains incidents of Norwegian vessels 
in non-Norwegian waters. This analysis limits the selection to all incidents in Norwegian 
waters, as defined by the Norwegian Map Authority (Kartverket 2014). To our knowledge, 
the territory covered in the database has not changed since its inception. For practical 
purposes, it is noteworthy that the grand majority of incidents happen near the Norwegian 
coastline, more on this in in the next section, and in the section on waters. 
Longitude and latitude: The database contains positional data for around 80% of the 
incidents reported. This data was useful in selecting relevant cases, as cases reported for 
coordinates outside Norwegian waters could relatively easy be filtered out. The data was also 
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used to visualize the positions and density of accidents. Data on longitude and latitude was 
however not ultimately used in the statistical analysis. A scatter plot of the selected positional 
items is given in figure 6.9.1 below. 
Figure 6.9.1: Scatterplot of longitude and latitude 
 
We can clearly see the outline of the Norwegian coastline. A few events appear 
questionable. Some accidents appear to have taken place inlands. This could potentially be 
accidents in rivers and lakes, although these accident waters were initially filtered out. The 
results could be due to error in reporting correct positioning, or else it could be due to error in 
reporting accident waters. I have used multiple criteria to filter events, such as data on regions 
(covered in the next section). The results illustrate the potential scope of errors in database 
records. 
Regions: The original database contains over 100 pre-defined geographical areas. Most 
of these are located along the Norwegian coastline, and refer to specific areas such as 
Stavanger, or to standardized shipping routes or waterways. For example, the database 
26 
 
identifies Stadt to Ålesund as one such route. International routes are not included in this 
analysis. 
The analysis breaks geographical areas into 8 initial categories: Swedish border-
Lindesnes, Lindesnes-Bergen, Bergen-Trondheim, Trondheim-Tromsø, Tromsø-Russian 
border, Svalbard/Jan Mayen/Bjørnøya, Norwegian Continental Shelf/Arctics and finally 
other/unknown regions in Norwegian waters. Take note that for statistical reasons, a few of 
these categories were ultimately collapsed into the other/unknown category in the analysis. 
This is noted for each separate analysis. 
Waters: The database contains information on 12 categories of waters. These are, in 
descending order of frequencies: Narrow coastal waters, outer coastal waters, port areas, open 
seas, canals/rivers, wharfside/dockside, oil field, separation/cautionary area, other and 
unknown waters, and finally lakes and archipelagic waters. There are relatively few missing 
cases. A brief review of the descriptive statistics gave cause to believe there were systematic 
differences in accidents between types of waters. 
The statistical analysis collapsed the categories into seven initial categories: narrow 
coastal, outer coastal, dockside, oil field, separation area and finally others/unknown. Note 
that for statistical reasons, oil field and separation are were ultimately collapsed into the other 
category in the analysis. The most important categories are therefore narrow and outer coastal 
waters, port/harbour areas and dockside. 
The NMA does not have a strict legal definition of outer and narrow coastal waters. 
This is somewhat surprising as it used as a set category in the accident report. The categories 
are based on qualitative assessments made by the NMA inspectors, according to information 
supplied by the NMA. A tentative description is that outer coastal waters are areas on the 
outer side and in relatively close proximity of the Norwegian coastline, not far enough from 
the coastline to qualify as open seas. In some cases, outer coastal might be areas between 
islands and reefs in the outer archipelagos of mainland Norway. Narrow coastal waters are 
waters between islands and reefs and the mainland, and fairways where vessels meet and must 
observe each other closely for safe passage. The terms harbour area and dockside are 
considered to be self-explanatory. 
6.10 Weather properties 
Lighting conditions are reported in three categories, light, twilight and dark. Data is 
available for around three fourths of all incidents. I used the three categories in addition to a 
separate category of unknown. 
27 
 
Sea state was measured in 9 categories, in accordance with World Meteorological 
Organization sea state code (WMO, n.d.). The original categories were calm (glassy), calm 
(rippled), smooth (wavelets), slight, moderate, rough, very rough, high, very high, 
phenomenal. 
For the present analysis, I divided sea state into three categories: calm/smooth, 
slight/moderate and rough/high/phenomenal, as well as a category of unknown wind force. 
Visibility is measured in 5 categories, based on visibility in nautical miles: Poor (0.5-2 
miles), good (over 5), moderate (2.1 to 5), below 0.25 and tight fog/snowfall (0-0.5). Data is 
available for around three fourths of all acccidents. I used these categories in the analysis, in 
addition to a separate category of unknown visibility. 
Wind direction and speed. The database records wind direction in 8 categories in the 
form of north, north-east etc for about three fourths of all incidents. Wind speeds are 
measured according to the Beaufort scale, which means there were 13 ordinal categories.  
For the present analysis, I opted to exclude wind direction from further analysis. Wind 
force was coded into three categories: Calm, light air and light breeze was coded as weak 
winds. Moderate and fresh breeze was coded as moderate winds, on the basis that the 
Norwegian Meteorological Institute issues weather warnings from moderate breeze and 
upwards. Strong breeze, high wind, gales, storms and hurricanes were coded as strong winds. 
In addition, there was a category of unknown and unregistered winds. 
6.11 Date and time properties 
The database contains exact data on the date of the accident, which was used to extract 
three categories of eleven years each and a variable on four quarters. A separate variable for 
exact time of accident was also present, but a lot of missing data and doubts about the 
precision of this data led us to construct four categories of hours: night time (01-06), morning 
(7-12), afternoon (13-18) and evening (19-23) as well as a category of unknown hours. 
Take note that all cases recorded as happening at midnight were coded as unknown, as I 
could not ascertain which ones actually happened at midnight. Midnight is therefore not 
included in the analytical categories. 
6.12 Certification properties 
The certification area is a designated type of water a vessel can traffic (Lovdata 1981). 
It has a direct impact on construction, equipment, crew and operation of the vessel. Both ship 
and crew must be certified to operate in the designated area. Due to its complexity, it was 
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subjected to a separate statistical test. The main division in certification is between national 
and international traffic. The different certifications are listed below. 
National traffic: Traffic on rivers and lakes and along the Norwegian coastline, with 
the exception of Svalbard and Jan Mayen. 
Traffic in enclosed waters (Area 1): Traffic on Norwegian lakes and rivers, as well as 
inner parts of fjords and other waters that can usually be considered smooth. 
Traffic in protected waters (Area 2): Traffic on Norwegian waters which are protected 
against waves and wind from the open seas, as well as any waters within these areas. 
Inshore traffic within open seas of 5 nautical miles (Area 3): Traffic along the 
Norwegian coastline which does not pass any stretch of more than 5 nautical miles, not 
protected against waves and winds of the open seas, as well as any waters within. 
Inshore traffic within open seas of 25 nautical miles (area 4): Traffic along the 
Norwegian coastline which does not pass any stretch of more than 25 nautical miles, not 
protected against waves and winds of the open seas, as well as any waters within. 
Minor coastal traffic: Traffic along the Norwegian coast line which passes more than 25 
nautical miles which is not protected against waves and winds of the open seas, as well as any 
waters within, with the added proviso that the ship is never further than 20 nautimal miles 
beyond the baseline (the line from which the seaward limits of a state's territorial sea and 
certain other maritime zones of jurisdiction are measured). The waters around Stadtlandet are 
considered minor coastal traffic. 
International traffic: Any traffic beyond national traffic. 
Major coastal traffic: Minor coastal traffic, plus traffic on Swedish, Danish and German 
waters east of Lindesnes-Limfjord, and  west of  Karlskrona-Svinemünde. 
Northern and Eastern Sea traffic: Minor coastal traffic, as well as traffic in Skagerrak, 
Kattegat, Eastern Sea (including the Botnic and Finnish bay), and the North Sea up to 61 
degrees north. Traffic to Great Britain, Ireland east of 8 degrees west, and the English canal 
limited to Brest-Cork. 
European traffic: Any travel within the following outer limits: The White Seas, 
Svalbard, Jan Mayen, Iceland, Madeira, Azores, Canaries, the African west coast north of 30 
degrees, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. 
Minor international travel: International traffic where the vessel is not beyond 200 
nautical miles from port, or where passengers and crew can be brought to safety, or where the 
distance between the latest port of arrival begins and the last destination does not exceed 600 
nautical miles. 
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International traffic: Traffic from a country which has ratified the SOLAS treaty to a 
harbour beyond this country, or the other way around. 
Overseas traffic: Traffic from one continent to another across one of the oceans. 
Unlimited traffic: Traffic on any waters. 
The categories were initially retained for use in the statistical analysis. Some of the 
smaller categories had to be collapsed into an unknown category for statistical reasons, this is 
noted in the analysis. 
6.13 Vessel identity 
I include a summarised account of the way vessels and accidents are identified in the 
database, although I do not use this data in the analysis. This section might be useful for later 
work on normalization of traffic data using AIS. 
ID. All incidents in the database are linked to an ID. As pointed out in connection with 
collisions, these ID’s pose somewhat of a challenge in analysing the database, as a collision 
involves two ships, the ships are used as cases in the database, and both cases thus share the 
same ID. 
Vessel names: The database records the name, callsign and and IMO number of all 
ships where available. Interestingly, around one third of all name cases are duplicate, 
meaning that a ship of the same name was involved in more than one accident. Callsigns are 
supposed to be unique identifiers of ships. They report even more duplicates, around half of 
all callsigns occur more than once in the data.  
International Maritime Organization (IMO) numbers are a unique reference for 
ships and for registered ship owners and management companies. They were introduced under 
the SOLAS Convention to improve maritime safety and security and to reduce maritime 
fraud. For ships, the IMO number remains linked to the hull for its lifetime, regardless of a 
change in name, flag, or owner. (IMO, n.d. b) However, IMO numbers were not made 
mandatory until 1994, and then not covering all ship types. Thus, only around half of the 
incidents feature IMO numbers. Interestingly, only around one fourth of all IMO numbers are 
unique to the database.  
Taken together, the data on accident and vessel IDs strongly suggests that many ships 
are involved in multiple accidents.  These ships can be seen as having higher risk, and it 
would therefore be interesting to investigate these cases further. There was, however, not 
enough space to cover this in the current report. 
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6.14 A note on missing data 
The database in many ways resembles a Swiss cheese: There are many categories with 
large shares of missing data. The reasons for missing data can be many. First, there have been 
a few changes through the years on reporting. For example, there exists some data on current 
speeds, but this was not introduced before the early 00s (and was therefore found not suitable 
for inclusion in the analysis). Second, not all information may have been considered relevant 
at the time of reporting the accident. For example, if the accident happened while the ship was 
in dock, there might reason to believe that sea state was not recorded. 
Some of these data could have been imputed, using for example mean values of vessel 
length for the given vessel type.  The present analysis uses only data which is categorized. I 
have therefore opted for a strategy of categorizing missing data as unknown or unregistered. 
Significant results for these categories could imply that there are systematic differences 
between the known and the unknown categories. In the present analysis, I do not delve into 
the influence of unknown and unregistered data, and as such, significant results on these 
categories will not be discussed further. The reader is free to hypothesize on his own on the 
meaning of such results. 
This concludes the descriptions of the categories in the database. In the next two 
chapters, I will present descriptive statistics and a summary on the most common accident 
traits in Norwegian waters. 
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7 Analysis Part 1:  
Common traits in accidents - descriptive statistics. 
In the following two chapter (7 and 8), I will do a descriptive analysis of common traits 
in accidents. Chapter 7 contains descriptive statistics for each accident trait. Therefore, the 
variables are summated in columns. Looking at table 7.1.1 below, we can for example see that 
fires and explosions are most common on fishing vessels, while groundings are most common 
on cargo vessels. These traits are summarized in chapter 8. 
Take note that this format is different from the format used in the advanced statistical 
analysis used in chapters 9 and onwards. The regression analysis requires the tables to be 
summated in rows instead of columns. Descriptive statistics for the regression analysis is 
found in the appendix. 
Take note that this section includes data on capsizings, whereas the more advanced 
statistical analysis in chapters 9 an onwards exclude this accident type due to the small 
number of accidents, which makes capsizings unfit for advanced statistical analysis. 
I would also like to point out that although crosstables like these are informative, they 
should be read with care. It could very well be that the variation we find between vessel types, 
for example, has more to do with differences in gross tonnage and length of the vessel, than 
with the vessel types as such. To know what creates the variation between accident types, the 
advanced technique of regression analysis has to be conducted. This is done in chapter 9 
onwards. 
 
7.1 Vessel qualities 
 
Vessel group Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Fishing vessel 64,8% 37,7% 46,0% 43,8% 8,7% 37,8% 
Cargo vessel 20,2% 40,1% 48,9% 34,0% 25,4% 35,5% 
Passenger vessel 15,0% 22,2% 5,0% 22,2% 65,9% 26,7% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.1.1: Distribution of vessel groups within accident types. 
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Vessel type Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Fishing <15m 39,9% 15,8% 31,7% 25,0% 2,8% 18,3% 
Fishing >15m 24,9% 21,8% 14,4% 18,8% 5,8% 19,5% 
Ferries 4,4% 11,6% 2,9% 9,2% 48,8% 15,1% 
Passenger/cruise 5,2% 5,9% 1,4% 7,7% 8,9% 6,4% 
High-speed  1,5% 2,1% 0,0% 2,3% 7,0% 2,6% 
Other passenger  3,9% 2,6% 0,7% 2,9% 1,2% 2,6% 
Work and service  4,2% 4,8% 23,0% 3,5% 3,1% 4,7% 
Offshore service  2,0% 1,2% 0,0% 1,4% 3,6% 1,6% 
Wellboats 0,7% 2,4% 0,0% 0,8% 0,6% 1,7% 
Tanker  1,3% 2,7% 1,4% 2,3% 2,2% 2,4% 
Bulk  1,6% 3,9% 2,9% 3,5% 3,2% 3,5% 
Goods (Godsfartøy) 10,4% 25,2% 21,6% 22,5% 12,6% 21,6% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.1.2: Distribution of vessel types within accident types. 
 
Nationalities Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Norwegian 97,4% 92,4% 97,1% 92,3% 92,5% 93,0% 
PMOU White List 2,4% 6,5% 2,2% 6,5% 6,3% 6,0% 
PMOU Grey, Black  
& Others 
0,2% 1,1% 0,7% 1,3% 1,2% 1,0% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.1.3: Distribution of vessel national groups within accident types. 
 
Register Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
NOR ships 87,5% 87,7% 82,7% 83,0% 89,9% 87,2% 
NIS ships 1,3% 4,4% 1,4% 4,7% 4,4% 4,1% 
Foreign ships 0,8% 0,4% 1,4% 0,0% 0,4% 0,4% 
Unregistered & unknown 10,4% 7,4% 14,4% 12,3% 5,3% 8,3% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.1.4: Distribution of vessel registers within accident types. 
 
Class Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Class DNV 16,3% 28,4% 10,1% 23,5% 27,2% 25,9% 
Class ABS/BV/GL/LR 3,7% 10,1% 5,8% 9,7% 5,7% 8,8% 
Class other, unknown, 
unregistered 
80,0% 61,5% 84,2% 66,8% 67,1% 65,4% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.1.5: Distribution of classification societies within accident types. 
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Cargo Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Ballast 29,5% 21,1% 8,6% 19,8% 8,4% 19,9% 
Passengers 8,8% 15,4% 2,2% 16,8% 50,3% 19,1% 
Fish and fish produce 16,3% 19,8% 26,6% 17,9% 3,5% 17,2% 
Dry/Bulk/Container 3,4% 11,4% 17,3% 9,8% 5,4% 9,8% 
Bulk (Ore, coal, grains etc) 2,3% 6,8% 11,5% 4,3% 2,3% 5,5% 
Other known cargo 0,8% 1,7% 9,4% 0,8% 1,8% 1,7% 
Oil and oil produce 0,3% 1,1% 0,0% 0,9% 1,2% 1,0% 
Chemicals and gas 0,3% 0,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,3% 0,3% 
Empty 13,7% 5,4% 3,6% 5,7% 4,7% 6,2% 
Not registered/unknown 24,6% 16,9% 20,9% 24,0% 22,2% 19,5% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997
Table 7.1.6: Distribution of registered cargo within accident types. 
 
Gross Tonnage Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
< 500 79,3% 67,5% 82,0% 69,9% 37,6% 65,5% 
500-3000 11,1% 24,3% 5,0% 18,5% 47,3% 24,6% 
>3000 5,2% 5,2% 1,4% 6,2% 14,6% 6,5% 
Unknown  4,4% 2,9% 11,5% 5,3% 0,5% 3,3% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.1.7: Distribution of gross tonnages within accident types. 
 
Length Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
< 10.67 m 28,8% 9,6% 33,1% 19,4% 1,8% 12,5% 
10.67 to 15 m 14,2% 8,4% 15,1% 8,4% 1,3% 8,2% 
15 to 24 m 21,3% 13,3% 13,7% 16,5% 5,1% 13,5% 
> 24 m 34,5% 67,4% 36,7% 52,9% 90,0% 64,1% 
Unknown 1,1% 1,4% 1,4% 2,7% 1,8% 1,6% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.1.8: Distribution of vessel length within accident types. 
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Ship Age: Continuous 
 
 
Figure 7.1.1: Vessel age in years. 
 
Ship Age: In categories 
 
Ship Age Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
0-5 12,2% 12,1% 7,9% 11,0% 17,7% 12,6% 
6-15 23,3% 24,2% 24,5% 26,9% 24,1% 24,5% 
16-25 20,8% 24,3% 25,9% 27,5% 22,8% 24,3% 
25+ 41,0% 36,2% 37,4% 30,9% 30,2% 35,2% 
Unknown 2,6% 3,2% 4,3% 3,7% 5,2% 3,5% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.1.9: Distribution of vessel age within accident types. 
7.2 Geographical qualities 
 
Region Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Swedish border -  
Lindesnes 
7,7% 7,9% 11,5% 12,9% 10,2% 9,0% 
Lindesnes - Bergen 15,8% 16,8% 14,4% 22,7% 28,5% 19,0% 
Bergen - Trondheim 13,7% 23,2% 23,0% 16,8% 27,1% 21,8% 
Trondheim - Tromsø 30,5% 36,3% 36,0% 27,7% 21,2% 32,5% 
Tromsø - Russian border 30,5% 13,6% 14,4% 18,2% 8,4% 15,3% 
Svalbard/Jan M./Bj. 0,0% 1,2% 0,0% 0,5% 0,3% 0,8% 
Norwegian Continental Shelf/Arctics 0,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,9% 2,8% 0,5% 
Other/Unknown regions 1,6% 0,9% 0,7% 0,3% 1,4% 1,0% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.2.1: Distribution of regions within accident types. 
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Waters Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Narrow coastal 16,9% 58,4% 18,7% 28,4% 14,4% 43,3% 
In harbour area 24,3% 16,0% 25,2% 27,7% 64,0% 24,9% 
Outer coastal 35,3% 21,8% 43,9% 37,2% 4,0% 23,6% 
Along quay 20,4% 0,5% 7,9% 2,9% 11,4% 4,5% 
Oil field 0,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,8% 2,7% 0,5% 
Separation area 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,6% 0,0% 0,1% 
Other/unknown 2,9% 3,2% 4,3% 2,3% 3,5% 3,1% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.2.2: Distribution of waters within accident types. 
7.3 Weather qualities. 
 
Lighting Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Light 48,2% 35,5% 48,2% 56,8% 53,2% 42,5% 
Twilight 7,3% 7,3% 5,0% 8,6% 7,6% 7,5% 
Dark 25,6% 48,5% 23,7% 28,2% 25,1% 39,6% 
Unreg./unknown 18,9% 8,7% 23,0% 6,5% 14,0% 10,5% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.3.1: Distribution of lighting conditions within accident types. 
 
Sea state Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Calm seas 43,8% 56,0% 29,5% 62,7% 52,6% 54,6% 
Slight/moderate seas 11,2% 14,4% 22,3% 12,3% 5,3% 12,8% 
High seas 0,8% 2,8% 12,2% 1,4% 1,6% 2,5% 
Unknown 44,1% 26,8% 36,0% 23,7% 40,5% 30,1% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.3.2: Distribution of sea states within accident types. 
 
Visibility Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Good (>5 nm) 52,8% 56,9% 46,8% 63,4% 64,1% 58,1% 
Moderate (2.1.-5 nm) 6,0% 11,6% 10,8% 8,6% 9,8% 10,4% 
Poor (0.5-2 nm) 2,0% 7,4% 6,5% 3,8% 2,6% 5,7% 
None (>0.25 nm) 0,2% 4,9% 0,0% 8,0% 1,6% 4,3% 
Tight fog, snowfall  
(<0.5 nm) 
1,0% 4,8% 0,7% 4,4% 1,2% 3,8% 
Unknown 38,1% 14,4% 35,3% 11,9% 20,7% 17,8% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.3.3: Distribution of visibility within accident types. 
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Wind force Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Winds Weak 24,1% 31,3% 20,9% 40,2% 29,0% 31,3% 
Winds Moderate 17,3% 22,2% 13,7% 21,4% 14,4% 20,4% 
Winds Strong 5,4% 18,1% 29,5% 6,9% 18,7% 15,5% 
Winds Unknown 53,3% 28,4% 36,0% 31,4% 38,0% 32,8% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.3.5: Distribution of wind force within accident types. 
7.4 Time qualities 
 
Accident year Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
1981-1991 51,0% 39,1% 41,0% 47,2% 21,6% 39,3% 
1992-2002 21,2% 32,7% 28,8% 35,0% 25,4% 30,8% 
2003-2014 27,9% 28,2% 30,2% 17,8% 53,0% 29,9% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.4.1: Distribution of accident years within accident types. 
 
Seasons Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Jan-Mar 27,0% 28,1% 38,1% 24,7% 27,3% 27,6% 
Apr-Jun 23,3% 19,2% 18,7% 26,5% 22,2% 21,1% 
Jul-Sep 25,1% 22,2% 15,8% 26,1% 23,6% 23,1% 
Oct-Dec 24,6% 30,5% 27,3% 22,7% 26,9% 28,2% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.4.2: Distribution of seasons within accident types 
 
Time data: 
Data for time have been approximated to the nearest hour, and then split into five 
categories. A large number of accidents in the database were timed to midnight. There is good 
reason to believe that this is due to the exact accident time being unknown. The histogram 
below in figure 7.4.1 shows this very clearly graphically. I have therefore timed all accidents 
reported as happening at midnight as “unknown”. 
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Figure 7.4.1: Distribution of accidents by hour. 
 
Time Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
01-06 18,9% 26,2% 7,9% 15,7% 8,8% 21,3% 
07-12 24,8% 18,4% 25,9% 26,2% 29,1% 21,7% 
13-18 24,1% 20,6% 30,9% 31,0% 33,4% 24,3% 
19-23 14,3% 21,6% 13,7% 15,6% 19,2% 19,5% 
Unknown 17,9% 13,2% 21,6% 11,4% 9,5% 13,2% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.4.3: Distribution of accident time within accident types. 
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7.5 Other notable qualities 
 
Certification Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Enclosed waters 1,5% 2,5% 3,6% 4,5% 4,5% 3,0% 
Protected waters 3,1% 6,4% 2,2% 5,1% 30,4% 8,9% 
Inshore <5 n.m. 3,7% 5,7% 2,9% 5,0% 9,5% 5,8% 
Inshore <25 n.m. 4,6% 4,8% 5,0% 4,2% 4,8% 4,7% 
Minor coastal traffic 5,0% 11,1% 13,7% 7,6% 6,7% 9,5% 
Major coastal traffic 1,1% 2,9% 3,6% 3,2% 0,5% 2,5% 
Northern & Eastern Sea 2,9% 8,6% 1,4% 6,2% 2,5% 6,7% 
European traffic 1,8% 4,7% 1,4% 2,3% 3,8% 3,9% 
International & Overseas 1,0% 0,5% 0,0% 1,4% 0,9% 0,7% 
Unlimited traffic 2,4% 3,9% 2,2% 3,6% 4,0% 3,7% 
Fjord fishing 0,7% 0,5% 2,2% 1,3% 0,0% 0,6% 
Coastal fishing 12,7% 6,2% 7,9% 8,7% 1,3% 6,7% 
Bank fishing 9,0% 7,8% 5,8% 5,5% 1,8% 6,8% 
Sea fishing 8,5% 11,5% 3,6% 8,2% 2,3% 9,4% 
Others/unknown 40,4% 21,4% 44,6% 32,9% 19,2% 25,2% 
Certificate B/C/D 1,6% 1,4% 0,0% 0,2% 7,8% 2,1% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.5.1: Distribution of vessel certification within accident types. 
 
Operational stage Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total 
Underway 35,5% 75,7% 43,9% 64,2% 11,9% 61,0% 
On arrival port 2,3% 8,6% 3,6% 8,4% 65,2% 15,1% 
Along quay 28,8% 0,5% 12,9% 4,5% 4,3% 4,8% 
On departure port 1,8% 3,7% 2,9% 7,4% 6,5% 4,4% 
Fishing 11,6% 1,8% 14,4% 6,7% 0,0% 3,6% 
Other known 7,5% 1,5% 5,0% 1,5% 6,3% 2,8% 
Unknown/others 12,5% 8,1% 17,3% 7,3% 5,8% 8,4% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997 
Table 7.5.2: Distribution of operational stages within accident types. 
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Severity Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total
No damage 0,9% 1,7% 0,0% 4,7% 8,2% 2,4%
Less damage 38,5% 65,5% 4,5% 61,8% 78,6% 61,6%
Severe damage 24,5% 25,7% 19,7% 16,0% 11,8% 23,5%
Shipwreck, no sinking 7,3% 0,9% 3,8% 1,1% 0,0% 1,7%
Total shipwreck 28,8% 6,2% 72,0% 16,4% 1,3% 10,9%
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Total N 587 3380 132 275 449 4823
Table 7.5.3: Distribution of severity within accident types. 
 
Injuries Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total
No injuries 94,3% 98,1% 92,1% 95,8% 89,6% 96,2%
One person injured 4,2% 1,2% 7,2% 3,5% 6,1% 2,6%
Two or more injured 1,5% 0,6% 0,7% 0,7% 4,3% 1,2%
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997
Table 7.5.4: Distribution of injuries within accident types. 
 
 
Fatalities Accident type 
 Fire/expl. Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision Total
No fatalities 99,0% 99,3% 80,6% 97,9% 99,9% 98,7%
One fatality 0,7% 0,4% 10,1% 1,6% 0,1% 0,8%
Two or more fatalities 0,3% 0,2% 9,4% 0,5% 0,0% 0,5%
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Total N 614 3607 139 865 772 5997
Table 7.5.5: Distribution of fatalities within accident types. 
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8 Analysis Part 1: Common traits in accidents 
This section summarizes the descriptive statistics given in the previous section for each 
accident type. A summary of common traits across accident types is given in the last part of 
this section. 
8.1 Common traits in fires and explosions 
Fires and explosions account for 614 (10,2%) of 5997 accidents. 
8.1.1 Vessel qualities in fires and explosions. 
Both when looking at the general vessel groups and the more specific vessel types, we 
can see that fires and explosions are most common on fishing vessels, and vessels under 15 m 
in particular. Most of the vessels involved are over 25 years old. As most fires happen on 
small vessels, it follows that most fires happen on ships below 500 GT. The largest known 
certification category is vessels registered for coastal fishing. Most of the vessels involved in 
fires and explosions are registered in the NOR database. The largest known class is DNV. The 
most common cargo held on a vessel involved in a fire is ballast followed by fish. Most fires 
happen on ships below 15 m in total, while fires on longer vessels are also quite common. 
Almost all fires and explosions happen on Norwegian ships. 
8.1.2 Geographical qualities in fires and explosions. 
Most fires happen in outer coastal waters, however, the distribution is relatively equal 
among categories: In the harbour area, along the quay and narrow coastal waters all 
accounting for substantial portions among waters. When it comes to geographical regions, the 
two northernmost regions (Trondheim-Tromsø and Tromsø-Russia) account for around 30% 
each of all fires. 
8.1.3 Weather qualities in fires and explosions. 
When it comes to sea state, the largest known category is calm and glassy seas. The 
same pattern holds for wind forces, where weak winds are the largest known category. Good 
lighting conditions are the most common in fires, followed by dark conditions. Most fires 
happen in good visibility. 
8.1.4 Time qualities in fires and explosions. 
Most fires and explosions happen in the first quarter of the year, although there is only a 
few percent variation between seasons. Most of these accidents happen during daytime and in 
the afternoon, although there is also relatively little variation here. 
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8.1.5 Other notable qualities in fires and explosions. 
Most fires happen while the ship is underway or in dock, as is also reflected in the 
geographical qualities. A relatively small proportion of injuries happen in fires and 
explosions, and a small proportion of fatalities. Fires and explosions tend to have somewhat 
severe consequences, with a large amount of shipwrecks and severe damage. 
8.2 Common traits in groundings 
8.2.1 Vessel qualities in groundings. 
For the general category of vessel groups, we see that most of the groundings are 
reported on cargo vessels. For the more specific vessels types, most of the groundings occur 
in the category godsfartøy (break bulk). However, this is a more general category than most of 
the other categories. The more specific categories of short and long fishing vessels are also 
commonly featured in groundings. Groundings are most common among older ships, 
although this might reflect the relatively high ship age in the database. Most groundings occur 
on vessels of less than 500 GT, and the most common certification is for coastal fishing. A 
large majority of vessels are in the NOR register, and most commonly classed by DNV, 
although there are a lot of vessels of unknown class. Most vessels involved in groundings are 
above 24 m. 
8.2.2 Geographical qualities in groundings. 
Most groundings happen in narrow coastal waters, and in the region north of Tromsø. 
8.2.3 Weather qualities in groundings. 
Most groundings happen in a calm sea state, with weak winds. However, groundings are 
most frequent in the dark. This is slightly at odds with the fact that most groundings are 
reported in good visibility. 
8.2.4 Time qualities in groundings 
Most groundings happen in quarters 1 and 4, and most happen at night. 
8.2.5 Other notable qualities in groundings 
Most groundings happen while the ship is underway. Groundings involve the least of all 
injuries and rather few fatalities. They tend to involve less severe damage to the ship. 
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8.3 Common traits in capsizings 
Capsizings account for 139 of all accidents. This small number gives reason for caution 
in reading too much into the descriptions, as the basis for statistical generalization is much 
smaller than for the other categories. Capsizings were therefore not included in the advanced 
statistical analysis in chapters 9 and 10. 
8.3.1 Vessel qualities in capsizings. 
For the general vessel groups, cargo and fishing vessels account for 95% of all 
capsizings. The largest vessel type involved in capsizing is small fishing vessels. Work and 
service vessels as well as goods vessels and large fishing vessels also contribute substantially. 
Most of the vessels are old, and below 500 GT. The largest known certification is minor 
coastal traffic. The large majority of vessels belong to the NOR register, and are of unknown 
class, while DNV is the largest known class. Most capsizings are reported on vessels longer 
than 24 meters, although vessel below 10.7 m rank a close second, presumably due to the 
large number of small fishing vessels. 
8.3.2 Geographical qualities in capsizings. 
Most capsizings are reported in outer coastal waters, and in the region north of Tromsø. 
8.3.3 Weather qualities in capsizings. 
Most capsizings are reported in calm seas. However, capsizings have the largest share 
of accidents happening in slight/moderate and high seas. Most capsizings are reported when 
the wind is strong, which sets these accidents apart from other accident types, where weak 
winds are most common. Around half of all capsizings are reported in good lighting 
conditions and in good visibility. 
8.3.4 Time qualities in capsizings. 
Most capsizings are reported in the first quarter, and in the afternoon. 
8.3.5 Other notable qualities in capsizings 
Most capsizings are reported while the ship is underway. Capsizings have the largest 
share of injuries and fatalities among accident types, and are also associated with total 
shipwrecking and severe damage. These qualities suggest that although capsizings are 
relatively rare, much can be gained from reducing the number further. 
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8.4 Common traits in collisions 
Once again, it should be noted that one collision is reported as at least two events, as the 
database lists collisions per ship. 
8.4.1 Vessel qualities in collisions. 
Looking at the general vessel groups, most vessels reported are fishing vessels. Both 
types of fishing vessels as well as break bulk vessels account for the three largest types of 
vessels. Most of the ships are more than 25 years old, with a gross tonnage below 500. 
Certifications are relatively evenly distributed, but coastal fishing, sea fishing and minor 
coastal traffic are the most common. A large majority is registered in NOR, and are of 
unknown class, with DNV being the largest known class. More than half of all ships reported 
in collisions are longer than 24 meters.  
8.4.2 Geographical qualities in collisions. 
Around a third of all collisions happen in outer coastal waters, with narrow coastal and 
in the harbour area following closely behind. The region north of Tromsø reports most 
collisions, followed by Lindesnes-Bergen. 
8.4.3 Weather qualities in collisions. 
Most collisions are reported in calm seas and weak winds. More than half are reported 
in light conditions, and a quarter in dark. Visibility is reported to be good in most cases. 
8.4.4 Time qualities in collisions 
Most collisions are reported in quarters 2 and 3, and in the afternoon. 
8.4.5 Other notable qualities in collisions 
Most collisions are reported while the ship is underway. When it comes to injuries and 
fatalities, collisions are about average. Collisions are associated with less severe damage in 
most cases. 
8.5 Common traits in allisions 
8.5.1 Vessel qualities in allisions. 
In terms of the general vessel groups, allisions are by far most frequent in passenger 
vessels. When it comes to vessel types, this is reflected in the large share of ferries involved in 
allisions. Break bulk  vessels follow a rather distant second. Most ships are more than 25 
years old. When it comes to gross tonnage, allisions differ somewhat from other accidents, in 
that they primarily are associated with tonnages of 500-3000, although tonnage below 500 
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follows a rather close second. Allisions are also different in that most accidents are reported 
for vessels certified to traffic protected waters. They are primarily registered in NOR, and 
with a large category of unclassed vessels, with DNV following second. Around 90% of 
allisions happen on ships above 24 m length.  
8.5.2 Geographical qualities in allisions. 
Almost half of all allisions are reported in narrow coastal waters, and the Lindesnes-
Bergen region is the largest, closely followed by Bergen-Trondheim. 
8.5.3 Weather qualities in allisions. 
Allisions are associated with calm sea states and weak winds, although allisions are 
relatively more common in strong winds than for most other types of accidents. Half are 
reported in light conditions, and with good visibility. 
8.5.4 Time qualities in allisions. 
Allisions are relatively evenly spread through the year, although they are marginally 
more common in the first quarter. Most allisions happen in the afternoon. 
8.5.5 Other notable qualities in allisions. 
Not unexpectedly, as allisions are highly associated with ferries in narrow waters, most 
allisions are reported on arriving port. Somewhat more surprising is the fact that allisions 
have the second highest share of injuries, but only a fraction of fatalities. Most allisions report 
less severe damage, with severe damage following a rather distant second. 
8.6 Common traits in accidents: A summary and 
comparison. 
In the following section, I briefly summarize notable traits of accidents, and make a 
comparison between accident types, to lay the ground for the analysis ahead. 
Fires and explosions are most common on small fishing vessels in outer coastal waters 
in the Northern regions.  They usually happen in good weather. A notable proportion of fires 
and explosions happen while the vessel is in dock. 
Groundings are most common among cargo vessels, however small fishing vessels in 
coastal fishing are also notable. Narrow coastal waters are typical, as is the northernmost 
region of the coastline. Groundings are most common in the dark and at night, while the ship 
is underway. 
Capsizings typically involve smaller fishing and cargo vessels in outer coastal waters. 
The northernmost region of the coastline is once again notable for capsizings. Capsizings are 
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characterized by strong winds, and more frequent in moderate and high seas than other types 
of accidents. Capsizings tend to be the most severe accidents in terms of damage, injuries and 
fatalities. Fortunately, they are rare. 
Collisions are most common among fishing vessels and break bulk vessels. They are 
most frequent in outer coastal waters, but narrow coastal waters and harbour areas also feature 
notably in collisions. Once again, the northernmost coastal region reports most collisions. 
Collisions tend to happen in good weather conditions. 
Allisions are most common among medium sized passenger vessels, in particular 
ferries. They tend to feature vessels certified for trafficking protected waters. This goes 
together with the fact that half of all allisions are reported in narrow coastal waters, which in 
practice usually means striking the quay. In contrast with other accident types, most happen in 
the two regions between Lindesnes and Trondheim. Most happen in good weather, but a 
larger proportion happens in in strong winds compared to other accidents. Allisions come 
second in the number of cases involving injuries. 
The following table summarizes these traits: 
 
 Fires/explosions Groundings Capsizings Collisions Allisions 
Vessel Small fishing Cargo and small 
fishing 
Cargo and small 
fishing 
Fishing, break 
bulk 
Medium sized 
passenger, 
ferries 
Weather Good  In the dark Strong winds, 
higher seas 
Good  Good, stronger 
winds 
Waters Outer coastal  Narrow coastal  Outer coastal  Outer coastal  Narrow coastal  
Other Notable proportion 
in dock 
Underway Severe Notable 
proportion in 
narrow coastal 
waters and 
harbour areas 
Notable 
proportion of 
injuries 
Table 8.6.1: Common traits in accidents summarized. 
As we can see, accidents vary between vessel types. Fishing and cargo vessels feature 
most in the first four accident types, whereas passenger vessels feature most in allisions. Most 
accidents are reported in good weather, but allisions feature somewhat harsher conditions. We 
see that groundings and allisions are more typical in narrow coastal waters, where the other 
types are typical in outer coastal. As we can see from the last row in the table, each accident 
type has some additional particular qualities. 
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8.7 Risk influencing factors based on common traits 
Based on the previous description, I propose the following candidates for risk 
influencing factors in these types of accidents: 
Fires/explosions: Small fishing vessels appear to be at higher risk of fires and 
explosions. Weather does not appear to influence the risk of fires substantially. Waters 
emerges as a risk influencing factor. Most fires happen in outer coastal waters, but a notable 
proportion happens in dock. 
Groundings: Cargo and small fishing vessels appear at higher risk of groundings. 
Darkness emerges as a RIF in groundings, as does narrow coastal waters. 
Capsizings: Cargo and small fishing vessel appear as exposed to higher risk of 
capsizing. Severe weather is more common in capsizings. 
Collisions: Fishing and break bulk vessels appear at higher risk of collisions, with outer 
coastal waters increasing the risk of collisions. 
Allisions: Passenger vessels and ferries appear at higher risk of allisions. Stronger 
winds emerges as a possible risk influencing factor. Narrow coastal waters appears to increase 
the risk of allisions. 
 
I now move on to see whether these purely descriptive points will hold up to be 
statistically significant when all variables are ultimately entered simultaneously into an 
advanced statistical analysis. Conditional probabilities for the common traits scenarios are 
calculated in chapter 10.6. 
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9 Analysis part 2: Logistic and multinomic regression 
methods 
This chapter is strictly methodological, and therefore quite technical in nature. Readers 
who are not familiar with regression techniques are advised to read the whole chapter. You do 
not need to understand the reasoning behind the logarithmic transformation technique that is 
used, but the chapter will tell you how to interpret the output of the regression analysis, how I 
arrive at the probabilities I present in the results section, and enable the reader to calculate 
probabilities on his or her own, if so desired. Readers familiar with logistic regression can 
skip to the section on multinomic regression. 
The following analysis will apply the methods of logistic and multinomic regression. 
Multinomic regression is an expansion on logistic, so I will cover the logistic model first, and 
the multinomic model second, illustrating the concepts with examples from the current data 
set. 
9.1 The logistic regression model. 
Regression analysis is a method of predicting the variability of a dependent variable, 
such as an accident, using information on one or more independent variables, such as vessel, 
weather and geographical properties. The method attempts to find out what values in the 
dependent variable we can expect, given certain values of the independent variables (Vogt 
2005:69). In this case, the dependent variables are primarily accidents, and secondarily 
qualities of accidents. 
In the case of accidents, they either happen or they don’t happen. In this case, I only 
have data on different types of accidents. For the current dataset, that means that an accident 
is either for example a fire/explosion or it is not, in which case it is another type of accident. I 
express this mathematically by assigning fires the value 1, and all other accidents 0. 
Logistic regression uses what is technically referred to as maximum likelihood 
estimation, which selects coefficients that make the observed value the most likely to have 
occurred (Vogt 2005:188). For technical reasons, data is transformed by using natural 
logarithms. See for example Field (2009:264-315) for a detailed introduction to this method. 
Logistic models are assessed by what is technically referred to as changes in -2 Log 
Likelihood or -2LL. The log likelihood is a measure of unexplained variance in the model. 
We wish to reduce unexplained variance, and therefore the size of -2LL. As I add explanatory 
variables, log likelihood should therefore decrease. Initial models are compared to a 
theoretical null model, which contains no explanatory variables.  
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I do not report -2LL values here, as they are not very intuitive in their interpretation. 
Instead, I report pseudo R squares, which have an intuitive interpretation, as they report the 
percentage of the variation we are able to explain. A model which explained all the variation 
would thus have a R square of 100%. For technical reasons, logistic regression is not able to 
produce a true R square, and there are a number of approximations. I have selected the Cox & 
Snell measure. All pseudo R squares have technical issues that demand that they be treated 
with some caution. A shortcoming of the Cox & Snell measure is that its maximum value can 
be less than 100%, which means that we actually underestimate the explained variance. In this 
instance, we are primarily interested in how pseudo R squares change between models, and an 
increase in the figure is interpreted as an improvement of the model. For more on this topic, 
see for example Field (2009) or Eikemo & Claussen (2012). 
I also assess the statistical significance of the model. This tells us whether a model with 
explanatory variables explains the variation in accidents better than a model without 
explanatory variables. Each variable is also tested using an LR test. This tells us whether a 
single variable adds significant explanatory power to the model. As we are using variable 
categories as parameters in the model, we might experience that a variable, such as wind 
force, is significant as a whole, whereas a single category, such as medium winds, might not 
be. As long as the variable as a whole is significant, it makes statistical sense to retain it in the 
analysis. 
More on significance in the example below. 
A simple example. 
Using a simple example to illustrate, I ask how fires vary among vessel groups. In this 
case, I simply compare fires to all other types of accidents. For the dependent variables, I 
compare the effects of the vessel group against a reference category; in this case I use fishing 
vessels. Running a logistic regression in SPSS yields the following result: 
 
 B SE Wald p OR 
Cargo Vessels -1.237 .108 131.322 .000 .290 
Passenger Vessels -1.281 .121 112.362 .000 .278 
Constant -1.512 .055 745.369 .000 .220 
Table 9.1.1: Logistic regression of fires by vessel groups. 
Statistical tests of the model 
The model is statistically significant at the 0.000 level, meaning that there is only an 
extremely small probability that the results could be due to chance. By extension, it is highly 
likely that fires and explosions vary systematically between vessel groups. 
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The model has a Cox & Snell pseudo R square of 0.035. This is a somewhat unreliable 
measure, but shows that we can explain only approximately 3.5% of the variation in fires 
from vessel groups. 
Interpreting the results of the analysis 
Now I move on the most interesting part of the analysis, namely interpretation of the 
coefficients in the model.  
Interpreting the B-coefficient, standard error, Wald and p. 
The B-coefficient shows the change in the predicted logit when there is a change of one 
in values on the independent variable (Eikemo & Claussen 2012:122). The predicted logit is a 
technical measure, which is only a preliminary step in the analysis. In this case, the 
independent variables can change from either being a cargo or a passenger vessel (1) or not 
being one (0). The only thing we can read from the B-coefficient is that since it is negative for 
cargo vessels, they are less likely to be involved in fires than fishing vessels. It is important to 
keep in mind that this is conditional upon an accident happening. Put in another way, if an 
accident happens, it is less likely that it is a fire if we are travelling on a cargo vessel. 
SE stands for standard error, and is technically defined as the standard deviation of the 
sampling distribution of a statistic (Vogt 2005). In layman’s terms, it tells us the margin of 
error in the B-coefficient.  
The Wald statistic is a technical measure for assessing the significance of individual 
coefficients (Vogt 2005: 341), which is given in the next column. These values are called p-
values, and technically they are defined as the probability that a statistic could occur by 
sampling error, if the null hypothesis were true (Vogt 2005:252). The commonly accepted p-
value is below 0.05, meaning that values below are considered statistically significant, and 
values above 0.05 are considered statistically insignificant. In layman’s terms, a value above 
0.05 implies too much of a probability that the results could be due to chance, although this is 
a simplistic interpretation of the p value. 
Interpreting the odds ratio in the odds scale 
Technically, the odds ratio (OR) is the antilogarithm of the B-coefficient (Eikemo & 
Claussen 2012:123). Another slightly simpler way of describing it is as the relationship 
between two odds. In this case, the OR tells us of the odds of an accident involving a cargo or 
passenger vessel compared to the odds of involving a fishing vessel. The OR is not totally 
straightforward in its interpretation, but with a little effort it can tell us a lot. Odds are briefly 
defined as the ratio of success to failure in probability calculations (Vogt 2005:219). 
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Odds of 1:1=1 implies that there’s an equal chance of success and failure in an event. It 
follows that an odds ratio of 1:1=1 implies that two events have the same odds. An OR higher 
than one implies that the odds increases when the value of the variable changes by one, and 
an OR below one implies that the odds decreases. 
Using the results from the simple regression model given above, we see that cargo 
vessels have an OR of -1.237. This means that given that an accident happens, the odds of it 
being a fire happening with a cargo vessel is 1.237 times or 23.7% lower than the odds of it 
being a fire with a fishing vessel. If the odds ratio was higher than 1, that would mean the 
odds increased. Take note that percentage changes in odds are not the same as changes in 
probability, which I will cover in the section on calculating L. 
It is still hard to have an intuitive understanding of how odds ratios affect probabilities, 
but it tells us something of the relative influence, in this case it tells us that fishing vessels are 
more likely to be involved in fires than other vessels. I will review probabilities next, after 
explaining how to calculate the regression equation to find L.  
Calculating L: The regression equation and predicting probability. 
Odds ratios can be transformed to probabilities by using the formula  
P=(1/1+e-L), where P is the probability, and L the predicted B coefficient. To calculate 
probabilities in the given model, we first need to calculate the regression equation. Here, we 
only have one independent variable, which yields the following equation: L = B0 + B1X1, or, 
in more practical terms, L = Constant + Vessel type. (In more complex equations, additional 
independent variables are added together in the same way as vessel types.) 
We have three different possibilities, depending on vessels group. In table 9.1.2 below, 
we find the calculated probabilities of an accident being a fire. For clarity, I have also 
calculated the probability of the accident not being a fire by using the formula P(Not fire) = 
100 – P(Fire). 
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Vessel group L P (Fire) P (Not fire) 
Fishing -1.512 + 0 (since it is the reference category) = -1.512. 18,1 % 81,9 % 
Cargo -1.512 - 1.237 = -2,749 6,0 % 94,0 % 
Passenger -1.512 - 1.281 = -2,793 5,8 % 94,2 % 
Table 9.1.2: Predicted vessel groups in fires/explosions. 
How do we interpret these numbers? First and foremost, the reader must always keep in 
mind that given that we are analysing an accident database, it is 100% certain that an accident 
is going to happen. (Take note that we summarize probabilities in rows, which always are 
100%.) What we are trying to find out here, is what the probability is of this accident being a 
fire, as opposed to a grounding, collision or allision. Note that by this method, we can only 
tell whether other accidents are non-fires. Next, we have to keep in mind that we are using 
fishing vessels as the reference category. Say we are on board a fishing vessel, and we know 
that there’s going to be an accident. Then, there’s around a 18% chance that this accident is 
going to be a fire. 
What happens if we travel by a cargo vessel instead of a fishing vessel? Then, the 
probability that the accident will be a fire decreases to 6%. Cargo vessels are thus less likely 
to report fires than fishing vessels are. The results are very similar for passenger vessels. In 
absolute terms, the probability decreases from around 18 to around 6. In relative terms, you 
could say that it is around three times more likely that an accident will be a fire on a fishing 
vessel as opposed to other vessel. The logistic regression technique will be applied to analyses 
of vessel damage severity, injuries and fatalities. 
The logistic technique is not satisfactory in that we only are able to compare fires to 
non-fires. I will therefore move on to an extension of the logistic regression model. All 
aspects of interpretation of the logistic model are carried forward into the multinomic 
regression model. The multinomic technique will be applied to analysis of vessel qualities, 
geography and weather. 
9.2 The multinomic regression model 
Multinomic regression (Tufte 2012) is based on logistic regression with an important 
addition. Where logistic regression only permits a dichotomous outcome, such as fires versus 
non-fires, multinomic regression allows a number of categorical outcomes on the dependent 
variable. In this way, we can compare how an independent variable influences several 
outcomes at once. The differences between the logistic and multinomic methods are 
illustrated in the figures below. 
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Figure 9.2.1: Illustration of logistic approach: Fires vs non-fires. 
Figure 9.2.2: Illustration of multinomic approach: Grounding, collision and allision vs fires. 
 
I will continue by using the same example as in the previous section, only this time by 
comparing each accident type against one reference category. All other types of accidents will 
be compared to fires/explosions. The reference category for vessels will remain fishing 
vessels. 
Running a multinomic analysis yields the following results. Only B, significance and 
OR is reported here: 
Vessel type Accident type 
 Grounding  Collision  Allision 
 B p OR  B p OR  B p OR 
Intercept 1.228 .000   -.049 .496   -1.782 .000  
Cargo Vessel 1.229 .000 3.418  .912 .000 2.490  2.240 .000 9.390 
Passenger Vessel .936 .000 2.550  .785 .000 2.192  3.492 .000 32.865 
Table 9.2.1: Multinomic regression of accidents by vessel groups. 
9.2.1 Interpreting the model 
The model can be interpreted in the following way: The previous logistic model 
compared fires against non-fires. Here, we split the non-fires into three distinct accident types. 
The model can be described as having three logistic regressions in one. Each model can be 
read in the same way as a logistic model. We compare groundings with fires, collisions with 
fires and allisions with fires. The B’s, p’s and OR’s are read exactly in the same way as a 
logistic model: For groundings, the odds are around 3.4 times higher that an accident on a 
cargo vessel will be a grounding as opposed to a fire. For passenger vessels, the odds are over 
32 times higher that an accident will be an allision as opposed to a fire. 
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The advantage this has over the logistic model is that now we are able to separate the 
variation between all types of accidents. An additional advantage is that we are able to do this 
in one model, which means that we can compare figures. The odds of an allision on a 
passenger vessel are 32 times higher than for a fire, while the odds of a grounding is just 2.5 
times higher. 
9.2.2 Statistical tests of the model 
The model as a whole is significant at the .000 level, with a Cox and Snell pseudo R 
square of 13.3%, which implies that the model explains a lot more of the variation than the 
logistic model. This is a statistical argument in favour of using multinomic regression instead 
of logistic. The logical extension of this argument is that we are able to see how each accident 
type is different from the others, instead of comparing one accident type against the rest. 
The intercept is here interpreted in the same way as the constant in the previous 
example, as the value of L when all other values are zero. In this case, it means the values for 
a fishing vessel. The statistics software does not list odds ratios for the intercept, but the 
coefficient for groundings is positive, which means that the odds are higher for groundings on 
fishing vessels than for fires, and lower for collisions and allisions. 
Odds ratios are listed for cargo and passenger vessels. The odds ratio for cargo vessels 
in groundings is 3.418. This means that cargo vessels have increased odds of groundings 
compared to the odds of fires/explosions. In fact, all odds ratios are larger than 1, which 
means that fires and explosions on fishing vessels have decreased odds of happening, 
compared to all other combinations of accident types and vessel groups. 
The most extreme result is that passenger vessels have an odds ratio of over 32. This 
means that an allision on a passenger vessel is 32 times more likely to happen than an allision 
on a fishing vessel. 
9.2.3 Calculating probabilities in multinomic regression 
Take note that the following calculations summate probabilities in rows and not 
columns. The probabilities should therefore be compared to the descriptive statistics in the 
appendix. 
A challenge in using multinomic regression is the calculation of probabilities, which is 
even more complex than in logistic regression. This has to be done in two steps. First, we 
have to calculate the odds for all the values of the independent variable we wish to calculate. 
Second, we take the odds of the value of the variable we wish to calculate, and divide it by the 
sum of all odds plus one. For the reference category, we divide 1 by the sum of 1 and all 
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available odds. I will now do some predictions on probabilities for accidents in passenger 
vessels. The reference category is still fires/explosions. 
Predictions of accidents in passenger vessels 
Step one: Calculate the odds for all the values of the independent variable using the 
following equation: e ((intercept accident type) + passenger) = e(L) 
Accident L e (L)
Grounding 1.228 + 0.936 = 2,164 8,7059
Collision -0.049 + 0.785 = 0,736 2,0876
Allision -1.782 + 3.492 = 1,710 5,5290
Table 9.2.1: Odds of accidents in passenger vessels. 
Step two: calculate probabilities by the following formula: 
P = Odds/(1+sum of all odds). 
For example, the probability of a grounding in a passenger vessel is: 
P = 8,7059 /(1+ 8,7059 + 2,0876 + 5,5290) = 50,3 % 
 
The probabilities for collisions and allisions are calculated in the same way, and are 
presented in table 9.2.2 below. 
For the reference category (here; fires in passenger vessels), the formula is: 
P = 1/(1+ sum of all odds) which gives: 
P = 1/(1+8,7059 +  2,0876+ 5,5290) = 5,8 % 
The results for accidents in passenger vessels are given in table 9.2.2 below.  
P (Grd) P (Coll) P (All) P (Fire) Sum 
50,3 % 12,1 % 31,9 % 5,8 % 100,0 % 
Table 9.2.2: Probabilities of accidents in passenger ships. 
 
Take note that these results are exactly the same as the first table in the descriptive 
statistics in table 14.1.1 in the descriptive statistics for the regression analysis in the appendix. 
This is because we have not yet added any explanatory variables. I turn to this issue in the 
next section. 
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Adding independent variables in multinomic regression: Analytical strategy. 
The real interest in using multinomic regression analysis comes when we start adding 
independent variables. 
I have identified three major types of potential risk-influencing factors. First we have 
the vessel qualities, which may be both physical and regulatory. Second, we have the 
geographical qualities, and third we have the weather variables. I will apply the following 
analytical strategy: First I will test the vessel types, then add the remaining vessel qualities, 
and drop any insignificant variables. Then I test geographical and weather qualities separately 
and discard insignificant items. Finally I test all these qualities in an integrated model. 
Separate analyses will be provided on time categories, certifications and operational 
states. This is due to the fact that the data set was not large enough, or did not contain enough 
variation to expand on the integrated model in chapter 10.3. 
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10 Analysis part 2:  
Regression analyses of accidents. 
This chapter utilizes both multinomic and logistic regression analysis of accidents; 
please take note which technique is being applied for each subchapter. I begin by building a 
multinomic regression model of accidents. I begin with a preliminary analysis of vessel types 
and accidents in chapter 10.1. Chapter 10.2 builds the regression model by testing vessel 
qualities, geography and weather in individual models. Significant variables from each of 
these models are then used in an integrated model in chapter 10.3. Chapters 10.4 through 10.7 
calculate conditional probabilities for various scenarios. Take particular note of 10.6, which 
calculates probabilities of the common traits scenario, and 10.7, which calculates the 
scenarios which maximize the conditional probability of each accident type. 
Chapter 10.8 contains a separate multinomic analysis of time categories, whereas 
chapter 10.9 contains a separate analysis of certification. Chapter 10.10 contains a multinomic 
analysis of operational stages. Chapter 10.11 contains a logistic regression analysis of 
severity, while 10.12 contains a logistic regression on injuries and 10.13 a logistic regression 
of fatalities. 
The calculation of probabilities summates values in rows. This format is different from 
the format used in the section on common traits. A separate section with descriptive statistics 
where traits are summated in rows is found in the appendix, chapter 14. 
10.1 Preliminary analysis of vessel types and accidents. 
10.1.1 Analyzing the NSRM categories. 
The NSRM vessel categories are theoretical constructions. Before proceeding with the 
full models including vessel, geographical and weather qualities, I will do a separate test of 
NSRM categories against accidents. A multinomic regression was performed, using accident 
categories as dependent variables, and NSRM types as independent. The reference categories 
are fires and explosions and NSRM fishing vessels above 15m. The results are shown on the 
next page in table 10.1.1. 
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 Grounding Collision Allision 
 B SE p OR B SE p OR B SE p OR 
Intercept 1,64 0,09 0,00  0,06 0,11 0,57  -1,22 0,17 0,00  
Fishing <15m -0,79 0,12 0,00 0,45 -0,19 0,15 0,20 0,83 -1,19 0,28 0,00 0,31 
Ferries 1,10 0,22 0,00 3,01 1,02 0,25 0,00 2,78 3,86 0,26 0,00 47,47 
Pass./Cruise 0,26 0,21 0,21 1,30 0,68 0,24 0,01 1,97 1,99 0,27 0,00 7,33 
High Speed 0,48 0,36 0,19 1,62 0,74 0,42 0,08 2,09 3,02 0,40 0,00 20,40 
Other Pass. -0,27 0,25 0,26 0,76 -0,02 0,31 0,94 0,98 0,24 0,43 0,57 1,28 
Work/Service 0,25 0,23 0,27 1,28 0,08 0,29 0,78 1,08 1,14 0,33 0,00 3,14 
OffshoreServ -0,36 0,34 0,28 0,70 -0,06 0,42 0,88 0,94 2,07 0,38 0,00 7,93 
Well Boats 1,42 0,52 0,01 4,13 0,50 0,64 0,44 1,64 1,45 0,69 0,04 4,25 
Tankers 0,85 0,38 0,03 2,33 0,85 0,43 0,05 2,35 1,98 0,46 0,00 7,23 
Bulk 1,01 0,34 0,00 2,74 1,04 0,38 0,01 2,82 2,14 0,41 0,00 8,50 
Break bulk 1,02 0,16 0,00 2,76 1,05 0,18 0,00 2,86 1,64 0,23 0,00 5,15 
Table 10.1.1: Multinomic regression model 1, vessel types (N=5858). 
 
The model is statistically significant at the 0.000 level. The Cox and Nell pseudo R 
square shows that we explain approximately 17.7% of the variation in accidents. This 
suggests that the NSRM vessel types are a slight improvement on the generic vessel groups 
presented in the introduction to this chapter, which had a Cox and Snell of 13.3%.  
A Likelihood Ratio test reveals that all of the variables have significant effects at the 
0.01 level in the model as a whole, except for other passenger vessels. This finding is 
reflected in the table, where we see that this category proves insignificant across accident 
types. All the other vessel categories produce significant results in at least one accident 
category. The NSRM vessel types are thus maintained in the further analysis. 
I will refrain from further discussion of the actual results in this model, as it is a 
preliminary stage before introducing the remaining independent variables. 
10.2 Multinomic analysis of vessels, geography and 
weather. 
10.2.1 Choosing reference categories 
The present analysis rests almost entirely on categorical analysis. To some extent, the 
categories are ordered, but the main strategy has been to dummy code relevant categories to 
measure the potential influence of each category. This entails choosing the best reference 
categories for comparison. Theoretically, any category can be chosen to be a reference 
category, as it does not influence the statistical tests so long as the category has a sufficient 
size. However, the reference category should also be meaningful. Fishing vessels are, in our 
view, the most homogenous vessels. I chose Norwegian medium sized vessels of above 15 
meters as our reference vessel type. There were 1169 accidents involving such vessels 
registered in the database overall. As for additional vessel qualities, I chose 500-3000 GT, 
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length of above 24 meter and ballast cargo as reference categories. This reduced the number 
of real cases to 42. This means that for additional qualities, it is very unlikely that there are 
actual cases in the database that covers all the reference categories. However, it still makes 
sense to envision these vessels to be of different age, certification, traveling in different 
waters, and under different lighting conditions. I thus chose vessels of 0-5 years of age, 
traveling in outer coastal waters in the Sweden to Lindesnes region, under good weather 
conditions, in the third season and in daytime, as our reference categories for the remaining 
variables. 
NB! For the accident types, fires and explosions was chosen as the reference, as it was 
seen as qualitatively most different from the other types of accidents. Groundings, collisions 
and allisions all share the quality of hitting an obstruction, be it the sea floor, another ship or a 
quay. 
The details of the reference categories are given in table 10.2.1 below. 
 
Reference categories: Accident type  
Fires/explosions  
Reference categories: Vessel qualities Value 
NSRM type 2 Fishing vessels >15m 
Nationality type 1 Norway 
Vessel register type 1 NOR 
Class type 1 DNV 
GT type 2 500-3000 
Length type 4 >24 m 
Cargo type 1 Ballast 
Ship Age type 1 0-5 years 
Reference categories: Geographical qualities Value 
Region type 4 Tromsø-Russia 
Waters type 1 Narrow coastal 
Reference categories: Weather qualities Value 
Lighting conditions type 1 Light 
Sea State type 1 Calm 
Visibility type 1 Good 
Wind Force type 1 Weak 
Table 10.2.1: reference categories for multinomic analysis. 
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10.2.2 Model with vessel qualities 
Vessel qualities such as nationality, register, classification society, gross tonnage, 
length, cargo type and ship age were added to the model of vessel types. Some problems were 
found with the register variables. The solution was to collapse the unknown and foreign 
categories into one. 
Statistical tests of the model. 
The model as a whole was significant at the .000 level. The model had a Cox and Snell 
pseudo R square approximate explained variation of 23.6%. LR tests showed that ferries, 
passenger & cruise ships, offshore service, well boats and break bulk vessels were significant 
as a whole. Only PMOU White Lists nations were significant, as was unknown class 
societies. Vessels carrying passengers, fish, empty and unknown cargo were significant, as 
were all gross tonnages and lengths. Ship age was also significant for all ages. 
Even though one category of class society was shown as significant as a whole, none of 
the individual coefficients were significant. It was thus decided to drop the class societies 
from further analysis. 
Individual results from the model will not be discussed further here, as the primary 
interest lies in presenting a full model featuring vessel, geographical and weather qualities. 
Some of the changes from this model will be compared with the results from the final model. 
Results are given in the table below. 
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 Grounding Collision Allision 
 B SE p OR B SE p OR B SE p OR 
Intercept 2,002 0,23 0,00  -0,152 0,28 0,59  -0,136 0,31 0,67  
NSRM vessel types             
Fishing <15m -0,225 0,32 0,48 0,80 -0,299 0,38 0,43 0,74 0,510 0,59 0,39 1,67 
Ferries 0,991 0,28 0,00 2,69 0,761 0,33 0,02 2,14 2,414 0,34 0,00 11,17 
PassCruise 0,369 0,26 0,15 1,45 0,414 0,30 0,17 1,51 1,174 0,33 0,00 3,24 
HighSpeed 0,163 0,40 0,68 1,18 0,122 0,46 0,79 1,13 1,938 0,45 0,00 6,94 
OtherPass -0,002 0,32 1,00 1,00 -0,451 0,40 0,26 0,64 0,344 0,50 0,49 1,41 
WorkService 0,354 0,25 0,16 1,42 0,076 0,32 0,81 1,08 0,771 0,36 0,03 2,16 
OffshoreServ -0,311 0,38 0,42 0,73 0,126 0,47 0,79 1,13 1,083 0,44 0,01 2,95 
Well Boats 1,104 0,53 0,04 3,02 0,400 0,65 0,54 1,49 0,718 0,71 0,31 2,05 
Tankers 0,498 0,45 0,27 1,65 0,820 0,51 0,11 2,27 0,877 0,55 0,11 2,41 
Bulk 0,383 0,40 0,34 1,47 0,558 0,45 0,22 1,75 0,807 0,48 0,10 2,24 
Goods 0,389 0,21 0,07 1,48 0,653 0,25 0,01 1,92 0,695 0,30 0,02 2,00 
Nationality             
PMOU White 1,003 0,36 0,01 2,73 0,733 0,39 0,06 2,08 0,617 0,42 0,14 1,85 
PMOU G/B/O 1,837 1,04 0,08 6,28 1,700 1,08 0,11 5,47 1,684 1,10 0,13 5,39 
Register             
NIS 0,723 0,40 0,07 2,06 0,827 0,43 0,05 2,29 0,958 0,44 0,03 2,61 
Foreign & unknown 0,063 0,18 0,73 1,07 0,282 0,20 0,16 1,33 -0,095 0,30 0,75 0,91 
Class             
Other Known* 0,210 0,26 0,41 1,23 0,325 0,28 0,25 1,38 0,286 0,31 0,36 1,33 
Unknown -0,071 0,16 0,66 0,93 -0,145 0,19 0,45 0,87 0,351 0,19 0,07 1,42 
Registered Cargo             
Fish 0,629 0,14 0,00 1,88 0,590 0,17 0,00 1,80 0,210 0,28 0,45 1,23 
Passengers 0,236 0,23 0,31 1,27 0,824 0,28 0,00 2,28 1,024 0,29 0,00 2,78 
Dry/Bulk/Cont 0,693 0,28 0,01 2,00 0,677 0,31 0,03 1,97 0,623 0,34 0,07 1,87 
Bulk/Ore/Grain/Coal 0,579 0,32 0,07 1,78 0,298 0,37 0,42 1,35 0,151 0,42 0,72 1,16 
Oil/Chemicals/Gas 0,474 0,59 0,42 1,61 0,029 0,70 0,97 1,03 0,707 0,68 0,30 2,03 
Other Known* 0,686 0,49 0,16 1,99 0,319 0,61 0,60 1,38 1,156 0,57 0,04 3,18 
Empty -0,576 0,16 0,00 0,56 -0,435 0,22 0,04 0,65 0,085 0,28 0,76 1,09 
Unknown -0,308 0,13 0,02 0,74 0,177 0,16 0,27 1,19 0,331 0,21 0,11 1,39 
Gross Tonnage             
<500 0,187 0,17 0,28 1,21 0,324 0,20 0,11 1,38 -0,538 0,20 0,01 0,58 
>3000 -1,176 0,26 0,00 0,31 -0,811 0,30 0,01 0,44 -0,552 0,28 0,05 0,58 
Unknown 0,863 0,29 0,00 2,37 0,974 0,33 0,00 2,65 -0,520 0,61 0,40 0,59 
Length             
<10.67 m -1,268 0,33 0,00 0,28 -0,176 0,39 0,65 0,84 -2,537 0,61 0,00 0,08 
10-15 m -0,601 0,32 0,06 0,55 -0,133 0,38 0,72 0,88 -2,172 0,58 0,00 0,11 
15-24 m -0,719 0,17 0,00 0,49 -0,132 0,20 0,51 0,88 -1,250 0,25 0,00 0,29 
Unknown -0,883 0,47 0,06 0,41 0,015 0,51 0,98 1,02 -0,892 0,56 0,11 0,41 
Vessel Age             
6-15 -0,074 0,16 0,65 0,93 0,168 0,19 0,38 1,18 -0,381 0,20 0,06 0,68 
16-25 -0,132 0,17 0,43 0,88 0,177 0,20 0,37 1,19 -0,461 0,21 0,03 0,63 
26+ -0,415 0,16 0,01 0,66 -0,372 0,19 0,05 0,69 -0,715 0,20 0,00 0,49 
Unknown 0,053 0,32 0,87 1,06 0,040 0,37 0,91 1,04 0,284 0,38 0,45 1,33 
Table 10.2.2: Multinomic model 3: Vessel qualities (N=5858). 
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10.2.3 Model with geographical variables 
A model was tested using only the geographical variables. The analysis revealed that 
there were problems with the categories oil field and separation area due to the low number 
of cases. These categories were collapsed into the other category. Region 7, Norwegian 
Continental Shelf & Arctics and Region 8, Svalbard/Jan Mayen and Bjørnøya were also 
problematic, and collapsed into the other waters category. 
Statistical tests of the model:  
The model as a whole was significant at the .000 level. The Cox and Snell pseudo R 
square approximate explained variation is 28.3%. All entered variables were significant as a 
whole. All items were thus retained. As with the vessel qualities, these results will not be 
discussed further individually. Results are given in the table below. 
 Grounding Collision Allision 
 B SE p OR B SE p OR B SE p OR 
Intercept 3,07 0,12 0,00  0,66 0,14 0,00  -0,31 0,17 0,06  
Region             
Sweden-Lindesnes -0,15 0,19 0,42 0,86 0,68 0,21 0,00 1,97 0,43 0,22 0,05 1,53 
Lindesnes-Bergen -0,07 0,15 0,64 0,94 0,53 0,16 0,00 1,69 0,71 0,17 0,00 2,04 
Bergen-Trondheim 0,24 0,15 0,10 1,27 0,27 0,17 0,12 1,31 0,88 0,17 0,00 2,41 
Trondheim-Tromsø -0,73 0,13 0,00 0,48 -0,45 0,15 0,00 0,64 -0,76 0,19 0,00 0,47 
Region Others & Unknown 0,04 0,34 0,90 1,04 -0,10 0,41 0,81 0,90 1,20 0,38 0,00 3,30 
Waters             
Harbour Area -1,59 0,14 0,00 0,20 -0,36 0,16 0,02 0,70 1,19 0,17 0,00 3,29 
Outer Coastal -1,53 0,13 0,00 0,22 -0,23 0,15 0,13 0,79 -1,70 0,24 0,00 0,18 
Along Quay -4,83 0,27 0,00 0,01 -2,45 0,25 0,00 0,09 -0,34 0,20 0,09 0,71 
Other Waters -1,20 0,28 0,00 0,30 -0,27 0,32 0,40 0,76 0,67 0,32 0,04 1,95 
Table 10.2.3: Multinomic model 4: Geographical Qualities (N=5858). 
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10.2.4 Model with weather variables 
A separate model was tested using only weather data. 
Statistical tests of the model:  
The model as a whole was significant at the .000 level. The Cox and Snell pseudo R 
square approximate explained variation is 13.3%. LR tests showed that items were significant 
as a whole, except twilight, high seas, moderate visibility and moderate winds. As these were 
parts of dummy sets, they were all retained for further analysis. As with the vessel and 
geographical qualities, these results will not be discussed further individually. Results are 
given in the table below. 
 Grounding Collision Allision 
 B SE p OR B SE p OR B SE p OR 
Intercept 1.69 0.10 0.00  0.78 0.11 0.00  0.49 0.12 0.00  
Lighting             
Twilight 0.21 0.18 0.25 1.23 -0.06 0.21 0.77 0.94 -0.06 0.22 0.78 0.94 
Dark 0.81 0.11 0.00 2.24 -0.09 0.13 0.50 0.91 -0.18 0.14 0.19 0.83 
Unknown 0.76 0.16 0.00 2.14 0.03 0.23 0.90 1.03 0.56 0.21 0.01 1.75 
Sea State             
Moderate -0.58 0.17 0.00 0.56 -0.34 0.20 0.08 0.71 -1.55 0.24 0.00 0.21 
High -0.09 0.49 0.85 0.91 0.18 0.57 0.75 1.20 -0.64 0.57 0.26 0.53 
Unknown 0.05 0.14 0.72 1.05 -0.09 0.16 0.57 0.91 0.43 0.16 0.01 1.54 
Visibility             
Moderate 0.27 0.19 0.16 1.30 0.25 0.22 0.25 1.29 0.13 0.23 0.56 1.14 
Poor 0.81 0.31 0.01 2.25 0.58 0.35 0.10 1.78 -0.21 0.39 0.59 0.81 
None 3.04 1.01 0.00 20.83 3.69 1.01 0.00 40.08 1.91 1.05 0.07 6.75 
Fog/Snow 1.17 0.42 0.01 3.21 1.35 0.45 0.00 3.86 -0.12 0.54 0.83 0.89 
Unknown -1.15 0.15 0.00 0.32 -1.14 0.19 0.00 0.32 -1.31 0.19 0.00 0.27 
Winds             
Moderate 0.02 0.15 0.88 1.02 -0.13 0.17 0.44 0.88 -0.02 0.18 0.92 0.98 
Strong 0.85 0.23 0.00 2.35 -0.17 0.27 0.53 0.84 1.68 0.25 0.00 5.38 
Unknown -0.51 0.13 0.00 0.60 -0.43 0.16 0.01 0.65 -0.35 0.16 0.03 0.70 
Table 10.2.4: Multinomic model 5: Weather qualities (N=5858). 
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10.3 Integrated model of vessel, geography and weather. 
Statistical tests of the model. 
This model integrates significant items from the previous models on vessel, geography 
and weather. It will be used as the basis for the calculation of probabilities in chapters 10.4 
through 10.7. 
The model as a whole was significant at the .000 level. The Cox and Snell pseudo R 
square approximate explained variation is 43.8%. Taken together, this suggests that this 
model is better than each model individually. It also shows that we have been able to explain 
a fair amount of the variation in the data set. 
Likelihood ratio tests revealed that only the following variables were significant for the 
model as a whole: For vessel types, ferries and high speed craft. For nationalities, only ships 
on the PMOU White List. For type of cargo, only vessels carrying passengers, fish and 
unknown cargo were significant. All gross tonnages were significant, as were all lengths, 
except the unknowns. Ship age was only significant for ages 16-25. All regions were 
significant, except the “others” category. All types of waters were significant. Only dark and 
unknown lighting conditions were significant, and no sea states except the unknown. All 
categories of visibility were significant, except the moderate. Only strong winds were 
significant as a whole. As all of the categories were parts of dummy sets, we could not 
exclude any single category from the analysis. 
Individual results are given in table 10.3.1 below, and will be used as a basis for 
discussion and predictions. This model will be referred to as the integrated model. Following 
the table, on the next page, is an edited version, containing only significant B-coefficients and 
odds ratios, to clarify results. 
 
 
  
64 
 
 Grounding Collision Allision 
 B SE p OR B SE p OR B SE p OR 
Intercept 2,465 0,31 0,00  0,026 0,36 0,94  -0,250 0,41 0,55  
Vessel types             
Fishing <15m -0,186 0,37 0,62 0,830 -0,551 0,42 0,19 0,576 0,373 0,60 0,53 1,453 
Ferries 1,314 0,31 0,00 3,721 0,605 0,36 0,09 1,830 2,361 0,36 0,00 10,603 
PassCruise 0,820 0,30 0,01 2,271 0,601 0,34 0,08 1,825 1,208 0,36 0,00 3,348 
HighSpeed 0,550 0,43 0,21 1,734 0,282 0,48 0,56 1,326 1,975 0,47 0,00 7,208 
OtherPass -0,191 0,37 0,60 0,826 -0,732 0,43 0,09 0,481 0,208 0,52 0,69 1,232 
WorkService 0,579 0,30 0,05 1,784 0,043 0,35 0,90 1,044 0,758 0,39 0,05 2,133 
OffshoreServ -0,449 0,42 0,29 0,638 -0,268 0,50 0,59 0,765 0,399 0,48 0,40 1,490 
Well Boats 1,093 0,61 0,07 2,984 0,462 0,71 0,51 1,588 1,015 0,74 0,17 2,761 
Tankers 0,532 0,51 0,30 1,702 0,840 0,57 0,14 2,317 0,763 0,60 0,20 2,145 
Bulk 0,525 0,44 0,23 1,690 0,520 0,48 0,28 1,682 0,856 0,51 0,09 2,354 
Goods 0,378 0,24 0,11 1,459 0,574 0,27 0,03 1,776 0,671 0,31 0,03 1,957 
Nationality             
PMOU White 1,333 0,39 0,00 3,791 1,077 0,42 0,01 2,936 0,862 0,44 0,05 2,367 
PMOU G/B/O 1,985 1,09 0,07 7,276 1,975 1,11 0,08 7,208 1,993 1,13 0,08 7,336 
Register             
NIS 0,902 0,42 0,03 2,464 0,792 0,44 0,07 2,208 0,961 0,45 0,03 2,615 
Foreign & unknown 0,126 0,20 0,53 1,134 0,512 0,22 0,02 1,668 -0,016 0,32 0,96 0,984 
Registered Cargo             
Fish 0,623 0,16 0,00 1,865 0,587 0,18 0,00 1,799 0,274 0,29 0,34 1,315 
Passengers -0,027 0,26 0,92 0,974 0,501 0,30 0,09 1,650 0,706 0,31 0,02 2,026 
Dry/Bulk/Cont 0,287 0,29 0,33 1,333 0,342 0,32 0,29 1,408 0,238 0,36 0,51 1,269 
Bulk/Ore/Grain/Coal 0,400 0,36 0,26 1,492 0,175 0,40 0,66 1,191 0,146 0,44 0,74 1,157 
Oil/Chemicals/Gas 0,509 0,67 0,45 1,663 -0,142 0,77 0,85 0,867 0,529 0,75 0,48 1,697 
Other Known* 0,497 0,53 0,35 1,644 0,248 0,64 0,70 1,281 0,836 0,61 0,17 2,308 
Empty -0,337 0,20 0,09 0,714 -0,179 0,24 0,45 0,837 -0,043 0,30 0,88 0,958 
Unknown 0,366 0,18 0,04 1,441 1,075 0,20 0,00 2,930 0,553 0,25 0,03 1,738 
Gross Tonnage             
<500 0,242 0,19 0,20 1,274 0,352 0,21 0,10 1,421 -0,410 0,21 0,05 0,663 
>3000 -1,221 0,28 0,00 0,295 -1,007 0,32 0,00 0,365 -0,770 0,29 0,01 0,463 
Unknown 0,807 0,32 0,01 2,242 1,021 0,36 0,00 2,775 -0,454 0,63 0,47 0,635 
Length             
<10.67 m -1,347 0,38 0,00 0,260 -0,268 0,42 0,53 0,765 -2,024 0,61 0,00 0,132 
10-15 m -0,694 0,36 0,06 0,499 -0,121 0,41 0,77 0,886 -1,605 0,58 0,01 0,201 
15-24 m -0,812 0,18 0,00 0,444 -0,270 0,21 0,19 0,764 -1,002 0,25 0,00 0,367 
Unknown -0,908 0,52 0,08 0,403 -0,236 0,56 0,67 0,790 -0,722 0,59 0,22 0,486 
Vessel Age             
6-15 -0,047 0,18 0,79 0,954 0,217 0,20 0,29 1,242 -0,249 0,22 0,25 0,779 
16-25 -0,124 0,18 0,50 0,883 0,212 0,21 0,31 1,237 -0,317 0,23 0,16 0,729 
26+ -0,327 0,17 0,06 0,721 -0,258 0,20 0,20 0,773 -0,436 0,22 0,04 0,647 
Unknown 0,273 0,35 0,44 1,313 0,274 0,39 0,49 1,315 0,635 0,40 0,11 1,887 
Region             
Sweden-Lindesnes 0,129 0,23 0,58 1,137 0,739 0,26 0,00 2,093 0,273 0,30 0,36 1,313 
Lindesnes-Bergen 0,125 0,19 0,50 1,134 0,729 0,21 0,00 2,074 0,120 0,25 0,63 1,127 
Bergen-Trondheim 0,343 0,18 0,06 1,409 0,536 0,21 0,01 1,709 0,297 0,25 0,23 1,346 
Trondheim-Tromsø 0,600 0,14 0,00 1,822 0,445 0,17 0,01 1,560 0,175 0,22 0,43 1,191 
Region Others/Unkn. 0,483 0,40 0,23 1,621 0,266 0,47 0,57 1,305 1,015 0,47 0,03 2,759 
Waters             
Harbour Area -1,522 0,15 0,00 0,218 -0,204 0,17 0,23 0,815 0,761 0,18 0,00 2,140 
Outer Coastal -1,323 0,14 0,00 0,266 -0,084 0,16 0,60 0,920 -1,306 0,25 0,00 0,271 
Along Quay -4,617 0,29 0,00 0,010 -1,987 0,27 0,00 0,137 -0,521 0,24 0,03 0,594 
Other Waters -0,415 0,31 0,18 0,660 0,615 0,36 0,09 1,849 1,233 0,37 0,00 3,430 
Lighting             
Twilight 0,427 0,20 0,04 1,532 0,218 0,22 0,33 1,244 0,498 0,26 0,06 1,646 
Dark 0,665 0,13 0,00 1,945 -0,070 0,15 0,63 0,933 0,091 0,16 0,58 1,095 
Unknown 0,291 0,20 0,15 1,338 -0,642 0,26 0,01 0,526 0,276 0,26 0,29 1,318 
Sea State             
Moderate -0,315 0,18 0,09 0,730 -0,247 0,21 0,23 0,781 -0,745 0,28 0,01 0,475 
High 0,141 0,51 0,78 1,151 0,229 0,58 0,69 1,257 0,360 0,63 0,57 1,433 
Unknown -0,117 0,16 0,47 0,890 -0,352 0,18 0,06 0,703 0,093 0,19 0,63 1,098 
Visibility             
Moderate 0,062 0,21 0,77 1,064 0,112 0,23 0,63 1,118 -0,005 0,26 0,99 0,995 
Poor 0,586 0,33 0,07 1,797 0,371 0,36 0,31 1,449 -0,410 0,43 0,34 0,664 
None 2,453 1,01 0,02 11,623 3,310 1,02 0,00 27,386 1,265 1,06 0,23 3,541 
Fog/Snow 0,914 0,45 0,04 2,494 1,182 0,47 0,01 3,262 -0,249 0,57 0,66 0,780 
Unknown -0,903 0,18 0,00 0,405 -1,201 0,21 0,00 0,301 -1,236 0,23 0,00 0,291 
Winds             
Moderate -0,069 0,16 0,67 0,933 -0,177 0,18 0,32 0,837 -0,023 0,21 0,91 0,978 
Strong 0,872 0,25 0,00 2,393 -0,111 0,29 0,70 0,895 1,401 0,28 0,00 4,059 
Unknown -0,349 0,15 0,02 0,706 -0,343 0,17 0,04 0,710 -0,152 0,19 0,43 0,859 
Table 10.3.1: Multinomic regression 6: Integrated model (N=5 858). 
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10.3.1 Highlighting significant results 
To simplify interpreting the results, I have deleted all insignificant results from the 
previous table. This table only lists B-coefficients and odds ratios for the significant 
categories. 
 Grounding Collision Allision 
 B OR B OR B OR 
Vessel types   - -   
Ferries 1,314 3,721 - - 2,361 10,603 
Passenger & Cruise ships 0,820 2,271 - - 1,208 3,348 
High Speed Craft 0,550 1,734 - - 1,975 7,208 
Work Service Vessels 0,579 1,784 - - 0,758 2,133 
Break Bulk - - 0,574 1,776 0,671 1,957 
Nationality       
PMOU White 1,333 3,791 1,077 2,936 0,862 2,367 
Register       
NIS 0,902 2,464 - - 0,961 2,615 
Foreign & unknown - - 0,512 1,668 - - 
Registered Cargo       
Fish 0,623 1,865 0,587 1,799 - - 
Passengers - - - - 0,706 2,026 
Unknown 0,366 1,441 1,075 2,930 0,553 1,738 
Gross Tonnage       
<500 - - - - -0,410 0,663 
>3000 -1,221 0,295 -1,007 0,365 -0,770 0,463 
Unknown 0,807 2,242 1,021 2,775 - - 
Length       
<10.67 m -1,347 0,260 -0,268 0,765 -2,024 0,132 
10-15 m - - - - -1,605 0,201 
15-24 m -0,812 0,444 - - -1,002 0,367 
Vessel Age       
26+ - - - - -0,436 0,647 
Region       
Sweden-Lindesnes - - 0,739 2,093 - - 
Lindesnes-Bergen - - 0,729 2,074 - - 
Bergen-Trondheim - - 0,536 1,709 - - 
Trondheim-Tromsø 0,600 1,822 0,445 1,560 - - 
Region Others/Unkn. - - - - 1,015 2,759 
Waters       
Harbour Area -1,522 0,218 - - 0,761 2,140 
Outer Coastal -1,323 0,266 - - -1,306 0,271 
Along Quay -4,617 0,010 -1,987 0,137 -0,521 0,594 
Other Waters - - - - 1,233 3,430 
Lighting       
Twilight 0,427 1,532 - - - - 
Dark 0,665 1,945 - - - - 
Unknown - - -0,642 0,526 - - 
Sea State       
Moderate - - - - -0,745 0,475 
Visibility       
None 2,453 11,623 3,310 27,386 - - 
Fog/Snow 0,914 2,494 1,182 3,262 - - 
Unknown -0,903 0,405 -1,201 0,301 -1,236 0,291 
Winds       
Strong 0,872 2,393 - - 1,401 4,059 
Unknown -0,349 0,706 -0,343 0,710 - - 
Table 10.3.1.1: Multinomic regression 6: Significant results (N=5 858). 
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10.3.2 Results of the integrated model 
In the following section, I will only present some highlights of the results as basis for 
further discussion and as a basis for doing some predictions of probabilities. 
Vessel types: Only three types of passenger ships and two types of cargo vessels 
showed significantly different results compared to the reference category, and then mainly in 
the grounding and allision accidents. Looking at the odds ratios, we see that given that an 
accident happens, ferries have 3.7 times higher odds than large fishing vessels of being 
involved in a grounding as opposed to a fire/explosion. This is the largest difference in ORs 
for groundings vs fires. When it comes to collisions, only break bulk vessels have higher odds 
than large fishing vessels. The biggest differences are found in the allision category, where 
ferries and high speed craft have the largest differences in odds compared to large fishing 
vessels. 
Nationality: Perhaps due to the low number of accidents featuring other nationalities, 
the only category that proved significant was the PMOU White list. The PMOU normally lists 
Norway as belonging to the White List as well. For all types of accidents, the odds are two to 
three times higher of White List vessels to be involved in other accidents than fires. Or, put 
the other way, the odds are significantly lower of a White List vessel to be involved in a fire 
as opposed to other types of accidents. 
Register: We see that NIS ships have slightly lower odds of being involved in fires and 
explosions than NOR ships, as opposed to other types of accidents. 
Cargo: The type of cargo a ship carries does not on the whole seem to affect accident 
type a lot, as only vessels carrying fish and passengers have significantly different results than 
vessel carrying ballast. By extension, a fishing vessel carrying fish has higher odds of a 
grounding or collision as opposed to fishing vessel carrying ballast. Or put the other way: A 
fishing vessel carrying ballast has higher odds of being involved in a fire/explosion compared 
to groundings and collisions. For vessels carrying passengers, the odds of allisions are higher 
as opposed to vessels carrying ballast. 
Gross tonnage: Vessels of small and large tonnages have lower odds of being in 
groundings and allisions than in fires and explosions opposed to tonnages of 500-3000. 
Length: Vessel shorter than 24 meter all have lower odds of being in groundings and 
allisions as opposed to vessels longer than 24 meters. 
Vessel age: Vessel age turned out to be significant only for allisions in older ship, 
where the odds are lower than for fires and explosions. 
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In terms of regions, most of the differences were in the collision category. All known 
regions have higher odds of collisions than fires/explosions compared to the region Tromsø-
Russia. 
Waters: All known waters have lower odds than fires/explosions, except allisions in the 
harbour area, which has around two times higher odds. It is reasonable to link this to the 
higher odds of allisions among passenger vessels. 
Lighting: Lighting seems to have a modest effect, as only twilight and dark increases 
the odds of groundings, with dark conditions being most influential. 
Sea state has very little influence, where moderate seas actually decrease the odds of 
allisions. 
Visibility proves to be one of the most influential factors. In particular, traffic in no 
visibility increases the odds of groundings and collisions. The odds ratios of 11 and 27 are the 
largest in the entire model. This means that travelling in no visibility increases the odds of an 
accident being a collision 27 times as opposed to it being a fire/explosion. The same figure for 
groundings is around 11. Improving visibility in traffic thus has the potential to reduce the 
number of groundings and collisions considerably. Interestingly, no known visibility has 
effect on the odds of allisions. It is noteworthy that while no visibility proves highly 
influential, dark lighting conditions have relatively little influence, and only on groundings. 
Winds have relatively little influence. Strong winds increase the odds of groundings 
and allisions, and are most influential on allisions. 
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10.4 Predicted probabilities from the integrated model 
Take note that the following calculations summate probabilities in rows and not 
columns. The probabilities should therefore be compared to the descriptive statistics in the 
appendix. 
The following table lists predicted probabilities of accidents for fully and partially 
significant items from the integrated regression model. Probabilities based on significant 
items are marked with an asterisk (*). Note that as fires/explosions are the reference category, 
they are all marked as significant. This means that other items marked with an asterisk are 
significantly different from fires/explosions. The remaining insignificant items are thus 
subject to type II errors. This means the incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis, or, in 
layman’s terms, failing to detect an effect that is present. 
 
 P(Fire) P(Grd) P(Coll) P(All) 
Reference 6,86* 80,75* 7,04* 5,35*  
Vessel types     
Ferries 1,82*  79,72*  3,42  15,04* 
Passenger/Cruise 3,11*  82,98 * 5,82  8,10*  
High Speed 3,53*  71,89 * 4,80  19,79* 
Work & Service 4,04*  84,90 * 4,33  6,72*  
Break Bulk 4,65*  79,80  8,47 * 7,08*  
Nationality     
PMOU White 1,98*  88,39*  5,97*  3,65*  
Register     
NIS 2,92* 84,54*  6,61  5,94  
Registered Cargo     
Fish 3,88*  85,00*  7,15*  3,97*  
Passengers 6,36*  72,83  10,77  10,04  
Empty 9,09*  76,33*  7,80  6,78  
Gross Tonnage     
<500 5,57*  83,43  8,13  2,88*  
>3000 19,21*  66,66*  7,20*  6,93*  
Length     
<10.67 m 20,22*  61,83*  15,87*  2,08*  
10-15 m 12,59*  73,99  11,45  1,97*  
15-24 m 13,71*  71,62*  10,74  3,92*  
Vessel Age     
26+ 9,28*  78,69  7,36  4,67*  
 
 
 P(Fire) P(Grd) P(Coll) P(All) 
Region     
Sweden-Lindesnes 5,70*  76,23  12,24*  5,83  
Lindesnes-Bergen 5,77*  76,89  12,27*  5,07  
Bergen-Trondheim 4,91*  81,34  8,61*  5,14  
Trondheim-Tromsø 4,01*  85,86*  6,42*  3,72  
Waters     
Harbour Area 16,47*  42,29* 13,78  27,46* 
Outer Coastal 18,91* 59,25*  17,85  3,99*  
Along Quay 58,16*  6,76*  8,18*  26,90* 
Lighting     
Twilight 4,63*  83,52*  5,91  5,94  
Dark 3,89*  89,06*  3,73  3,32  
Sea State     
Moderate 9,30*  79,81  7,45  3,44*  
Visibility     
None 0,59*  81,10*  16,67*  1,64  
Fog/Snow 2,92*  85,56*  9,76*  1,77  
Winds     
Strong 3,01*  84,71*  2,77  9,52*  
 
 
Table 10.4.1: Predicted probabilities from the multinomic regression. 
 
These predictions are all based on a theoretical comparison case. For example, the 
probability of an allision is around ten percent points higher on a ferry than on a large fishing 
vessel. We also know that the probability of an allision is higher in strong winds. The 
prediction does not tell us the probability of an allision on a ferry in strong winds. To do this, 
we must calculate the regression equation and repeat the previous step. There are twelve 
variables in the regression table, with between 3 and 12 categories in each, which yields over 
one billion possible combinations. I will therefore manipulate one parameter at the time, and 
then focus on those parameters which maximize the probabilities of accidents. 
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10.4.1 Baseline probabilities 
The multinomic regression produced significant differences between only a few vessel 
types. These differences will be used as a basis for calculating probabilities between a few 
types of situations. First, the selected vessel types are large fishing vessels, ferries, 
passenger/cruise ships, high speed craft and break bulk vessels. This means that each of the 
main vessel groups is represented. First, we look at the baseline probabilities for these vessel 
types, given in the table below: 
Vessel type Probabilities in percent 
 Fire Grd. Coll. All. Sum
Large Fishing 6,9 80,7 7,0 5,3 100
Ferries 1,8 79,7 3,4 15,0 100
Passenger/Cruise 3,1 83,0 5,8 8,1 100
High Speed 3,5 71,9 4,8 19,8 100
Break Bulk 4,6 79,8 8,5 7,1 100
Table 10.4.1.1: Baseline probabilities of accidents for vessel types. 
Interpreting the table: Probabilities are summated in rows. The results should be read 
as follows: Given that an accident happens with a particular vessel type, what are the 
probabilities of the accident being of a particular type? The table shows that given that an 
accident happens with a large fishing vessel, there’s around an 80% chance that it will be a 
grounding. This is under the theoretical assumption that the vessel belongs to the reference 
group: it is Norwegian, belongs to NOR, carries only ballast, is of 500-300 GT, is above 24 
m, is 1-5 years old, travels in the Tromsø-Russia coastal region, in narrow coastal waters, 
under good weather conditions. (I shall expand on these assumptions below.) Take note that 
this probability is considerably higher than what the descriptive statistics say: Groundings 
account for only slightly more than 60% of all accidents overall. This tells us that there are 
considerable differences in accident likelihood according to vessel qualities. Also, keep in 
mind that these probabilities exclude variation in the other parameters. For example, since we 
are assuming that the accident happens in narrow coastal waters, variation between waters is 
excluded. 
We can also compare probabilities across vessel types. We see that the probability of a 
grounding is the highest for all vessel types. High speed craft have 10% less probability of 
being involved in a grounding compared to a passenger/cruise ship, but on the whole, 
probabilities of groundings are all in the 70-80% range. Large fishing vessels have higher 
probability of being involved in collisions than ferries, but the probabilities are all in the 4-8% 
range. Allisions are notable in larger differences across vessel groups. Here, high speed craft 
has ten percent higher probability of being involved in allisions than passenger/cruise vessels. 
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For fires, it is notable that large fishing vessels have the highest risk of around 7%, whereas 
ferries have only around 2%. 
10.5 Conditional probabilities 
I now turn to exploring the parameters of the model. To avoid extreme degrees of 
complexity, I will keep the vessel types constant, and only vary one parameter at a time. I 
begin by exploring nationality. The multinomic regression showed that there were significant 
differences between Norway and nations on the PMOU White List. The table below shows 
the same type of probabilities given in the first table, with the added parameter of nationality. 
Simplified, we can express this as: probability of accident = baseline probability + probability 
of nationality. 
Vessel type Probabilities in percent 
 Fire Grd. Coll. All.
Large Fishing White List 2,0 88,4 6,0 3,7 
Ferries White List 0,5 86,4 2,9 10,2 
Passenger/Cruise White List 0,9 88,9 4,8 5,4 
High Speed White List 1,0 80,9 4,2 13,9 
Break Bulk White List 1,3 86,7 7,1 4,8 
Table 10.5.1: Probabilities of accidents for White List vessels. 
We see that the probabilities change somewhat. The probability of groundings increases 
for all White List vessels. However, it is reduced for fires/explosions, and does not change 
considerably for collisions and allisions. Thus we can assume that White List vessels are at 
relatively higher risk of groundings than Norwegian vessels. Take note that we cannot say 
whether foreign ships in general have higher probabilities of being involved in accidents 
based on these predictions. 
I will now turn to exploring probabilities by adding one parameter to the reference 
category. I will do this in two different ways. Alternative 1 explores probabilities by vessel 
type, and for each vessel type, we see how changing a single parameter affects probability. 
Alternative 2 does the opposite, and keeps parameters constant while changing vessel type. 
These two alternative strategies yield two different types of insight. The first tells us how 
vessel types are affected by changing parameters, while the other tells us the relative influence 
parameters has on each vessel type. 
10.5.1 Conditional probabilities by vessel type 
Here, I list probabilities of parameters by vessel type. For example, how does it affect 
accident probability if a vessel changes from being a Norwegian vessel to a vessel on the 
PMOU White List? The answer, taken from table 10.5.1.1 below, is that White List vessels 
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have higher probabilities of groundings than Norwegian ones, 88.4 versus 80.7, but lower 
probabilities of other accident types. 
The baseline vessel is Norwegian, carrying ballast, 500-3000 GT, Tromsø-Russia 
region, in narrow coastal waters, in good visibility and no winds. 
Probability of accidents in large fishing vessels 
 Fire Grd. Coll. All.
Large Fishing Vessel 7,0 80,7 7,0 5,3 
PMOU White List 1,9 88,4 6,0 3,7 
Cargo: Fish 6,4 72,8 10,8 10,0 
Cargo: Empty 9,1 76,3 7,8 6,8 
>3000 GT 19,2 66,7 7,2 6,9 
Sweden-Lindesnes 5,8 76,2 12,2 5,8 
Lindesnes-Bergen 5,7 76,9 12,3 5,1 
Bergen-Trondheim 5,0 81,3 8,6 5,1 
Trondheim-Tromsø 4,0 85,9 6,4 3,7 
Harbour Area 16,4 42,3 13,8 27,5 
Outer Coastal Waters 18,9 59,3 17,8 4,0 
Along Quay 58,1 6,8 8,2 26,9 
No Visibility 0,6 81,1 16,7 1,6 
Strong Wind 3,0 84,7 2,8 9,5 
Table 10.5.1.1: Probabilities of accidents for large fishing vessels. 
The baseline relative probability of a grounding in a large fishing vessel is around 80%. 
We see that changing parameters has a relatively modest effect. For example, White List 
vessels have somewhat higher probabilities, whereas vessels above 3000 GT have somewhat 
lower. The most notable changes, however, are to do with waters. The relative probability of a 
grounding with a fishing vessels decreases progressively in outer coastal waters, in the 
harbour area and along quay. On the other hand, probabilities of allisions increase 
substantially in the same waters. Particularly notable is the fact that fires and explosions are 
much more likely to occur along quay than in any other water. 
Probability of accidents in ferries  
 Fire Grd. Coll. All.
Ferry 1,9 79,7 3,4 15,0 
PMOU White List 0,5 86,4 2,9 10,2 
Cargo: Passenger 1,5 67,2 4,9 26,4 
Cargo: Empty 2,3 74,9 3,8 19,0 
>3000 GT 5,4 70,1 3,7 20,8 
Length 15-24 4,0 78,0 5,8 12,2 
Sweden-Lindesnes 1,6 75,9 6,0 16,5 
Lindesnes-Bergen 1,6 77,7 6,1 14,6 
Bergen-Trondheim 1,3 80,1 4,2 14,4 
Trondheim-Tromsø 1,1 85,3 3,1 10,5 
Harbour Area 3,3 32,1 5,2 59,4 
Outer Coastal Waters 6,0 70,1 10,4 13,5 
Along Quay 15,1 6,6 3,9 74,4 
No Visibility 0,7 32,8 38,0 28,5 
Strong Wind 0,7 74,3 1,2 23,8 
Table 10.5.1.2: Probabilities of accidents for ferries. 
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Ferries are similar to fishing vessels in that they have a high probability of groundings, 
but the most notable change is an increase in allisions. We can note that allisions are more 
likely to happen when the vessel is carrying passengers as opposed to when it is empty. The 
greatest changes in probabilities are due to waters. Ferries have the highest probabilities of 
allisions along quay, followed by fires and explosions. 
Probability of accidents in Break Bulk vessels 
 Fire Grd. Coll. All. 
Break Bulk Vessel 4,6 79,8 8,5 7,1 
PMOU White List 1,4 86,7 7,1 4,8 
Cargo: Empty 6,1 75,5 9,4 9,0 
>3000 GT 13,4 68,1 9,0 9,5 
Length 15-24 9,4 72,1 13,2 5,3 
Sweden-Lindesnes 3,8 74,1 14,5 7,6 
Lindesnes-Bergen 3,8 75,0 14,6 6,6 
Bergen-Trondheim 3,2 79,7 10,3 6,8 
Trondheim-Tromsø 2,7 84,7 7,7 4,9 
Harbour Area 10,5 39,5 15,7 34,3 
Outer Coastal Waters 13,0 59,7 21,9 5,4 
Along Quay 43,1 7,3 10,7 38,9 
No Visibility 0,4 78,0 19,5 2,1 
Strong Wind 2,0 82,3 3,3 12,4 
Table 10.5.1.3: Probabilities of accidents for break bulk vessels. 
Break bulk vessels are notable for increased probabilities of collisions. Here, vessels of 
15-24 m are more likely to enter into collisions than vessels above 24m. Also, outer coastal 
waters are associated with higher probability of collisions. Once again, fires are most likely to 
occur along quay, and the same goes for allisions. 
Probability of accidents in passenger/cruise vessels 
 Fire Grd. Coll. All.
Passenger/cruise vessel 3,1 83,0 5,8 8,1 
PMOU White List 0,9 88,9 4,8 5,4 
Cargo: Passengers 2,9 73,5 8,7 14,9 
Cargo: Empty 4,2 79,0 6,5 10,3 
>3000 GT 9,2 73,2 6,4 11,2 
Length 15-24m 6,5 77,8 9,4 6,3 
Sweden-Lindesnes 2,6 78,5 10,1 8,8 
Lindesnes-Bergen 2,6 79,5 10,2 7,7 
Bergen-Trondheim 2,2 83,0 7,1 7,7 
Trondheim-Tromsø 1,8 87,4 5,2 5,6 
Harbour Area 7,2 41,8 11,0 40,0 
Outer Coastal Waters 9,5 67,5 16,3 6,7 
Along Quay 32,6 8,6 8,4 50,4 
No Visibility 1,1 29,6 56,0 13,3 
Strong Wind 1,3 82,8 2,2 13,7 
Table 10.5.1.4: Probabilities of accidents for passenger/cruise vessels. 
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Passenger vessels are notable due to the qualities of visibility. It is almost ten times 
more likely that a passenger vessel is involved in collision under no visibility as opposed to 
good visibility. 
Probability of accidents in High Speed Craft 
 Fire Grd. Coll. All.
High Speed Craft 3,5 71,9 4,8 19,8 
PMOU White List 1,0 80,9 4,2 13,9 
Cargo: Passengers 2,9 57,6 6,5 33,0 
Cargo: Empty 4,4 66,0 5,2 24,4 
>3000 GT 9,9 59,5 4,9 25,7 
Length 15-24m 7,6 68,8 7,9 15,7 
Sweden-Lindesnes 2,9 67,4 8,3 21,4 
Lindesnes-Bergen 3,0 69,5 8,5 19,0 
Bergen-Trondheim 2,5 72,5 5,9 19,1 
Trondheim-Tromsø 2,2 79,1 4,5 14,2 
Harbour Area 5,3 24,0 6,0 64,7 
Outer Coastal Waters 10,9 59,0 13,6 16,5 
Along Quay 21,1 4,3 4,0 70,6 
No Visibility 1,1 24,3 43,8 30,8 
Strong Wind 1,3 66,1 1,7 30,9 
Table 10.5.1.5: Probabilities of accidents for large fishing vessels. 
High speed craft are similar to other passenger vessels in that groundings are most 
likely, followed by allisions. Visibility has a big impact on the probability of collisions. 
10.5.2 Conditional probabilities by parameter. 
Here, I list probabilities by parameter type. We can ask, for example, which parameter 
affects accident probability the most among vessel types? One possible answer, taken from 
the table below, is that all White List vessel types have higher probabilities of groundings 
than Norwegian ones, whereas all White List vessels have lower probabilities of fires and 
explosions. 
Probability of accidents by vessels and nationality 
Fire Grd. Coll. All. 
Norwegian     
Large fish 7,0 80,7 7,0 5,3 
Ferries 1,9 79,7 3,4 15,0 
Passenger/Cruise 3,1 83,0 5,8 8,1 
High Speed 3,5 71,9 4,8 19,8 
Break Bulk 4,6 79,8 8,5 7,1 
White List 
Large fish 1,9 88,4 6,0 3,7 
Ferries 0,5 86,4 2,9 10,2 
Passenger/Cruise 0,9 88,9 4,8 5,4 
High Speed 1,0 80,9 4,2 13,9 
Break Bulk 1,4 86,7 7,1 4,8 
Table 10.5.2.1: Probabilities of accidents by nationalities. 
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Here, we see that white list vessels have higher relative probabilities of groundings than 
Norwegian vessels, and similarly lower probabilities of fires. It is tempting to assume that this 
is due to differences in reporting more so than substantial differences in probabilities between 
Norwegian and foreign ships. 
Probability of accidents by vessels and gross tonnage 
Fire Grd. Coll. All.
GT 500-3000
Large fish 7,0 80,7 7,0 5,3 
Ferries 1,9 79,7 3,4 15,0 
Passenger/Cruise 3,1 83,0 5,8 8,1 
High Speed 3,5 71,9 4,8 19,8 
Break Bulk 4,6 79,8 8,5 7,1 
GT >3000
LargeFish>3k 19,2 66,7 7,2 6,9 
Ferries>3k 5,4 70,1 3,7 20,8 
Passenger/Cruise>3k 9,2 73,2 6,4 11,2 
HiSpeed>3k 9,9 59,5 4,9 25,7 
BreakBulk>3k 13,4 68,1 9,0 9,5 
Table 10.5.2.2: Probabilities of accidents by gross tonnage. 
 
The general pattern appears to be that higher tonnages are associated with somewhat 
decreased probabilities of groundings, and increased probability of allisions and fires. 
Probability of accidents by vessels and cargo 
Fire Grd. Coll. All. 
Cargo: Ballast     
Large fish 7,0 80,7 7,0 5,3 
Ferries 1,9 79,7 3,4 15,0 
Passenger/Cruise 3,1 83,0 5,8 8,1 
High Speed 3,5 71,9 4,8 19,8 
Break Bulk 4,6 79,8 8,5 7,1 
Cargo: Fish 
Large Fish 6,4 72,8 10,8 10,0 
Cargo: Passenger
Passenger/Cruise 2,9 73,5 8,7 14,9 
Ferries 1,5 67,2 4,9 26,4 
High Speed 2,9 57,6 6,5 33,0 
Cargo: Empty 
Large fish 9,1 76,3 7,8 6,8 
Passenger/Cruise 4,2 79,0 6,5 10,3 
Ferries 2,3 74,9 3,8 19,0 
High Speed 4,4 66,0 5,2 24,4 
Break Bulk 6,1 75,5 9,4 9,0 
Table 10.5.2.3: Probabilities of accidents by cargo. 
Some of the theoretically possible combinations are not logically meaningful. For 
example, there is no reason to estimate the probability of a grounding for a passenger vessel 
carrying fish. It is noteworthy, though, that the relative probability of a grounding decreases 
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when a fishing vessel carries fish instead of ballast. It is also noteworthy that the probabilities 
for the various passenger vessel types change according to whether they carry passengers or 
are empty. Groundings are more likely to happen when the vessels are empty, whereas 
allisions are more likely when they carry passengers. 
Probability of accidents by vessels and length 
Fire Grd. Coll. All. 
Length >24     
Ferries 1,9 79,7 3,4 15,0 
Passenger/Cruise 3,1 83,0 5,8 8,1 
High Speed 3,5 71,9 4,8 19,8 
Break Bulk 4,6 79,8 8,5 7,1 
Length 15-24 
Ferries 4,0 78,0 5,8 12,2 
Passenger/Cruise 6,5 77,8 9,4 6,3 
High Speed 7,6 68,8 7,9 15,7 
Break Bulk 9,4 72,1 13,2 5,3 
Table 10.5.2.4: Probabilities of accidents by length. 
Length has not been used for calculations involving fishing vessels, as they are already 
categorized according to whether they are above or below 15 m. I therefore limit the analysis 
to passenger and cargo type vessels. Here, we see that the greatest change comes for collisions 
with break bulk vessels, which are more likely to collide if they are shorter. Longer vessels 
are more likely in allisions and fires than shorter ones. 
Probability of accidents by vessels and region. 
Fire Grd. Coll. All. 
Tromsø-Russia 
Large fish 7,0 80,7 7,0 5,3 
Ferries 1,9 79,7 3,4 15,0 
Passenger/Cruise 3,1 83,0 5,8 8,1 
High Speed 3,5 71,9 4,8 19,8 
Break Bulk 4,6 79,8 8,5 7,1 
Sweden-Lindesnes 
Large fish 5,8 76,2 12,2 5,8 
Ferries 1,6 75,9 6,0 16,5 
Passenger/Cruise 2,6 78,5 10,1 8,8 
High Speed 2,9 67,4 8,3 21,4 
Break Bulk 3,8 74,1 14,5 7,6 
Lindesnes-Bergen 
Large fish 5,7 76,9 12,3 5,1 
Ferries 2,6 79,5 10,2 7,7 
Passenger/Cruise 1,6 77,7 6,1 14,6 
High Speed 3,0 69,5 8,5 19,0 
Break Bulk 3,8 75,0 14,6 6,6 
Bergen-Trondheim 
Large fish 5,0 81,3 8,6 5,1 
Ferries 1,3 80,1 4,2 14,4 
Passenger/Cruise 2,2 83,0 7,1 7,7 
High Speed 2,5 72,5 5,9 19,1 
Break Bulk 3,2 79,7 10,3 6,8 
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Trondheim-Tromsø
Large fish 4,0 85,9 6,4 3,7 
Ferries 1,1 85,3 3,1 10,5 
Passenger/Cruise 1,8 87,4 5,2 5,6 
High Speed 2,2 79,1 4,5 14,2 
Break Bulk 2,7 84,7 7,7 4,9 
Table 10.5.2.5: Probabilities of accidents by region. 
We can note that there are no radical differences in groundings between regions. Break 
bulk vessels are more likely to collide in the southern regions. Apart from this, variation in 
vessel types and regions does not add all that much new information. 
Probability of accidents by vessels and waters. 
Fire Grd. Coll. All. 
Narrow Coastal     
Large fish 7,0 80,7 7,0 5,3 
Ferries 1,9 79,7 3,4 15,0 
Passenger/Cruise 3,1 83,0 5,8 8,1 
High Speed 3,5 71,9 4,8 19,8 
Break Bulk 4,6 79,8 8,5 7,1 
Harbour Area 
Large fish 16,4 42,3 13,8 27,5 
Ferries 3,3 32,1 5,2 59,4 
Passenger/Cruise 7,2 41,8 11,0 40,0 
High Speed 5,3 24,0 6,0 64,7 
Break Bulk 10,5 39,5 15,7 34,3 
Outer Coastal 
Large fish 18,9 59,3 17,8 4,0 
Ferries 6,0 70,1 10,4 13,5 
Passenger/Cruise 9,5 67,5 16,3 6,7 
High Speed 13,0 59,7 21,9 5,4 
Break Bulk 10,9 59,0 13,6 16,5 
Along Quay 
Large fish 58,1 6,8 8,2 26,9 
Ferries 15,1 6,6 3,9 74,4 
Passenger/Cruise 32,6 8,6 8,4 50,4 
High Speed 21,1 4,3 4,0 70,6 
Break Bulk 43,1 7,3 10,7 38,9 
Table 10.5.2.6: Probabilities of accidents by waters. 
Waters prove to influence probabilities a lot. As we have already seen, groundings are 
most likely in narrow coastal waters, followed by outer coastal and the harbour area. 
Collisions are most probable in outer coastal waters, followed by the harbour area. Allisions 
are most likely along quay and in the harbour area. (This is very much common sense.) 
Somewhat more surprisingly, fires and explosions are much more probable along quay than in 
any other water. 
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Probability of accidents by vessels and visibility 
Fire Grd. Coll. All. 
Good visibility     
Large fish 7,0 80,7 7,0 5,3 
Ferries 1,9 79,7 3,4 15,0 
Passenger/Cruise 3,1 83,0 5,8 8,1 
High Speed 3,5 71,9 4,8 19,8 
Break Bulk 4,6 79,8 8,5 7,1 
No visibility 
Large fish 0,6 81,1 16,7 1,6 
Ferries 0,7 32,8 38,0 28,5 
Passenger/Cruise 1,1 29,6 56,0 13,3 
High Speed 1,1 24,3 43,8 30,8 
Break Bulk 0,4 78,0 19,5 2,1 
Table 10.5.2.7: Probabilities of accidents by visibility. 
Visibility has rather different types of effects for different types of vessels and 
accidents. Notably, it is much less likely that a grounding with a passenger type vessel 
happens under no visibility than in good visibility. On the other hand, it is ten times more 
likely that a collision will happen to a passenger type vessel under no visibility. Probabilities 
of allisions also increase for passenger type vessels under no visibility. 
Probability of accidents by vessels and winds. 
Fire Grd. Coll. All.
No winds     
Large fish 7,0 80,7 7,0 5,3 
Ferries 1,9 79,7 3,4 15,0 
Passenger/Cruise 3,1 83,0 5,8 8,1 
High Speed 3,5 71,9 4,8 19,8 
Break Bulk 4,6 79,8 8,5 7,1 
Strong Winds 
Large fish 3,0 84,7 2,8 9,5 
Ferries 0,7 74,3 1,2 23,8 
Passenger/Cruise 1,3 82,8 2,2 13,7 
High Speed 1,3 66,1 1,7 30,9 
Break Bulk 2,0 82,3 3,3 12,4 
Table 10.5.2.8: Probabilities of accidents by winds. 
Winds have a relatively modest effect on probabilities. Strong winds decrease the 
probabilities of collisions, and increase the probability of allisions. 
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10.6 Predicted probabilities of common traits 
In chapter 8 I listed common traits of accidents. These traits were listed one by one, 
meaning that for example fires and explosions were most common on small fishing vessels, 
and that they were most common on vessels below 500GT, to use two examples. Now, I will 
investigate what happens if all the common traits co-occur. I will compare this to the baseline 
probabilities given in chapter 10.4. The reference scenario is thus a large fishing vessel, 
registered in NOR, with a gross tonnage of 500-3000, longer than 24 m, traveling in narrow 
coastal waters in the Tromsø-Russia region under good weather conditions. 
For fires/explosions, this means I will calculate the relative probability of a fire on a 
small fishing vessel below 500 GT, with a length of 10-15 m, registered in NOR, carrying 
ballast, travelling in outer coastal waters in the Trondheim-Tromsø region, under good 
weather conditions. 
For groundings, I will calculate the relative probability for a break bulk vessel, less than 
500 GT, longer than 24 m, registered in NOR, carrying ballast, longer than 24 m, traveling in 
narrow coastal waters in the Tromsø-Russia region in good weather conditions. 
For collisions, I will calculate the relative probability for large fishing vessels, below 
500 GT, carrying ballast, registered in NOR, longer than 24 m, traveling in outer coastal 
waters in the Tromsø-Russia region under good weather conditions. 
For allisions, I will calculate the relative probability for a ferry with a GT of 500-3000, 
registered in NOR, longer than 24 m, travelling in narrow coastal waters in the Lindesnes-
Bergen region, under good weather conditions. The results are given in the table below. 
 
 P(Fire) P(Grd.) P(Coll.) P(All.) 
Reference 6,9 % 80,8 % 7,0 % 5,3 %  
Common traits fire 19,5 % 58,7 % 20,8 % 0,9 % 
Common traits grounding 2,1 % 90,4 % 5,1 % 2,4 % 
Common traits collision 15,4 % 61,7 % 20,7 % 2,2 % 
Common traits allision 1,6 % 77,7 % 6,1 % 14,6 % 
Table 10.6.1: Probabilities of common traits scenario. 
The table shows that for fires, the common traits scenario actually increases the 
probability of an accident being a fire by more than 10%. Another way of seeing it is that fires 
are around three times more likely under the common traits scenario than the reference 
scenario. This suggests that the common traits scenario is a realistic scenario for fires and 
explosions.  
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For groundings, the common traits scenario increases probability by around 10%. This 
is a smaller change relatively of around 1.1 times the reference, but also suggests that the 
scenario is realistic. 
 For collisions, the common traits scenario increases probability by 13%. This amounts 
to a probability which is around three times higher than the reference. Take note that this 
scenario also increases the probability of a fire somewhat.  
For allisions, the common traits scenario increases the probability by around 10% 
compared to the reference. Relatively speaking, this is three times higher than the reference. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the common traits scenario is indeed 
realistic, where most of the accident types are around three times more likely under their 
specific common traits scenario than under the reference scenario.  
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10.7 High risk profiles of accidents 
In this section, we see what combination of traits that maximize the probabilities of each 
type of accident. I do this by adding one parameter at a time. A summary is given at the end 
of this section. 
So far, I have investigated probabilities of accidents by adding the effects of one 
parameter only. I have also investigated the probabilities of combinations of common traits. 
All the combinations of common traits appear realistic, in that they tend to increase the 
probability of the given accident type compared to the reference category. 
An interesting question in the extension of this is: What combination of traits 
maximizes the probability of a given type of accident? Take note that this is a slightly 
theoretical exercise, regarding the combinations of gross tonnages and length in particular. 
Some of the combinations listed below might not be very realistic; this is an issue for expert 
opinion. 
Let’s return to the baseline results from setting all variables to their reference categories. 
This means a Norwegian fishing vessel longer than 24 m, GT 500-3000, traveling in narrow 
coastal waters in good weather conditions. Other variables create very little variation, so I will 
disregard the effects of cargo and regions, for example. I begin by reviewing the baseline 
probabilities as listed below: 
 
Parameter P (Grd) P (Coll) P (All) P (Fire)
Reference 80.7 % 7.0 % 5.3 % 6.9 %
Table 10.7.1: Baseline probabilities of accidents using reference categories. 
 
There is no direct way of calculating which coefficients maximize the probability of any 
given outcome. Instead, I work iteratively, by adding one parameter at a time, to find the 
parameter that maximizes probability. We see that the probability of a grounding is already 
high, which reflects the fact that groundings are the most common accidents overall, and that 
the reference category realistically reflects a grounding scenario. 
10.7.1 Adjusting for vessel types 
I begin by manipulating vessel types. The reference category is large fishing vessels. 
What happens to the probabilities as we change vessel types? The table below lists the vessel 
type which yields the maximum probability for each accident type.   
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Parameters P (Grd) P (Coll) P (All) P (Fire) 
Work/Service 84,9 % 4,3 % 6,7 % 4,0 % 
Break Bulk 79,8 % 8,5 % 7,1 % 4,6 % 
High speed 71,9 % 4,8 % 19,8 % 3,5 % 
Large fishing 80,7 % 7,0 % 5,3 % 6,9 % 
Table 10.7.1.1: Maximum probabilities by vessel types. 
 
We see that when it comes to groundings, work and service vessels are somewhat more 
likely to enter into groundings than the other vessels. When it comes to collisions, break bulk 
vessels are slightly more likely to enter into collisions than the reference category. High speed 
craft are more likely than any other vessel type to enter into allisions, although it should be 
noted that they still are even more likely to be involved in groundings. An allision scenario is 
therefore rather similar to a groundings scenario. Large fishing vessels remain the vessels 
most likely to enter into fires. 
10.7.2 Adjusting for gross tonnages 
I now maintain the previous vessel types, and vary between gross tonnages. This means 
that for large fishing vessels, for example, we try to find the gross tonnage that increases the 
probability of a grounding, and for high speed craft we try to find the GT that increases the 
probability of an allision. The results are given in the table below. 
 
Parameters P (Grd) P (Coll) P (All) P (Fire) 
Work/service, GT<500 88.1 % 5.0 % 3.6 % 3.3 % 
Break bulk, GT<500 82.6 % 9.8 % 3.8 % 3.8 % 
High speed, GT med. 71.9 % 4.8 % 19.8 % 3.5 % 
Large fishing, GT >3000 66.7 % 7.2 % 6.9 % 19.2 % 
Table 10.7.2.1: Maximum probabilities by vessel type and gross tonnage. 
 
We see that work/service vessels below 500 GT are more likely to enter into groundings 
than the reference category. Break bulk vessels below 500 GT are more likely to enter into 
collisions. High speed craft of medium GT remain most likely to enter into allisions. Large 
fishing vessels above 3000 GT are more likely to enter into fires. The greatest change from 
the reference category is for fires/explosions, where fishing vessels above 3000 GT are three 
times more likely to enter into fires than medium sized GTs.   
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10.7.3 Adjusting for length 
I retain the previous combinations, and see what lengths maximize probabilities of 
accidents. The results are given in the table below. 
 
Parameters P (Grd) P (Coll) P (All) P (Fire) 
Work/service, GT<500, >24m 88.1 % 5.0 % 3.6 % 3.3 % 
Break bulk, GT<500, <10.7m 64.6 % 22.5 % 1.5 % 11.4 % 
High speed, GT med, >24m 71.9 % 4.8 % 19.8 % 3.5 % 
Large fishing, GT >3000, 15-24m 52,1 % 9,7 % 4,5 % 44.7 % 
Table 10.7.3.1: Maximum probabilities by vessel type, gross tonnage and length. 
 
For groundings, the reference category of vessels longer than 24 m remains most likely. 
For collisions, lengths below 10.7 m are most likely. For allisions, the reference category 
above 24 m remains most likely.  For fires, fishing vessels between 15-24 m are most likely to 
enter into fires. The most substantial changes are for collisions and fires. Collisions become 
more than twice as likely when vessels are shorter than the reference category, and fires 
become twice as likely when the length is reduced from above 24 m to between 15 and 24. 
10.7.4 Adjusting for waters. 
The reference category is narrow coastal waters. We will now see what happens when 
we try to find the type of waters that maximizes the probability of each type of accident. The 
results are given in the table below. 
 
Parameters P (Grd) P (Coll) P (All) P (Fire)
Work/service, GT<500, >24m, narrow coastal 88,1 % 5,0 % 3,6 % 3,3 %
Break bulk, GT<500, <10.7m, outer coastal  34,6 % 41,7 % 0,8 % 22,9 %
High speed, GT med, >24m, harbour area 42,3 % 13,8 % 27,5 % 16,5 %
Large fishing, GT >3000, 15-24m, along quay 1,3 % 3,5 % 6,9 % 88,3 %
Table 10.7.4.1: Maximum probabilities by vessel type, gross tonnage, length and waters. 
 
For groundings, the reference category of traveling in narrow coastal waters remains the 
most probable scenario. For collisions, the probability increases drastically, from around 20 to 
around 40 when traveling in outer coastal waters. Allisions become somewhat more likely in 
the harbour area, but take note that groundings are still more probable under this scenario. 
Fires become extremely likely along quay, as opposed to in narrow coastal waters, with a 
increase from 45 to almost 90%. 
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10.7.5 Adjusting for lighting and sea state 
No changes in lighting conditions and sea states substantially increase the probabilities 
of accidents. This means that good light and calm seas are the most likely scenarios for all 
types of accidents. 
10.7.6 Adjusting for visibility 
The results showed that changing from good visibility to no visibility increased the 
probability of collisions. The effect of this change is shown in the table below. 
Parameters P (Grd) P (Coll) P (All) P (Fire) 
Work/service, GT<500, >24m, 
narrow coastal, good visibility. 
88,1 % 5,0 % 3,6 % 3,3 % 
Break bulk, GT<500, <10.7m,  
outer coastal, no visibility. 
25,6 % 72,7 % 0,2 % 1,5 % 
High speed, GT med, >24m,  
harbour area, good visibility. 
42,3 % 13,8 % 27,5 % 16,5 % 
Large fishing, GT >3000, 15-24m, 
along quay, good visibility. 
1,3 % 3,5 % 6,9 % 88,3 % 
Table 10.7.6.1: Maximum probabilities by vessel type, gross tonnage, length, waters and visibility. 
 
We see that the probability of collisions increases quite dramatically when visibility 
changes from good to none, from around 40 to over 70. Other accidents do not increase their 
probabilities due to changes in visibility. 
10.7.7 Adjusting for winds 
The results showed that strong winds increased the probability of groundings somewhat. 
The effect of strong winds is shown in the table below. 
Parameters P (Grd) P (Coll) P (All) P (Fire)
Work/service, GT<500, >24m,  
narrow coastal, good visibility, strong winds.
90,3 % 1,9 % 6,3 % 1,4 %
Break bulk, GT<500, <10.7m,  
outer coastal, no visibility, calm winds. 
25,6 % 72,7 % 0,2 % 1,5 %
High speed, GT med, >24m, harbour area,  
good visibility, calm winds. 
42,3 % 13,8 % 27,5 % 16,5 %
Large fishing, GT >3000, 15-24m,  
along quay, good visibility, calm winds. 
1,3 % 3,5 % 6,9 % 88,3 %
Table 10.7.7.1: Maximum probabilities by vessel type, gross tonnage, length, waters ,visibility and winds. 
 
Strong winds increase the probability of groundings slightly, but does not increase the 
probability of any other accident.   
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10.7.8 Summary 
Groundings: The scenario with the highest probability of groundings is thus a 
work/service vessel (GT <500, length >24 m), traveling in narrow coastal waters, with good 
visibility and in strong winds. Under these circumstances, it is more than 90% likely that an 
accident will be a grounding. Most of this probability seems to come from the type of waters. 
Groundings are thus a phenomenon closely linked to narrow coastal waters. 
Collisions: The scenario with the highest probability of collisions is a break bulk vessel 
(GT <500, Length <10.7 m), traveling in outer coastal waters, under no visibility in good 
weather. (Take note that this weather combination is not realistic. However, the effect of 
visibility is much stronger than any weather effect anyway.) Under these circumstances, it is 
more than 70% likely that an accident will be a collision. Once again, waters probably 
influence this more than any other factor, although visibility has a fairly strong effect. 
Collisions are thus a phenomenon closely linked to outer coastal waters and no visibility. 
Allisions: The scenario with the highest probability of an allision is a high speed craft 
(GT medium, length >24 m), traveling in the harbour area under good weather conditions. 
Under these circumstances, it is around 27% likely that an accident will be an allision. This is 
the lowest maximum predicted probability for all accidents types. Additionally, a grounding is 
actually more likely than an allision under these circumstances. Most of the increase in 
probability appears to be due to type of craft. Waters are not as influential here as with other 
types of accidents. This is interesting, as high speed craft can be assumed to arrive and depart 
from dock more often than other types of vessel, due to their role in passenger traffic. 
Fires and explosions: The scenario with the highest probability of a fire is a large 
fishing vessel (GT >3000, 15-24m) lying along quay, in good visibility and calm winds. 
Under these conditions, it is around 90% probable that an accident will be a fire. A lot of this 
comes from the fact that other types of accidents are much more unlikely while the vessel is in 
dock. However, there appears to be quite a lot of variation due to gross tonnage and length, 
which warrants further investigation. 
This concludes the analysis of differences in accident traits from the integrated model. 
The results are discussed in chapter 11.1. Following next in chapters 10.8 through 10.10 are a 
few analyses of additional qualities such as time, certification and operational stage. These are 
discussed in chapter 11.2. Then there are analyses of severity, injuries and fatalities in 
chapters 10.11 through 10.13. These are discussed in chapter 11.3. 
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10.8 Multinomic analysis of time categories. 
I performed a multinomic regression of time categories to see whether probabilities of 
accidents fluctuate significantly over the years. This was done individually, as I did not want 
to interfere with the already high complexity of the integrated model. NB! This model 
includes data on capsizing, as the accident type satisfied the criteria for inclusion at the time 
of running the model. However, this results in the model not being directly comparable to the 
descriptive statistics. Due to the very small size of capsizings, the substantial impact of 
inclusion is very small indeed. I therefore include this part of the analysis. 
The analysis is laid out in the same way as the previous models. For reference 
categories, we set the third category of years from 2003-2014, the third quarter of the year 
ranging from July through September, and the afternoon hours between 13 and 18. 
The model was statistically significant at the .000 level, with a Cox & Snell 
approximate explained variation of around 10%, which suggests that variation in time has a 
modest effect on accidents. The results are given below in table 10.8.1. 
 
 Grounding Capsizing Collision Allision 
 B SE p OR B SE p OR B SE p OR B SE p OR 
Intercept 1,484 0,14 0,00  -1,619 0,31 0,00 0,174 0,17 0,30 1,094 0,16 0,00 
1981-1991 -0,281 0,11 0,01 0,755 -0,308 0,23 0,17 0,735 0,415 0,14 0,00 1,515 -1,429 0,13 0,00 0,239
1992-2002 0,381 0,13 0,00 1,463 0,267 0,25 0,29 1,307 0,931 0,15 0,00 2,536 -0,479 0,15 0,00 0,619
Quarter 1 0,148 0,12 0,23 1,160 0,786 0,28 0,01 2,194 -0,148 0,15 0,32 0,863 0,068 0,15 0,66 1,070
Quarter 2 -0,028 0,13 0,83 0,972 0,206 0,31 0,51 1,229 0,084 0,15 0,58 1,088 0,015 0,16 0,93 1,015
Quarter 4 0,339 0,13 0,01 1,403 0,543 0,29 0,06 1,721 -0,148 0,15 0,33 0,863 0,130 0,16 0,40 1,139
Time 01-06 0,505 0,13 0,00 1,657 -1,101 0,36 0,00 0,333 -0,459 0,16 0,01 0,632 -1,012 0,19 0,00 0,364
Time 07-12 -0,126 0,13 0,33 0,882 -0,205 0,25 0,42 0,815 -0,194 0,15 0,19 0,824 -0,179 0,15 0,23 0,837
Time 19-23 0,543 0,15 0,00 1,721 -0,350 0,31 0,26 0,705 -0,165 0,17 0,34 0,848 -0,063 0,17 0,71 0,939
Time Unkn. 0,002 0,14 0,99 1,002 0,050 0,27 0,85 1,052 -0,616 0,18 0,00 0,540 -0,774 0,19 0,00 0,461
Table 10.8.1: Multinomic regression of accidents on time (N=5.997). 
The results show that all accidents vary significantly over time compared to fires and 
explosions, although capsizing is only significantly different on a few categories.  
For the years category: The odds of grounding and collisions and (in particular) 
allisions were lower in 81-91 compared to the last 11 years, whereas the odds of collisions 
were higher. For the years 92-02 however, the odds of groundings and collisions were higher, 
while the odds of allisions were lower, although not as low as for 81-91. This can be 
interpreted as saying that given that an accident happens, it is more likely today that it is an 
allision rather than a fire than in the past two periods. It is less likely in the last period that an 
accident was a grounding or a collision as opposed to a fire than it was in the previous period. 
The effects are relatively modest, though. 
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For the seasons, there are fewer significant results. Here, the most notable result is that 
the odds of a capsizing are around two times higher in the first quarter. 
For the accident times, the most notable result is that the odds of groundings increase 
at night, while all other accidents decrease their odds at night, compared to fires and 
explosions. 
10.8.1 Probabilities of time categories 
Only the significant items from the analysis were retained. The results are given in the 
table below. The reference categories are the periods 2003-2014 and the hours 13-18. 
 
 P(Fire) P(Grd) P(Cap) P(Coll) P(All) 
1981-1991 14,3 47,6 2,1 25,8 10,2  
1992-2002 7,9 51,3 2,1 24,0 14,7  
2003-2014 10,2 45,1 2,0 12,2 30,5  
Time 01-06 9,8 71,6 0,6 7,4 10,6  
Table 10.8.1.1: Probabilities of accidents by time categories. 
For the year categories, we see that the probabilities of groundings and fires fluctuate 
somewhat, collisions decrease, whereas allisions increase. The only significant difference 
between accident hours is between day and night, where groundings are much more likely to 
occur at night. 
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10.9 Multinomic analysis of certification. 
I performed a separate multinomic regression analysis on the certification areas, see 
table 10.9.1 below. The reference category was set to minor coastal traffic. The model as a 
whole was statistically significant at the .000 level, with a Cox & Snell approximate explained 
variation of 15%.  
 
 Grounding Collision Allision 
 B SE p OR B SE p OR B SE p OR 
Intercept 2,562 0,19 0,00  0,756 0,22 0,00  0,517 0,23 0,02  
Enclosed waters -0,260 0,40 0,51 0,771 0,711 0,43 0,10 2,035 0,841 0,44 0,05 2,318 
Protected waters -0,064 0,30 0,83 0,938 0,084 0,35 0,81 1,088 1,998 0,33 0,00 7,373 
Inshore u 5 nm -0,380 0,29 0,19 0,684 -0,130 0,34 0,70 0,878 0,638 0,33 0,05 1,892 
Inshore u 25 nm -0,741 0,28 0,01 0,476 -0,504 0,33 0,13 0,604 -0,239 0,34 0,48 0,788 
Major coastal 0,155 0,43 0,72 1,168 0,631 0,48 0,19 1,879 -1,077 0,67 0,11 0,341 
North & Eastern Sea 0,281 0,31 0,36 1,324 0,343 0,35 0,33 1,409 -0,463 0,40 0,25 0,629 
European 0,181 0,36 0,62 1,199 -0,158 0,43 0,72 0,854 0,452 0,42 0,28 1,572 
International/overseas -1,464 0,51 0,00 0,231 -0,063 0,55 0,91 0,939 -0,363 0,60 0,55 0,696 
Unlimited -0,329 0,33 0,32 0,720 -0,030 0,38 0,94 0,971 0,209 0,39 0,59 1,232 
Fjord fishing -1,116 0,59 0,06 0,328 0,256 0,62 0,68 1,292 -20,752 0,00 . 0,000 
Coastal fishing -1,503 0,23 0,00 0,222 -0,795 0,27 0,00 0,452 -2,571 0,41 0,00 0,076 
Bank fishing -0,924 0,24 0,00 0,397 -0,892 0,29 0,00 0,410 -1,886 0,38 0,00 0,152 
Sea fishing -0,483 0,24 0,04 0,617 -0,444 0,28 0,12 0,641 -1,578 0,36 0,00 0,206 
Others -1,428 0,20 0,00 0,240 -0,617 0,23 0,01 0,540 -1,033 0,25 0,00 0,356 
Certificate B/C/D -0,933 0,39 0,02 0,393 -2,365 0,81 0,00 0,094 1,275 0,41 0,00 3,577 
Table 10.9.1: Multinomic regression of accidents on certification (N=5 858). 
The results show that there are significant results for around two thirds of all the 
certification categories. For groundings, the odds are lower for most of the fishing categories, 
as well as for inshore under 25 n.m. and international traffic. Vessels certified for coastal 
fishing have the most decreased odds of groundings. For collisions, there are fewer significant 
differences, but the coastal and bank fishing certifications have decreased odds. For allisions, 
enclosed and in particular protected waters have highly increased odds. This is not surprising, 
knowing the strong correlation between allisions and passenger vessels. It is also noteworthy 
that three of the fishing categories have significantly and substantially lower odds of allisions. 
This could simply be an expression of these vessels being in considerably less contact with 
quays. 
10.9.1 Predicted probabilities of certification. 
The only categories consistently significant across accident types are the certifications 
for fishing vessels, as well as the B/C/D certificates. The probabilities for these are given in 
table 10.9.1.1 on the next page. 
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 Fire Grd. Coll. All. 
Minor Coastal 5,6 72,9 12,0 9,4 
Coastal fishing 20,1 58,0 19,3 2,6 
Bank fishing 13,8 70,7 12,0 3,5 
Sea fishing 9,3 74,7 12,8 3,2 
Certificate B/C/D 8,1 41,5 1,6 48,8 
Table 10.9.1.1: Predicted probabilities of accidents by certification (N=5 858). 
We see that probabilities of accidents vary somewhat across fishing vessels. Fishing 
vessels certified for coastal fishing are less likely than other fishing vessels to be involved in 
groundings, but more likely to be involved in collisions. Minor coastal is most likely of 
certifications to be involved in allisions, whereas coastal fishing is most likely to be involved 
in fires. We also see that the B/C/D certificates are more likely to be involved in groundings 
and allisions than other accident types. 
10.10 Multinomic analysis of operational state. 
I performed a separate multinomic regression analysis on operational states. The 
reference category was set to underway. The model as a whole was statistically significant at 
the .000 level, with a Cox & Snell approximate explained variation of 34,7%. The results are 
given in table 10.9.1 below. 
 
 Grounding Collision Allision 
 B SE p OR B SE p OR B SE p OR 
Intercept 2,528 0,07 0,00  0,934 0,08 0,00  -0,863 0,12 0,00  
Arriving Port 0,576 0,28 0,04 1,778 0,717 0,30 0,02 2,048 4,444 0,30 0,00 85,135 
Along Quay -4,760 0,25 0,00 0,009 -2,447 0,19 0,00 0,087 -0,817 0,23 0,00 0,442 
Departing Port -0,021 0,32 0,95 0,979 0,827 0,34 0,01 2,285 2,377 0,36 0,00 10,771 
Fishing -2,632 0,19 0,00 0,072 -1,137 0,19 0,00 0,321 -22,266 0,00 . 2,14E-10 
Other Known -2,387 0,21 0,00 0,092 -2,198 0,32 0,00 0,111 0,926 0,24 0,00 2,524 
Unknown -1,195 0,15 0,00 0,303 -1,135 0,19 0,00 0,321 0,326 0,23 0,15 1,385 
Table 10.9.1: Multinomic regression of accidents on operational stage (N=5 858). 
There was a statistical problem, presumably due to the low number of allisions during 
fishing, which results in no available significance for fishing in allisions. Although the 
validity of the model fit is uncertain, the model is still significant at the .000 level. I therefore 
proceed presenting the results. 
The results show that there are significant differences among almost all the operational 
stages. Arriving port increases the odds of a grounding, a collision or an allision. In 
particular, port arrival is noteworthy, as the odds of an accident being an allision rather than a 
fire on arrival of port are 85 times higher. The vessel being along quay decreases the odds of 
groundings and collisions substantially. It also decreases the odds of allisions, but not quite as 
much. Put in another way, the most likely accident along quay is a fire/explosion, followed by 
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an allision. Departing port increases the odds of a collision somewhat, but once again 
allisions have the highest increase in odds. Vessels that are busy fishing have highly 
decreased odds of groundings, and also substantial decrease in odds of collisions. I will not 
get into details on the other known stages, except to say that all other known operational 
stages are associated with decreased odds of groundings and collisions, but increased odds of 
allisions, compared to being underway. 
In all, the model to a large degree serves to reinforce the previous findings from the 
integrated model featuring vessel, geographical and time qualities. In particular, the 
operational stage can be seen as a slightly different expression of the information in the 
“waters” category. 
10.10.1 Predicted probabilities of operational states. 
Predicted probabilities of operational states are given in table 10.10.1 below. 
 
 Fire Grd Coll All 
Underway 6,1 76,0 15,4 2,6 
Arriving Port 1,6 34,6 8,1 55,8 
Along Quay 66,1 7,1 14,5 12,3 
Departing Port 4,2 51,9 24,6 19,2 
Table 10.10.1: Predicted probabilities of accidents by operational state (N=5 858). 
 
We can note that probabilities vary quite a lot depending on operational stages. Take 
note that this analysis does not differentiate between vessel types, so this is an average effect 
across vessels. Most of these predictions make common sense. It is more likely that a 
grounding happens while the vessel is underway, and more likely that an allision happens in 
proximity of port. We can take note that allisions are much more likely on arrival of port than 
on departure, whereas the reverse is true for groundings. Fires are most likely to happen along 
quay. The findings mostly reinforce the findings on waters. 
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10.11 Logistic regression analysis of severity 
I performed four individual logistic regressions on severity in fires/explosions, 
groundings, collisions and allisions. The results are given below in table 10.11.1. 
 Fire (N=587) Grounding (N=3380) Collision (N=275) Allision (N=449) 
 B SE p OR B SE p OR B SE p OR B SE p OR 
Vessel types        
Fishing <15m - - - - 0,012 0,31 0,97 1,012 -2,576 1,32 0,05 0,076 -3,872 1,81 0,03 0,021
Ferries - - - - -0,551 0,23 0,02 0,576 -0,140 1,03 0,89 0,869 -1,754 0,72 0,02 0,173
Pass./cruise - - - - -0,392 0,25 0,12 0,676 -0,684 0,86 0,43 0,505 -2,796 0,95 0,00 0,061
High Speed - - - - 0,094 0,33 0,77 1,098 -19,959 15826,28 1,00 0,000 -1,212 0,81 0,14 0,297
Other Pass. - - - - -0,103 0,32 0,74 0,903 -2,202 1,56 0,16 0,111 -20,446 17873,65 1,00 0,000
Work/Service - - - - -0,546 0,25 0,03 0,579 -21,182 12760,90 1,00 0,000 -3,359 1,74 0,05 0,035
Offshore Service - - - - -0,012 0,39 0,98 0,988 0,533 1,44 0,71 1,704 -0,182 1,37 0,90 0,834
Well Boats - - - - -0,184 0,30 0,54 0,832 -0,938 1,40 0,50 0,391 -20,608 23146,76 1,00 0,000
Tankers - - - - -0,065 0,33 0,84 0,937 -1,559 1,54 0,31 0,210 -22,048 11478,99 1,00 0,000
Bulk - - - - -0,116 0,25 0,64 0,890 -0,994 1,02 0,33 0,370 -1,624 1,32 0,22 0,197
Break Bulk - - - - -0,025 0,16 0,87 0,975 -2,286 0,78 0,00 0,102 -1,437 0,82 0,08 0,238
Register        
NIS - - - - 0,761 0,19 0,00 2,141 - - - - - - - -
Unknown - - - - 0,437 0,17 0,01 1,549 - - - - - - - -
Foreign - - - - 0,180 0,71 0,80 1,198 - - - - - - - -
Cargo        
Passengers -1,133 0,39 0,00 0,322 0,311 0,21 0,14 1,364 -1,105 0,84 0,19 0,331 - - - -
Fish 0,088 0,31 0,78 1,092 0,239 0,12 0,05 1,270 -1,010 0,48 0,04 0,364 - - - -
Dry/Bulk/Cont. -0,578 0,53 0,28 0,561 0,409 0,17 0,01 1,506 0,449 0,70 0,52 1,566 - - - -
Bulk/Ore/Grain/Coal 1,548 0,71 0,03 4,701 0,557 0,19 0,00 1,746 1,276 0,89 0,15 3,583 - - - -
Other Known 0,239 1,03 0,82 1,270 0,195 0,35 0,57 1,216 3,173 1,77 0,07 23,869 - - - -
Oil/Chem/Gas -0,600 1,20 0,62 0,549 0,341 0,39 0,39 1,406 1,787 1,64 0,28 5,971 - - - -
Empty 0,477 0,31 0,12 1,611 0,383 0,19 0,04 1,467 -0,508 0,76 0,50 0,602 - - - -
Unknown 0,004 0,27 0,99 1,004 0,289 0,15 0,06 1,335 0,456 0,57 0,43 1,578 - - - -
Length        
<10.67 m 1,620 0,27 0,00 5,055 1,151 0,32 0,00 3,162 3,061 1,29 0,02 21,343 4,327 1,63 0,01 75,748
10.67-15 m 71,261 0,31 0,00 3,530 0,715 0,30 0,02 2,045 2,654 1,27 0,04 14,213 6,809 2,16 0,00 905,626
15-24 m 0,515 0,25 0,04 1,673 0,445 0,14 0,00 1,560 0,733 0,61 0,23 2,082 -0,689 0,85 0,42 0,502
Unknown -0,589 1,15 0,61 0,555 -1,287 0,52 0,01 0,276 -20,397 14322,63 1,00 0,000 3,714 1,95 0,06 41,020
Vessel Age        
6-15 - - - - - - - - 1,187 0,67 0,08 3,277 - - - -
16-25 - - - - - - - - 0,680 0,67 0,31 1,974 - - - -
>25 - - - - - - - - 1,396 0,66 0,03 4,037 - - - -
Unknown - - - - - - - - 0,524 1,45 0,72 1,688 - - - -
Region        
Swe.-Lind. - - - - 0,192 0,19 0,32 1,212 - - - - 3,320 1,18 0,01 27,655
Lind.-Bergen - - - - 0,252 0,16 0,12 1,286 - - - - 2,256 1,14 0,05 9,544
Bergen-Trond. - - - - 0,291 0,15 0,05 1,337 - - - - 1,903 1,13 0,09 6,707
Trond-Tromsø - - - - 0,402 0,13 0,00 1,494 - - - - 2,378 1,12 0,03 10,779
Svalb/JanM/Bj. - - - - -0,568 0,48 0,24 0,566 - - - - 3,865 2,24 0,08 47,714
Other/Unknown - - - - 0,030 0,57 0,96 1,031 - - - - -0,800 1,90 0,67 0,449
Waters        
Harbour -0,91 0,317 0,004 0,402 -0,595 0,13 0,00 0,552 -2,010 0,54 0,00 0,134 2,171 1,55 0,16 8,765
Outer Coastal 0,095 0,298 0,751 1,099 0,427 0,10 0,00 1,532 -0,129 0,42 0,76 0,879 -0,769 0,39 0,05 0,463
Quay -0,702 0,336 0,037 0,496 -19,917 9339,46 1,00 0,000 -0,960 1,22 0,43 0,383 -0,348 0,87 0,69 0,706
Oil Field 21,132 40192,97 1 1.504. 
680.405 
-20,358 40192,97 1,00 0,000 -3,453 2,16 0,11 0,032 -1,162 0,61 0,06 0,313
Other 0,299 0,739 0,686 1,349 -0,468 0,29 0,10 0,626 -21,539 16913,03 1,00 0,000 -1,814 1,55 0,24 0,163
Light        
Twilight - - - - 0,024 0,16 0,88 1,024 - - - - - - - -
Dark - - - - 0,333 0,09 0,00 1,395 - - - - - - - -
Unknown - - - - -0,013 0,21 0,95 0,988 - - - - - - - -
Sea State        
Moderate - - - - 0,464 0,11 0,00 1,590 - - - - - - - -
High - - - - 1,113 0,22 0,00 3,044 - - - - - - - -
Unknown - - - - -0,147 0,11 0,18 0,863 - - - - - - - -
Constant 0,068 0,326 0,836 1,07 -1,708 0,18 0,00 0,181 -0,498 0,86 0,56 0,608 -1,909 1,19 0,11 0,148
Table 10.11.1: Logisitic regression of accident severity (individual models). 
Severity in fires was significant at the .000 level, with a Cox & Snell of 18.8%. Severity 
in fires was significant at the .000 level, with a Cox & Snell approximate explained variation 
of 11.4%. Groundings were significant at the .000 level, with a Cox & Snell of 29%. Allisions 
were significant at the .000 level, with a Cox & Snell of 11.9%. We were able to explain 
relatively little of the variation in severity in most accidents, but a fair amount in groundings. 
Length and waters were the only variables that were significant across the individual models.
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10.11.1 Results of analysis of severity 
It is important to point out that the models of severity are separate and independent of 
each other, and are thus not directly comparable. For each type of accident, we compare 
severe versus non-severe damage to the vessel. That said, certain comparisons can still be 
made across models. Sections with no listed results were insignificant, and were thus taken 
out of the analysis. Results were listed in one table to facilitate comparisons. 
Severity in fires is primarily associated with vessel length. The general pattern appears 
to be that the shorter the vessel, the higher the odds of an accident being severe. Additionally, 
vessels carrying passengers in groundings have lower odds of severity, and fires in harbour 
areas have lower odds of severity. 
Severity in groundings has a higher number of significant items. Once again, length is 
associated with severity, with the same pattern as for fires: The shorter the vessel, the higher 
the odds of severity. Type of cargo is associated with severity in that vessels carrying ballast 
appear to have lower odds of severity in groundings. Ferries and work/service vessels have 
lower odds of severity, and traffic between Bergen and Tromsø is associated with higher 
severity than the northernmost region. Groundings in the dark tend to be somewhat more 
severe, and higher seas are associated with more severity. 
Severity in collisions has somewhat fewer significant items. Once again, length is 
notable in that the shorter the vessel, the more severe the consequences, with odds ratios of 21 
and 14. Small fishing vessels, however, have much lower odds of severity than larger ones. 
Also, carrying fish rather than ballast is associated with lower odds of severity. Vessel age is 
significant, and all older vessels have increased odds of severity. Collisions in harbour areas 
tend to be less severe. 
Severity in allisions is significantly higher for large fishing vessels than for small ones, 
as well as for ferries and passenger/cruise ships. Vessel length has a radical effect on severity 
in allisions, with odds ratios of 75 for vessels below 10.67, and 905 for vessels 10.7-15 m. 
The odds are lower, however, for vessels 15-24 m. Allisions between Sweden and Lindesnes 
have much higher odds of severity, and all significant regions have higher odds than Tromsø-
Russia of severity in allisions. It is noteworthy, though, that the only significant difference 
between waters is lower odds for outer coastal compared to narrow coastal. 
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10.11.2 Probabilities of severity 
As noted, probabilities in logistic regression can be calculated by the formula P = 
(1/1+e-L). Selecting only significant items from the analysis of severity, and manipulating one 
parameter at the time yields the following results: 
10.11.3 Severity in fires and explosions 
Probabilities of severity in fires 
Large Fishing Vessel 51,7 % 
Passenger Cargo 25,6 % 
Bulk/Ore/Grain/Coal Cargo 83,4 % 
Length <10.67 m 84,4 % 
Length 10.67-15 m 100,0 %
Length 15-24 m 64,2 % 
In the harbour area. 30,1 % 
Along quay 34,7 % 
Table 10.11.3.1: Probabilities of severity in fires. 
 
There were no significant differences in severity among vessel types in fires, so with 
some caution we could argue that all vessel types have around 50% chance of severe damage 
in a fire. Vessels carrying passengers actually have the smallest probability of severe damage, 
whereas vessels carrying various bulk have a fairly high probability. The numbers for length 
have to be read with some caution. A vessel cannot logically be both longer than 15m, as the 
reference category is, and shorter than 15m at the same time. However, as there were no 
significant differences between vessel types, we could argue that length by itself changes the 
probability of severity in a fire. The reference length is actually over 24 m, so we could argue 
that all shorter vessels have higher probabilities of severity. Compared to the reference 
category of narrow coastal waters, harbour and quay areas are less likely to feature severe 
fires. 
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10.11.4 Severity in groundings 
Probabilities of severity in groundings
Large Fishing Vessel 15,3 %
Ferries 9,5 %
Work/Service Vessels 9,5 %
NIS vessels 27,9 %
Fish Cargo 18,7 %
Dry/Bulk/Cont. Cargo 21,4 %
Bulk/Ore/Grain/Coal Cargo 24,0 %
Empty Cargo 21,0 %
Length <10.67 m 36,4 %
Length 10.67-15 m 27,0 %
Length 15-24 m 22,0 %
Bergen-Trondheim. 19,5 %
Trondheim-Tromsø 21,3 %
Harbour Area 9,1 %
Outer Coastal Waters 21,7 %
Dark Conditions 20,2 %
Moderate Seas 22,4 %
Table 10.11.4.1: Probabilities of severity in fires. 
There were a few significant differences in severity between vessel types in groundings. 
Large fishing vessels are slightly more likely to have severe damage than ferries and 
work/service vessels. NIS vessel have substantially higher probability of severe damage than 
NOR vessels in groundings, 27.9 against 15.3%. Length once again appears as a notable 
influence on severity, although the numbers have to be read with caution, as there is no such 
thing as a large fishing vessel under 15 m. For groundings, the numbers do though suggest 
that shorter vessels are more likely to incur severe damage. Finally, groundings in the harbour 
area tend to be less severe. 
10.11.5 Severity in collisions 
Probabilities of severity in collisions 
Large Fishing Vessel 37,8 %
Fishing Vessel <15m 4,4 %
Break Bulk Cargo 5,8 %
Fish Cargo 18,1 %
Length <10.67 m 92,8 %
Length 10.67-15 m 89,6 %
Vessel age >25y 71,1 %
Harbour Area 7,5 %
Table 10.11.5.1: Probabilities of severity in collisions. 
 
In collisions, there were significant differences between large and small fishing vessels, 
as well as for length separately. The numbers have to be interpreted cautiously, but there 
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appears to be grounds for further research into the effects of length on the type of damage a 
vessel incurs in all accidents. 
10.11.6 Severity in allisions 
Probabilities of severity in allisions
Large Fishing 12,9 %
Fishing <15m 0,3 %
Ferries 2,5 %
Pass./cruise 0,9 %
Work/Service 0,5 %
<10.67 m 91,8 %
10.67-15 m 99,3 %
Swe.-Lind. 80,4 %
Lind.-Bergen 58,6 %
Trond-Tromsø 61,5 %
Outer Coastal 6,4 %
Table 10.11.6.1: Probabilities of severity in allisions. 
 
Interestingly, as previous results have shown that passenger vessels are much more 
likely to encounter allisions, they tend to be less severe than for fishing vessels. Length once 
again appears to be a substantial influence on severity, this time with shorter lengths being 
associated with severity. Interestingly, allisions in the southern region tend to be more severe 
than elsewhere. Allisions in outer coastal waters seem somewhat unlikely accidents logically, 
but if they do appear, they can be expected to be less severe. 
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10.12 Logistic regression analysis of injuries 
Individual logistic regression were performed on injuries. The reference category is a 
large fishing vessel, carrying ballast, with a GT of 500-3000, above 24 m length, in the 
Tromsø-Russia region, under good weather conditions and visibility. Models are listed below 
in table 10.12.1. 
 Fire (N=614)  Grounding (N=3607) 
 B SE p OR  B SE p OR 
Reference -3,012 0,46 0,00 0,049  -4,024 0,51 0,00 0,018 
Vessel type          
Fishing <15m -0,192 0,51 0,71 0,825  -1,224 0,71 0,08 0,294 
Ferries 0,965 0,73 0,19 2,624  0,350 0,57 0,54 1,419 
Pass./cruise 0,396 0,83 0,64 1,486  0,558 0,61 0,36 1,748 
High Speed -18,132 13393,87 1,00 0,000  1,746 0,68 0,01 5,734 
Other Pass. -18,148 8199,80 1,00 0,000  -0,027 0,82 0,97 0,973 
Work/Service -18,114 7880,25 1,00 0,000  0,235 0,68 0,73 1,265 
Offshore Service 0,822 1,05 0,43 2,274  -16,869 5901,94 1,00 0,000 
Well Boats 3,081 1,08 0,00 21,769  -0,290 1,06 0,78 0,749 
Tankers 1,079 1,14 0,34 2,943  -16,347 3773,57 1,00 0,000 
Bulk 2,246 0,80 0,01 9,449  -0,012 0,87 0,99 0,988 
Break Bulk -0,149 0,74 0,84 0,862  -0,843 0,65 0,20 0,431 
Cargo          
Passengers - - - -  0,523 0,54 0,33 1,687 
Fish - - - -  0,710 0,46 0,13 2,034 
Dry/Bulk/Cont. - - - -  0,601 0,74 0,41 1,825 
Bulk/Ore/Grain/Coal - - - -  -0,446 1,15 0,70 0,640 
Other Known - - - -  0,393 1,12 0,73 1,481 
Oil/Chem/Gas - - - -  -14,976 4485,78 1,00 0,000 
Empty - - - -  1,284 0,50 0,01 3,611 
Unknown - - - -  0,227 0,50 0,65 1,255 
Gross Tonnage          
GT1_500 - - - -  -1,018 0,38 0,01 0,361 
GT_3000 - - - -  -0,195 0,65 0,76 0,823 
GT_unknown - - - -  -0,546 0,67 0,42 0,579 
Length          
<10.67 m - - - -  1,737 0,75 0,02 5,678 
10.67-15 m - - - -  1,943 0,63 0,00 6,979 
15-24 m - - - -  0,483 0,45 0,28 1,620 
Unknown - - - -  -16,471 5278,37 1,00 0,000 
Sea State          
Moderate 0,259 0,60 0,67 1,296  - - - - 
High 4,416 1,19 0,00 82,784  - - - - 
Unknown -0,136 0,42 0,75 0,873  - - - - 
 
 Collision (N=865)  Allision (N=772) 
 B SE p OR  B SE p OR 
Constant -3,644 0,51 0,00 0,026  -3,040 0,74 0,00 0,048 
Region          
Swe.-Lind. 0,581 0,68 0,40 1,787  1,727 0,78 0,03 5,625 
Lind.-Bergen 0,001 0,68 1,00 1,001  0,827 0,77 0,28 2,287 
Bergen-Trond. 1,239 0,59 0,04 3,451  1,376 0,75 0,07 3,958 
Trond-Tromsø 0,509 0,60 0,40 1,663  1,624 0,76 0,03 5,071 
Svalb/JanM/Bj. -17,559 20096,49 1,00 0,000  -17,305 27728,60 1,00 0,000 
NCS/Arctic -17,559 14210,36 1,00 0,000  -17,512 8350,23 1,00 0,000 
Other/Unknown -17,559 23205,42 1,00 0,000  1,115 1,28 0,38 3,049 
Winds          
Moderate - - - -  -0,203 0,36 0,57 0,816 
Strong - - - -  -1,699 0,55 0,00 0,183 
Unknown - - - -  -0,346 0,27 0,21 0,708 
Table 10.12.1: Logistic regression of accident injuries (individual models). 
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10.12.1 Results of analysis of injuries 
Statistical tests show that all models were significant at the .000 level. Cox & Snell 
approximate explained variation was low for all models: 6.6% for fires, 1.6% for groundings, 
0.1% for collisions and 4.1% for allisions. 
As we can see from the models, factors associated with injuries vary across accident 
types. Vessel types are only significant for a few cases. In fires and explosions there are two:, 
the category of well boats, with an odds ratio of over 21, and bulk vessels, with an odds ratio 
of 10. In groundings, only high speed craft has a significant difference, with an increase in 
odds of injuries. 
Cargo is only significant in groundings, and then only for empty vessels compared to 
vessels carrying ballast. Empty vessels have over three times higher odds of injuries.  
Gross tonnage is only significant in groundings, where only the smallest group of 
vessels have decreased odds of injuries. 
Length is also only significant in groundings, where the two shortest vessel groups have 
increased odds of injury. 
Sea state is only significant for fires and explosions, where high seas has a substantial 
increase in odds of injury of over 82. 
There were a few significant differences in odds of injuries among regions in collisions 
and allisions. Sweden-Lindesnes and Trondheim-Tromsø has higher odds of injuries in 
allisions, whereas Bergen-Trondheim has slightly increased odds of injuries in collisions. 
Finally, strong winds actually decrease the odds of injuries in allisions, which based on 
previous findings suggests that passenger vessels decrease their activity level in strong winds, 
or else they take extra security precautions in strong winds, in particular when arriving or 
departing port. 
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10.12.2 Probabilities of injuries 
Probabilities of injuries in fires 
Fire P 
Reference 4,7 %
Well Boats 51,7 %
Bulk Vessel 31,7 %
High Seas 80,3 %
Table 10.12.2.1: Probabilities of injuries in fires. 
The probability of an injury in a fire is quite low around 5% at the baseline. However, 
well boats and bulk vessels have much higher probabilities of injuries than other vessel types. 
Additionally, high seas increases the probability of injury in a fire to over 80%. 
Probabilities of injuries in collisions 
Collision P 
Reference 2,5 %
Bergen-Trond. 8,3 %
Table 10.12.2.2: Probabilities of injuries in collisions. 
Probability of injury in a collision is also quite low at the baseline, and the only 
significant difference was that the Bergen-Trondheim region has around 5% higher 
probability of injuries. 
Probabilities of injuries in groundings 
Grounding P 
Reference 1,8 %
High Speed Craft 9,3 %
Cargo Empty 6,1 %
GT<500 0,6 %
<10.67 m 9,2 %
10.67-15 m 11,1 %
Table 10.12.2.3: Probabilities of injuries in groundings. 
Probability of injuries in groundings is also quite low. High speed craft has around 7% 
higher probability of injury than other vessel types. Vessels registered with empty cargo also 
have slightly higher probabilities, and shorter vessels also have substantially higher 
probability of injuries in groundings. 
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Probabilities of injuries in allisions 
Allision P 
Reference 4,6 %
Sweden-Lindesnes 21,2 %
Trondheim-Tromsø 19,5 %
Strong Winds 0,9 %
Table 10.12.2.4: Probabilities of injuries in allisions. 
The baseline probability of an injury in an allision is quite low. However, vessels 
traveling in Sweden-Lindesnes and Trondheim-Tromsø have higher probabilities of injuries 
compared to Tromsø-Russia. Strong winds actually decrease the probability quite 
substantially of injuries in allisions. 
10.13 Logistic regression analysis of fatalities. 
I performed a series of individual logistic regressions on fatalities for different 
accidents. The final models were quite different, so they are listed one by one below. 
10.13.1 Fatalities in fires and explosions 
There were no significantly different qualities between fatalities and non-fatalities in 
fires and explosions. This could very likely be due to the statistically very small number of 6 
fatalities in fires and explosions. 
10.13.2 Fatalities in groundings 
 
 B SE Sig. OR
Nationality  
PMOU White List 2,178 0,84 0,01 8,830 
PMOU Grey/Black/Oth. -14,198 6071,10 1,00 0,000 
Length  
<10.67 m 3,314 0,76 0,00 27,484 
10-15 m 1,641 0,98 0,09 5,159 
15-24 m 2,596 0,73 0,00 13,413 
Unknown -16,346 5138,83 1,00 0,000 
Region  
Sweden-Lindesnes -0,293 0,71 0,68 0,746 
Lindesnes-Bergen -0,401 0,66 0,54 0,670 
Bergen-Trondheim -0,657 0,65 0,31 0,518 
Trondheim-Tromsø -1,749 0,67 0,01 0,174 
Svalbard/Jan M/Bj -15,939 5643,11 1,00 0,000 
Other/Unknown Regions -17,149 6096,29 1,00 0,000 
Seas  
Moderate  0,392 0,64 0,54 1,481 
High  2,880 0,60 0,00 17,821 
Unknown  0,762 0,54 0,16 2,143 
Constant -6,688 0,80 0,00 0,001 
Table 10.13.2.1: Logistic regression of fatalities in groundings (N=3607). 
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The model was statistically significant at the .000 level, with a Cox & Snell 
approximate explained variation of 1.9%. We have thus been able to explain very little of the 
variation in fatalities in groundings. 
There are a relatively large number of significant differences between fatalities and non-
fatalities in groundings. First, nations on the PMOU white list have substantially higher odds 
of fatalities than Norwegian ships. Second, the two shortest categories of ships have even 
more substantially higher odds of being involved in fatalities than longer ships. Third, the 
Trondheim-Tromsø region has rather substantially lower odds of fatalities compared to 
Tromsø-Russia. Finally, high seas increase the odds of fatalities in groundings quite 
substantially. 
Probabilities of fatalities in groundings 
Groundings P
Reference 0,1 %
White List 1,1 %
Length <10.67 m 3,3 %
Length 15-24 1,6 %
Trondheim-Tromsø 0,0 %
High Seas 2,2 %
Table 10.13.2.4: Probabilities of fatalities in groundings. 
As we can see, the baseline probability of fatalities in groundings is fortunately very 
low. Statistically speaking, most of the effects are rather modest in absolute percentages, but 
we can note that white list vessels report ten times higher probability of fatalities than 
Norwegian vessels, that groundings in Middle Norway have a probability of zero of fatalities, 
and that high seas increases the probability twenty times of fatalities. The most extreme effect 
comes from groundings in short vessel, which increases probabilities by over 30 times. Still, 
none of these effects raise probabilities above around 3% in total. 
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10.13.3 Fatalities in collisions 
Results from the regression analysis of fatalities in collisions are given below in table 
10.13.4.1. 
 B SE p OR 
Twilight -0,194 0,791 0,806 0,823
Dark -2,266 1,062 0,033 0,104
Light Unkn. 0,608 1,022 0,552 1,836
Moderate Vis. 1,831 0,648 0,005 6,240
Poor Visibility 1,599 0,828 0,053 4,950
No Visibility 0,69 0,805 0,391 1,995
Fog/Snow -16,879 6294,308 0,998 0,000
Unknown Vis. -0,078 1,032 0,940 0,925
Constant -3,949 0,371 0 0,019
Table 10.13.4.1: Logistic regression of fatalities in collisions (N=865). 
The model was statistically significant at the .000 level, with a Cox & Snell of 1.9%. 
We have thus been able to explain very little of the variation in fatalities in collisions. 
Fatalities in collisions have two notable features. First, the odds of fatalities are 
substantially lower in dark lighting conditions. Second, moderate visibility is associated with 
increased odds of fatalities. 
Probabilities of fatalities in collisions 
Collisions P 
Reference 1,9 %
Dark Conditions 0,2 %
Moderate Visibility 10,7 %
Table 10.13.2.4: Probabilities of fatalities in collisions. 
Fatalities in allisions 
No significant differences between fatalities and non-fatalities were found in allisions. This is 
not surprising, as there was only one reported case of fatalities in the selected sample. 
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11 Discussion. 
I will now review the research questions listed in chapter 5.1: 
1. How do vessel qualities, geographical and weather data affect the relative risk 
of maritime accidents? 
2. How does time, certification and operational state influence the relative risk of 
maritime accidents? 
3. What factors contribute to severe damage, injuries and fatalities in maritime 
accidents? 
11.1 Vessels, geography, weather and maritime accidents. 
11.1.1 Differences in accidents between vessel types and qualities. 
The database originally separates vessels in three groups that were included in this 
analysis; fishing, passenger and cargo vessels. The simple example used in chapter 8.1 found 
significant differences between groundings for these groups. The NSRM research group 
proposed a subdivision of these groups into 12 vessel categories. In the integrated model 
(chapter 9.2.6), only a few of these vessel types remained significantly different from each 
other. Using large fishing vessels as the reference category, we only found significant 
differences for the following vessel types: ferries, passenger/cruise vessels, high speed craft, 
work & service vessels and break bulk vessels. 
One point worth elaborating is why there not significant differences between more of 
the vessel types. I would like to offer three possibilities. First, there is the possibility that the 
results indicate that there are no major differences between vessel types beyond what the 
results show. This calls for a simplification of the vessel groupings in further analysis. 
Second, there is a possibility that the results are due to statistical shortcomings. In particular, 
some of the cargo vessel types are relatively small in terms of numbers, and the sample is not 
large enough to reveal significant differences. This interpretation also calls for a simpler 
categorization of vessel types. Third, there is the possibility that the current categorization 
does not properly capture underlying differences between vessel types. The result is still the 
same: The categorization of twelve vessel types only partially captures differences in accident 
risk. I propose that it might be feasible to use the general vessel groupings in further analysis, 
and focus more on vessel parameters such as gross tonnage and length to differentiate risk 
between vessels. 
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Relative probabilities between vessel types vary somewhat. For example, 
passenger/cruise vessels are around ten percent more likely to be involved in groundings than 
high speed vessels, whereas the situation is reversed for allisions. On the whole, though, there 
is relatively little variation across vessel types. 
The influence of the added parameters varies. Foreign vessels appear more susceptible 
to groundings as opposed to other accidents. Higher tonnages are associated with somewhat 
decreased probabilities of groundings, and increased probability of allisions and fires. For 
passenger vessels and cargo, groundings are more likely to happen when the vessels are 
empty, whereas allisions are more likely when they carry passengers. Break bulk vessels are 
more likely to collide if they are shorter. Longer vessels are more likely in allisions and fires 
than shorter ones. The influence of regions is rather modest, and does not point in a very 
specific direction. 
11.1.2 Geographical differences in accidents. 
Some of the greatest variation comes from types of waters. Groundings are most likely 
in narrow coastal waters, collisions are most probable in outer coastal waters and allisions are 
most likely in port areas. Perhaps the most surprising result is that fires and explosions are 
much more probable along quay than in any other water. 
11.1.3 Weather differences in accidents. 
Weather has a limited effect on most of the relative probabilities of accidents. However, 
it is much less likely that a grounding with a passenger type vessel happens under no visibility 
than in good visibility. On the other hand, it is ten times more likely that a collision will 
happen to a passenger type vessel under no visibility, which is among the largest effects of the 
statistical analysis. Strong winds decrease the probabilities of collisions, and increase the 
probability of allisions. 
11.1.4 The common traits scenario 
The common traits scenario outlined in chapter 8 turns out be realistic. Taken together, 
the common traits in fires, collisions and allisions increase the relative probability of each 
accident by around three times. 
11.2 Time, certification and operational state in maritime 
accidents. 
The time variables yielded significant, but rather modest variation between the three 
year categories. The most notable result was that probabilities of accidents change quite 
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substantially by night, where groundings become much more likely, and collisions become 
much less likely. 
When it comes to certifications, the only consistently significant differences were 
between the various certifications for fishing vessels as well as the B/C/D certificates. Vessels 
certified for coastal fishing were less likely to be involved in groundings than other fishing 
vessels, and the B/C/D category were even less likely to be involved in groundings. These 
certificates were also a lot less likely to be involved in collisions, and a lot more likely to be 
involved in allisions than vessels certified for fishing. Vessels certified for coastal fishing had 
the highest probability of fires/explosions. 
The analysis of operational states serve to reinforce the results on differences between 
waters. It is more likely that a grounding happens while the vessel is underway, and more 
likely that an allision happens in proximity of port. We can take note that allisions are much 
more likely on arrival of port than on departure, whereas the reverse is true for groundings. 
Fires are most likely to happen along quay. 
11.3 Damage severity, injuries and fatalities 
In terms of damage severity, the most consistent result was that it was associated with 
vessel length. The shorter the vessel, the higher the odds of an accident being severe, and this 
is particularly pronounced in allisions. 
We were not able to explain a lot of variation in injuries. The most notable result was 
that high seas increases the risk of injuries in fires/explosions around 17 times from 4,7% to 
80,3%. High speed craft have around five times higher probability of injuries than large 
fishing vessels. The most notable difference among regions was that vessels traveling in 
Sweden-Lindesnes and Trondheim-Tromsø have higher probabilities of injuries compared to 
Tromsø-Russia. 
We could not explain a lot of the variation in fatalities. Most notably, groundings in 
short vessels increase probability of fatality by over 30 times compared to vessels longer than 
24 m. 
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12 Conclusion: Risk influencing factors in maritime 
accidents. 
In chapter 5, I defined a risk influencing factor as any factor that affects an undesired 
event. What factors affect the probabilities of accidents? We have found a number of factors 
that influence the relative probabilities of accidents. We cannot tell for certain whether these 
factors are true risk influencing factors, in that we do not know what the non-accidents look 
like. It could be that the differences in gross tonnages, for example, merely reflect differences 
in the total fleet. However, some differences between traits were not significant. Until the 
accident database has been compared to normal traffic, we can retain the hypothesis that the 
significant items represent risk influencing factors. 
I will briefly summarize the potential risk influencing factors by type. 
For the vessel types, there were significant differences between accidents, but only for 
some of the vessel types. The major difference between vessel types was that passenger 
vessels have much larger likelihoods of allisions. 
For the vessel qualities, it is noteworthy that there is as much variation, or more, 
between gross tonnages and lengths of vessels as there is variation between vessel types. Put 
in other terms: The relative probabilities change more due to gross tonnage and length than 
due to vessel type. 
For geographical qualities, there was much more variation between waters than 
between regions. Indeed, waters prove to be a highly influential risk influencing factor. 
Narrow coastal waters are a risk factor in groundings, whereas outer coastal are factors in 
collisions. Also, the risk of fires is considerable along quay. 
For the weather qualities, visibility emerges as a notable factor in collisions. Apart from 
this, weather has a rather limited effect on accident risk. 
An important takeaway from the regression analysis is that the common traits scenarios 
described in chapter 7 and 8 are indeed realistic scenarios. A typical fire scenario is thus a 
small fishing vessel in good weather travelling in outer coastal waters. A typical grounding 
scenario is a cargo or small fishing vessel travelling in narrow coastal waters in the dark. A 
typical collision scenario is a fishing or break bulk vessel travelling in good weather in outer 
coastal waters. A typical allision scenario is a passenger vessel travelling in good weather 
with somewhat stronger winds in narrow coastal waters. 
To confirm these risk influencing factors, however, there is an urgent need to compare 
accident statistics against normal traffic data. 
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14 Appendix: Descriptive statistics for regression analysis 
The conditional probabilities in the regression analysis summate probabilities in rows. 
For reference, I have included descriptive statistics in this format here. Take note that this is a 
different format from the one used in the section on common traits, where traits are summated 
in columns. 
14.1 Vessel qualities 
 
Vessel Groups Accident type      
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Fishing vessel 18,1% 61,7% 17,2% 3,0% 100,0% 2203 
Cargo vessel 6,0% 70,2% 14,3% 9,5% 100,0% 2061 
Passenger vessel 5,8% 50,3% 12,0% 31,9% 100,0% 1594 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
Table 14.1.1: Distribution of accident types within vessel groups. 
 
Vessel type Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Fishing <15m 23,2% 54,2% 20,5% 2,1% 100,0% 1054 
Fishing >15m 13,3% 68,6% 14,2% 3,9% 100,0% 1149 
Ferries 3,0% 46,3% 8,9% 41,8% 100,0% 902 
Passenger/cruise 8,4% 56,0% 17,5% 18,1% 100,0% 382 
High-speed 5,7% 47,5% 12,7% 34,2% 100,0% 158 
Other passenger 15,8% 61,8% 16,4% 5,9% 100,0% 152 
Work and service 10,3% 68,3% 11,9% 9,5% 100,0% 252 
Offshore service 12,6% 45,3% 12,6% 29,5% 100,0% 95 
Well boats 4,0% 84,2% 6,9% 5,0% 100,0% 101 
Tanker 5,7% 68,1% 14,2% 12,1% 100,0% 141 
Bulk 4,9% 68,4% 14,6% 12,1% 100,0% 206 
Break bulk 5,1% 71,9% 15,4% 7,7% 100,0% 1266 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
Table 14.1.2: Distribution of accident types within vessel types. 
 
Nationalities by PMOU Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Norwegian ships 11,0% 61,2% 14,7% 13,1% 100,0% 5444 
PMOU White List 4,2% 66,2% 15,8% 13,8% 100,0% 355 
PMOU Grey, Black & Others 1,7% 64,4% 18,6% 15,3% 100,0% 59 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
Table 14.1.3: Distribution of accident types within nationalities. 
Individual nations belonging to each list are given below in alphabetical order. 
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White List: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bermuda, UK, 
Cayman Islands, UK, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Gibraltar, UK, Greece, Hong Kong, China, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Isle of Man, UK, Italy, 
Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Republic of, Latvia, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Netherlands, 
Panama, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States of America. 
Grey List: Albania, Algeria, Belize, Bulgaria, Curacao, Egypt, Georgia, India, 
Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Tunisia, Tuvalu, Ukraine, Vanuatu. 
Black List: Cambodia, Comoros, Cook Islands, Dominica, Honduras, Moldova, 
Republic of, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, United Republic of, 
Togo. 
Vessel Register  Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
NOR ships 10,5% 61,9% 14,0% 13,6% 100,0% 5113 
NIS ships 3,3% 65,7% 16,9% 14,0% 100,0% 242 
Foreign ships 20,8% 66,7% 0,0% 12,5% 100,0% 24 
Unregistered & unknown 13,4% 55,9% 22,1% 8,6% 100,0% 479 
 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.1.4: Distribution of accident types within vessel registers. 
 
Class  Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Class DNV 6,5% 66,6% 13,2% 13,7% 100,0% 1537 
Class ABS/BV/GL/LR 4,4% 70,8% 16,2% 8,5% 100,0% 517 
Class other, unknown, unregistered 12,9% 58,3% 15,2% 13,6% 100,0% 3804 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.1.5: Distribution of accident types within classification societies. 
 
Cargo  Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Ballast 15,4% 64,6% 14,5% 5,5% 100,0% 1179 
Passengers 4,7% 48,6% 12,7% 34,0% 100,0% 1141 
Fish and fish produce 10,1% 71,7% 15,6% 2,7% 100,0% 995 
Dry/Bulk/Container 3,7% 73,6% 15,2% 7,5% 100,0% 561 
Bulk (Ore, coal, grains etc) 4,5% 78,0% 11,8% 5,8% 100,0% 313 
Other known cargo 5,7% 70,1% 8,0% 16,1% 100,0% 87 
Oil and oil produce 3,3% 68,3% 13,3% 15,0% 100,0% 60 
Chemicals and gas 10,0% 80,0% 0,0% 10,0% 100,0% 20 
Empty 23,1% 53,6% 13,5% 9,9% 100,0% 364 
Not registered/unknown 13,3% 53,4% 18,3% 15,0% 100,0% 1138 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.1.6: Distribution of accident types within cargo types. 
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Gross Tonnage  Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Below 500 GT 12,8% 63,8% 15,9% 7,6% 100,0% 3817 
Above 3000 GT 8,3% 48,6% 14,0% 29,2% 100,0% 387 
Between 500 and 3000 GT 4,6% 59,7% 10,9% 24,8% 100,0% 1471 
Unknown GT 14,8% 57,9% 25,1% 2,2% 100,0% 183 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.1.7: Distribution of accident types within gross tonnages. 
 
Length  Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Below 10.67 m 25,1% 49,0% 23,9% 2,0% 100,0% 704 
Between 10.67 and 15 m 18,4% 64,1% 15,4% 2,1% 100,0% 473 
Between 15- and 24 m 16,6% 60,4% 18,1% 4,9% 100,0% 791 
Above 24 m 5,6% 64,0% 12,1% 18,3% 100,0% 3795 
Unknown 7,4% 53,7% 24,2% 14,7% 100,0% 95 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.1.8: Distribution of accident types within vessel lengths. 
 
Ship Age: Continuous 
 
I include this histogram to detail the distribution of vessel age. 
 
 
Figure 7.1.1: Vessel age in years. 
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Ship Age: In categories 
 
Ship Age Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Ship Age 0-5 10,1% 58,7% 12,8% 18,4% 100,0% 744 
Ship Age 6-15 10,0% 60,9% 16,2% 13,0% 100,0% 1436 
Ship Age 16-25 9,0% 61,8% 16,8% 12,4% 100,0% 1419 
Ship Age 25+ 12,3% 63,4% 13,0% 11,3% 100,0% 2057 
Ship Age Unknown 7,9% 56,4% 15,8% 19,8% 100,0% 202 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.1.9: Distribution of accident types within vessel age. 
14.2 Geographical qualities 
 
Regions Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Swedish border - Lindesnes 9,0% 54,6% 21,4% 15,1% 100,0% 524 
Lindesnes - Bergen 8,7% 54,2% 17,5% 19,6% 100,0% 1120 
Bergen - Trondheim 6,6% 65,6% 11,4% 16,4% 100,0% 1274 
Trondheim - Tromsø 9,8% 68,9% 12,6% 8,6% 100,0% 1902 
Tromsø - Russian border 20,8% 54,5% 17,5% 7,2% 100,0% 899 
Svalbard/Jan Mayen/Bjørnøya 0,0% 87,8% 8,2% 4,1% 100,0% 49 
Norwegian Continental Shelf/Arctics 6,3% 0,0% 25,0% 68,8% 100,0% 32 
Other/Unknown regions 17,2% 58,6% 5,2% 19,0% 100,0% 58 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.2.1: Distribution of accident types within accident regions. 
 
Waters  Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Narrow coastal waters 4,0% 82,0% 9,6% 4,3% 100,0% 2568 
In the harbour area 10,2% 39,5% 16,4% 33,8% 100,0% 1460 
Outer coastal waters 16,0% 58,0% 23,7% 2,3% 100,0% 1357 
Along the quay 48,6% 7,4% 9,7% 34,2% 100,0% 257 
Oil field 3,3% 3,3% 23,3% 70,0% 100,0% 30 
Separation area 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 5 
Other/unknown 9,9% 64,1% 11,0% 14,9% 100,0% 181 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.2.2: Distribution of accident types within accident waters. 
14.3 Weather qualities. 
 
Lighting conditions  Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Light 11,9% 51,7% 19,8% 16,6% 100,0% 2479 
Twilight 10,2% 59,5% 16,8% 13,4% 100,0% 440 
Dark 6,7% 74,6% 10,4% 8,3% 100,0% 2344 
Unreg./unknown 19,5% 52,9% 9,4% 18,2% 100,0% 595 
 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.3.1: Distribution of accident types within lighting conditions. 
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Sea State Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Calm 8,3% 62,4% 16,7% 12,5% 100,0% 3236 
Slight/moderate 9,4% 70,7% 14,4% 5,6% 100,0% 737 
High 3,8% 77,9% 9,2% 9,2% 100,0% 131 
Unknown 15,5% 55,0% 11,7% 17,8% 100,0% 1754 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.3.2: Distribution of accident types within sea states. 
 
Visibility  Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Good (>5 nm) 9,5% 60,0% 16,0% 14,5% 100,0% 3419 
Moderate (2.1.-5 nm) 6,1% 69,2% 12,2% 12,5% 100,0% 607 
Poor (0.5-2 nm) 3,6% 80,5% 9,9% 6,0% 100,0% 333 
None (>0.25 nm) ,4% 68,2% 26,7% 4,7% 100,0% 258 
Tight fog, snowfall  
(<0.5 nm) 
2,7% 76,4% 16,9% 4,0% 100,0% 
225 
Unknown 23,0% 51,1% 10,1% 15,7% 100,0% 1016 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.3.3: Distribution of accident types within visibility. 
 
Wind force Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Weak 8,0% 61,1% 18,8% 12,1% 100,0% 1849 
Moderate 8,8% 66,6% 15,4% 9,2% 100,0% 1203 
Strong 3,7% 73,3% 6,7% 16,2% 100,0% 889 
Unknown 17,1% 53,5% 14,2% 15,3% 100,0% 1917 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.3.4: Distribution of accident types within wind forces. 
14.4 Time qualities 
 
Year Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
1981-1991 13,6% 61,4% 17,8% 7,3% 100,0% 2298 
1992-2002 7,2% 65,2% 16,7% 10,8% 100,0% 1809 
2003-2014 9,8% 58,1% 8,8% 23,4% 100,0% 1751 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.4.1: Distribution of accident types within years. 
 
Seasons Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Jan-Mar 10,3% 63,2% 13,3% 13,2% 100,0% 1604 
Apr-Jun 11,6% 56,1% 18,5% 13,8% 100,0% 1237 
Jul-Sep 11,3% 58,7% 16,6% 13,4% 100,0% 1362 
Oct-Dec 9,1% 66,5% 11,8% 12,6% 100,0% 1655 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.4.2: Distribution of accident types within seasons. 
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Time data: 
Data for time have been approximated to the nearest hour, and then split into five 
categories. A large number of accidents in the database were timed to midnight. There is good 
reason to believe that this is due to the exact accident time being unknown. A histogram 
shows this very clearly graphically. I have therefore timed all accidents reported as happening 
at midnight as “unknown”. 
 
Figure 7.4.1: Original distribution of hours within accident types 
 
Hours Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Time 01-06 9,2% 74,7% 10,8% 5,4% 100,0% 1264 
TIme 07-12 12,0% 52,4% 17,9% 17,7% 100,0% 1268 
Time 13-18 10,5% 52,4% 18,9% 18,2% 100,0% 1416 
Time 19-23 7,6% 67,8% 11,7% 12,9% 100,0% 1151 
Time Unknown 14,5% 62,8% 13,0% 9,6% 100,0% 759 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.4.3: Distribution of accident types within hours. 
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14.5 Other notable qualities 
 
Certification Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision  N 
Enclosed waters 5,2% 52,0% 22,5% 20,2% 100,0% 173 
Protected waters 3,6% 43,7% 8,3% 44,4% 100,0% 529 
Inshore <5 n.m. 6,7% 59,5% 12,5% 21,3% 100,0% 343 
Inshore <25 n.m. 10,2% 63,1% 13,1% 13,5% 100,0% 274 
Minor coastal traffic 5,6% 73,0% 12,0% 9,4% 100,0% 551 
Major coastal traffic 4,8% 73,1% 19,3% 2,8% 100,0% 145 
Northern & Eastern Sea 4,5% 77,3% 13,5% 4,8% 100,0% 400 
European traffic 4,8% 74,0% 8,7% 12,6% 100,0% 231 
International & Overseas 14,0% 41,9% 27,9% 16,3% 100,0% 43 
Unlimited traffic 6,9% 64,5% 14,3% 14,3% 100,0% 217 
Fjord fishing 12,5% 53,1% 34,4% 0,0% 100,0% 32 
Coastal fishing 20,1% 58,0% 19,3% 2,6% 100,0% 388 
Bank fishing 13,8% 70,8% 12,0% 3,5% 100,0% 400 
Sea fishing 9,3% 74,7% 12,7% 3,2% 100,0% 557 
Others/unknown 17,1% 53,1% 19,6% 10,2% 100,0% 1452 
Certificate B/C/D 8,1% 41,5% 1,6% 48,8% 100,0% 123 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.5.1: Distribution of accident types within certifications. 
 
Operational stage Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
Underway 6,1% 76,0% 15,4% 2,6% 100,0% 3597 
On arrival port 1,6% 34,6% 8,1% 55,8% 100,0% 902 
Along quay 66,0% 7,1% 14,6% 12,3% 100,0% 268 
On departure port 4,2% 51,9% 24,6% 19,2% 100,0% 260 
Fishing 36,8% 33,2% 30,1% 0,0% 100,0% 193 
Other known 28,6% 32,9% 8,1% 30,4% 100,0% 161 
Unknown/others 16,1% 61,2% 13,2% 9,4% 100,0% 477 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.5.2: Distribution of accident types within operational stages. 
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Damage severity Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
No damage 4,4% 51,8% 11,4% 32,5% 100,0% 114 
Less damage 7,6% 74,7% 5,7% 11,9% 100,0% 2963 
Severe damage 13,0% 78,2% 4,0% 4,8% 100,0% 1108 
Shipwreck, no sinking 55,8% 40,3% 3,9% 0,0% 100,0% 77 
Total shipwreck 39,4% 48,7% 10,5% 1,4% 100,0% 429 
Total 12,5% 72,1% 5,9% 9,6% 100,0% 4691 
 Table 14.5.3: Distribution of accident types within damage severity. 
 
Injuries Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
No 10,3% 62,8% 14,7% 12,3% 100,0% 5639 
Yes 16,0% 31,1% 16,4% 36,5% 100,0% 219 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.5.4: Distribution of accident types within injuries. 
 
Fatalities Accident type  
 Fire/expl. Grounding Collision Allision Total N 
No 10,5% 61,7% 14,6% 13,3% 100,0% 5808 
Yes 12,0% 50,0% 36,0% 2,0% 100,0% 50 
Total 10,5% 61,6% 14,8% 13,2% 100,0% 5858 
 Table 14.5.5: Distribution of accident types within fatalities. 
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14.6 Appendix: Correspondence analysis of accidents and 
vessels. 
Correspondence analysis is a descriptive/exploratory technique designed to analyse simple 
two-way and multi-way tables containing some measure of correspondence between the rows 
and columns. Rather than delve into the statistical theory behind this technique, I will 
illustrate it with a simple imaginary example, before applying it on the present data. The 
analysis is applied using the guidelines given by Fox (2014) 
Imagine a situation where fires and explosion almost always happened on fishing vessels, 
gorundings almost always happened on passenger vessels, collisions only happened on cargo 
vessels, and allisions was rather evenly distributed among vessels. This could result in the 
constructed data given in the table below: 
 VESSEL ACCIDENT 
 Fire Grounding Collision Allision Total 
Fish 8 1 1 4 14 
Passenger 1 8 1 3 13 
Cargo 1 1 8 3 13 
Total 10 10 10 10 40 
Table 13.1.1: Constructed example crosstab for correspondence analysis. 
This particular example would explain 74% of the variation in accidents due to the variation 
in vessel types. If allisions had been more closely associated with one vessel type, we would 
have been able to explain almost all the variation. 
Now, I skip all the technical explanation, and present what is called a symmetrical 
normalization graph of the correspondence analysis. The result is given below. In figure 
13.1.1. 
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Figure 13.1.1: Symmetrical normalization of constructed accidents and vessel groups. 
 
The graph shows quite clearly what we already knew: collisions correspond with cargo 
vessels, groundings with passenger vessels, and fires with fishing vessels. Allisions do not 
correspond with any vessel group, although the distance between allisions and fishing vessels 
is slightly shorter than to the other two vessel types, as there is one more case of allisions in 
fishing vessels. There is also very little correspondence between accident types, which 
suggests that they are qualitatively very different. Fox (2014) points out that care must be 
taken when interpreting the plot, as distances between columns and rows are not defined. 
I will now apply symmetrical normalization to the real accident data. Crosstabulations are 
available in the descriptive data section. 
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Symmetrical normalization of accidents and vessel types. 
First, here is a plot for accidents and the general vessel groups: 
 
 
 
The correspondence analysis shows that the variation in vessel groups explains 15.5% of the 
variation in accidents. We can graphically see clearly that allisions correspond with passenger 
vessels. However, the other correspondences are not quite as clear. Fishing vessels appear to 
correspond both to fires/explosions and collisions, whereas cargo vessels appear to 
correspond to capsizings, groundings and to a lesser degree collisions. 
Further tests of symmetrical normalization did not reveal any distinct patterns that were 
considered useful in the further analysis. It was decided that correspondence analysis would 
not be able to capture the complexity of the analysis, and it was subsequently dropped from 
further use. The research group decided that the logistic and multinomic techniques were 
more suitable for the task. 
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14.7 Appendix: NMA vessel codes. 
 
Figure 13.2.1: NMA vessel codes (NMA 2002)  
119 
 
14.8  Appendix: Cargo vessel types with translations. 
14.8.1 Work and service vessels 
Norwegian English 
7A: Slepe/Berging Tugboat/Salvage vessel 
7A1: Slepebåt Tugboat 
7B: Isbryter Icebreaker 
7C: Forskning/Værvarsling/Oppsyn/Seismisk Research/meteorological/supervision/seismic
7C1: Seismisk Seismic 
7C2: Oppsynsskip Supervision vessel 
7C3: Forskningsfartøy Research vessel 
7C4: Patruljefartøy Patrol vessel 
7C5: Hjelpeskip for seismisk fartøy Assistance vessel for seismic vessel. 
7E: Fyr og forsyning Lighthouse/supply 
7E3: Arbeidsbåt for Fyrvesenet Work vessel for Lighthouse Authority 
7E4: Inspeksjonsfartøy Inspection vessel 
7F: Los/Redning/Sjøbrannsprøyte Pilot/Salvage/Fire enginge 
7F1: Los Pilot vessel 
7F2: Redningsfartøy Salvage vessel 
7F3: Sjøbrannsprøyte Fire engine 
7G: Mudderapparat/Sandpumpe Dredger/Sand pump 
7H: Kranfartøy/Flytekran Crane vessel/Floating crane 
7H1: Kranfartøy Crane vessel 
7H2: Flytekran Floating crane 
7K: Andre spesial/Sandblåser/Dykker Other special/sandblaster/diving vessel 
7K3: Sand-/steindumper Sand/rock dumper 
8A: Ekspedisjonsfartøy Expedition vessel 
8B: Kabel Cable vessel 
8F: Opplæring Training vessel 
8F2: Opplæringsfartøy Training vessel 
8G: Bore Drilling vessel 
8I: Oljevern Petroleum security 
8K: Mindre arbeidsbåt Small work vessel 
8K1: Foringsbåt - 
9A: Fartøy som fører 12 eller færre passasjerer Vessel carrying 12 or fewer passengers 
9B: Undervannsfartøy Under water vessel 
9E: Lekter/Pølsetanker Barge/? 
9E1: Lekter Barge 
9F: Flytedokk Floating dock 
9I: Diverse --> ubestemt Various – indeterminate 
9K: Andre flytende konstruksjoner Other floating constructions 
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14.8.2 Offshore service vessels 
Norwegian English 
7D: Forsynings/hjelpeskip for plattformer Offshore supply vessel 
7D1: Forsyningsskip for plattformer Supply vessels 
7D2: Hjelpeskip/Beredskapsfartøy for plattformer Platform assistance/readiness 
 
14.8.3 Wellboats 
Norwegian English 
3H: Brønnfartøy Well boats 
 
14.8.4 Cargo: tank vessels 
Norwegian English 
0A: ---> ubestemt Indeterminate tank vessel 
0B: Animalsk/vegetabilsk olje Animal/vegetable oil 
0C: LNG LNG 
0E: Klor Chlorine 
0F: Tanklekter Tank barge 
0G: Flytende kjemisk/gass Liquid chemical gas 
0H: Tankskip --> ubestemt Indeterminate tanker 
1B: Olje Oil tanker 
1C: LPG LPG 
1D: Kjemikalier Chemicals 
1E: Asfalt Asphalt 
1F: Vin/Vann/Konsentrater Wine/water/concentrates 
1F2: Tankskip for vann Water tanker 
1I: Tankskip --> ubestemt Indeterminate tanker 
1K: Tankskip --> ubestemt Indeterminate tanker 
 
14.8.5 Cargo: Bulk vessels 
Norwegian English 
2A: Stykkgods/Bulk/Container Break bulk/bulk/container
2B: Tank/Malm (O/O) Tank/Ore 
2C: Tank/Bulk (O/B) Tank/Bulk 
2D: Tank/Bulk/Malm (OBO) Tank/Bulk/Ore 
2F: Kjemikalie/Bulk Chemicals/Bulk 
2H: Kjemikalie/Olje Chemicals/Oil 
2K: Kjemikalie/Asfalt Chemicals/Asphalt 
3A: Bulkskip --> ubestemt Indeterminate bulk 
3B: Vanlig bulk Regular bulk 
3C: Treforedlingsprodukter Woodwork vessel 
3D: Bil Car 
3E: Malm Ore 
3F: Sement Cement 
3G: Sand Sand 
3I: Bulkskip --> ubestemt Indeterminate bulk 
3K: Bulkskip --> ubestemt Indeterminate bulk 
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14.8.6 Cargo: Goods  vessels (godsbåter) 
Norwegian English 
4: Stykkgodsskip Break bulk 
4A: Stykkgodsskip --> ubestemt Indeterminate break bulk 
4B. Vanlig stykkgods Regular break bulk 
4C: Fryse- og kjøle Freezing/cooling 
4D: Palle Pall 
4E: Roll-on/Roll-off Roll-on/Roll-off 
4F: Container Container 
4F1: Containerskip Container vessel 
4F2: Semicontainerskip Semi container vessel 
4H: Stykkgodsskip --> ubestemt Indeterminate break bulk 
4I: Spesialbygd bilskip Special car transport vessel
4K: Stykkgodsskip --> ubestemt Indeterminate break bulk 
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14.9 Appendix: Map of Norwegian waters 
 
Figure 13.4.1: Map of  Norwegian territorial waters (Kartverket 2014). 
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